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Abstract 
The study seeks to delineate the African socio-political environment through an analytical 
contextualisation of repetitive authoritative systems, which perpetuate exclusion and the 
formation of politicised identity. Through a process of historical evaluation of African politics 
since the majority of states became independent, the study attempts to test a constructed 
triangular supposition that explains why identity disputation persists at almost every level of 
African governance.  
Bearing in mind the almost natural progression of African politics towards identity contestation, 
the second overriding objective seeks to evaluate the secession of South Sudan as a possible 
preventative model for identity politicised conflict. In this fashion, the study delves into the 
politics of a previously unified Sudan; and the events that led South Sudan to eventually seek 
secession. The primary objective of the study is to evaluate the assumption that territorial 
secession in Africa is able to quell identity contestation and promote an opportunity for 
equitable democratic governance. 
To meet the above objectives, a comprehensive outlay of African socio-politics and governance 
will be utilised to frame the analysis. Firstly, the study seeks to elaborate on the historiography 
of African colonial legacy as providing the foundations of identity exclusive politics on the 
continent. In this way, considerable investigative reverence must be given to the respective 
policies of colonial administration, namely indirect rule and direct rule. The effects of either of 
these policies contend a type of socio-political conditioning of African elites and civil society that 
still persists at time of writing. The concentration of this endeavour will be focused towards 
indirect colonial policy most famously implemented by British colonialism. The effects of the 
British policy of ethnic and ethno-religious categorisation is vitally important to a greater 
understanding of the majority of examples studied in the literature, including the formation of 
identity contestation in the case of the Sudan. 
Secondly, to further understand the complex dynamism of African politics which lead to identity 
based disputation, the study will turn to an analysis of the rhetoric of African independent 
governance and ideology. The primary objective here will be to detail how differing enactments 
of African ideology, including the advent of Pan-Arabism to the case of Sudan, ultimately 
continued the tradition of exclusive citizenship and dominance of some groups over others on 
the continent. This leads the study to uncover the deeper reasons for why socio-political 
exclusion continues to the present day. The final dimension of the triangular process suggests 
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that exclusion has been maintained in Africa to prevent access of subverted groups to 
governance structures and more importantly to the limited resources of African states. 
Finally, the case of the secession of South Sudan is interpreted through the analytical lens of 
politicised identity that forms in the face of inadequate state structures to provide legitimate 
democratic access to the state. The third facet of the proposed theoretical triangle suggests that 
conflict and contestation is a product of grievances expressed from political exclusion. In this 
way, it is pivotal to the study to assess whether secession, as in the case of South Sudan, provides 
a valid alternative platform for suppressing identity contestation and promoting effective 
democratic consolidation. By all accounts, there is overwhelming evidence already to suggest 
that secession may be a successful way to repress identity politicisation. However, there remain 
substantial hurdles for many African states, including a now autonomous South Sudan, in order 
to finally dissolve the enduring problems of socio-political exclusion. Propositions and possible 
solutions will be posited for these states as an ad hoc objective. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Context of research 
The concept of the nation-state in Africa is one that produces a host of differentiating 
perspectives, particularly with regards to its viability as a sustainable inclusive socio-political 
environment. As an extension of the ethnic fragmentation in a post-colonial African society, it 
becomes difficult to envision prospects for civic nationalism within territories that may contain 
many distinct ethnic or ethno-religious identities. A sense of civic nationalism in most cases has 
been tarnished by the declaration of either recognised primordial ethnic bonds; and/or the 
construction of political identity to suit strategic political interests (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 2005; 
Thomson, 2010). Ntahombaye and Nduwayo (2007: 240-241) argue a distinct guideline for the 
formalisation of identity, which is oftentimes resultant of the colonial categorisation attributed 
to the people of Africa. In addition to this claim, the concept of politicised ethnic identity may 
yet remain in a post-colonial Africa, most notably driven by political elites and internalised by 
their subordinate societies (Meredith, 2006). Therefore a cursory glance at the continent over 
approximately the last 60 years portrays discernable patterns of conflict that arise invariably as 
a result of competing groups finding it paramount to their survival to lay claim to a defined 
politicised identity. 
Somewhat surprisingly, considering the fragmentation that plagues many African states, post-
colonial boundaries in Africa have remained mostly intact since the 1950s. With the rare 
exceptions of secessions such as the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia and more recently 
South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, most African examples portray a potentially volatile picture of 
ethnic instability within defined state territories. The most well documented of these leading to 
eventual ethnic cleansing in territories such as modern day Rwanda; or the displacement of 
large groups from countries such as Uganda during times of severe political upheaval.1 
The recognition of political identity and ethnic diversity at intra-state level have largely been 
ignored or suppressed through strategic violence; or in areas where slightly better cooperation 
was achieved, the implementation of federalist principles to state governance. In the case of the 
latter, the primary field of study in Africa is perhaps contained in the methods of governance 
employed by Nigeria since independence. Advocates of federalism such as Jinadu (2007: 26-27), 
suggest that the autonomy achieved in decentralisation of state power, whereby ethnic groups 
                                                          
1
 Further discussion of states such as Rwanda and Uganda are contained in the literature review. 
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are given more jurisdiction of their specific homelands, can be a successful tool to dilute the 
absolutist power of the more common unitary state. 
However, in the case of Nigerian federalism, it is often lamented that the political categorisation 
of identity defined provincial territories merely increases the potential for conflict laden 
disputes over resource allocation. Lewis (2003: 136) suggests that the acquisition of power 
through ethnically divisive electoral methods dominance, may serve only to politicise identity 
conflict over borders and land ownership. In Nigeria’s situation, the access to resource revenue 
derived from oil in the Niger Delta has been the most prevalent bone of contention.2 These 
disputes further display the severity of competition for resources when group identity is 
politicised. Due to the infeasibility expressed in the example above, federalism has accrued few 
plaudits since Africa’s independence from colonialism. 
This study proposes a detailed exhibition and discussion of the viability of an ethnically 
fragmented nation-state in 21st century Africa. With a preceding evaluation of the volatility of 
ethnic diversification in mind, the case study of the recent secession of South Sudan will be 
offered to examine the prospects and feasibility of good governance thereafter. Incorporative of 
this discussion, the study will display theory and examples pertaining disputes of identity in the 
past and how they may or may not have been settled.  
A large portion of the study will be dedicated to the contemporary debate surrounding the much 
disputed territories of Sudan and South Sudan situated in north-east Africa. After discussing a 
variety of examples of disputed political identity in Africa, the case study will examine whether 
or not vastly different groups can successfully share a single state territory or if secession, as in 
the formation of South Sudan, may afford the latter state the opportunity for more durable and 
robust governance as an autonomous state. 
To contextualise, the study will explore the possible explanations for what limits the success of 
governance and society in Africa. Oftentimes, the Western world acts as a benchmark for 
seeking the right methods for developmental models in Africa, where theorists propose 
constitutionally defined tolerance and respect for others in ethnically heterogeneous societies 
(Heywood, 2007; Kymlicka, 2009). However, in cases of deep-seated diversity with sometimes 
only marginal demographic statistics portraying majorities and minorities, there is more to 
                                                          
2
  Regardless of a more decentralised system, conflict attributed to resource distribution in Nigeria is often 
expressed by an ethnic group that may feel excluded by decisions at the executive or federal level. Often it is 
perceived that presidents show favouritism towards members of their own ethnic denomination (Akpan, 2007).  
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consider than fulfilling a criteria of majoritarism, coupled with the minimum necessary concern 
for upholding a handful of minority rights. Claude Ake (1993: 239) frequently acknowledged 
that the African state has continually suffered ignorance of the differences between the 
productions of a Westernised conception of democracy when transplanted into the African 
situational construct. Ake (1993: 239) states further that having not paid attention to the 
inherently different formation of African societies, this has resulted in manipulative leadership 
with ethnic identity a tool for exclusion; the case of resulting scattered or under-developed areas 
within states as prevalent amongst a vast array of other mal-administration. 
From the brief explanation offered thus far it is possible to suggest that Africa is shrouded in 
long-standing struggles for group identity and rights within most state territories. By using a 
historical perspective and past theoretical propositions the study will attempt to place the 
African identity conundrum into context. As displayed briefly within this section, the foundation 
of this study will encompass an exploration of primordial and constructed ethnic identity under 
the constraints of colonial society (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 2005). It then becomes necessary to 
evaluate how political identity is utilised as a tool for creating disputes around exclusive 
citizenship rights; and to what extent resulting socio-economic goals are achieved by identity 
driven strategies.  
Secondly, bearing in mind these specific tendencies of African states in the manipulation of 
identity, the dissertation seeks to examine alternative methods in governance to secure more 
equitable democratic gains. In this regard it will be pertinent to discuss whether 
multiculturalism and unified state nationalism policies can be successful; and in the case of the 
newly formed South Sudan, whether secession could be seen as a viable solution when 
evaluating challenges and potential policy solutions for Africa’s youngest state. 
Motivation for research 
The primary motivation for this evaluation is to ascertain what method(s) may be best to 
stabilise an identity dominated political atmosphere in Africa in an attempt to create more 
sustainable governance. In light of this, the research explores concepts such multiculturalism 
and the outcome of methods as drastic as secession to placate long-standing identity conflicts 
that trouble the African continent. Of primary importance to the evaluation, a case study of the 
secession of South Sudan from Sudan is presented by looking at the colonial and post-colonial 
factors leading to the search for independence by the latter. By natural recourse, it will also be 
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pivotal to the dissertation to discuss what objectives must be secured to promote successful 
democracy in Africa’s youngest state. 
Research question 
Taking into account ethno-religious disputes, exclusive citizenship and politicised claims 
towards resource distribution, can secession be considered a successful means to settle deep-
seated identity related disputes in Africa? 
Research aims and objectives 
Detailing the aims and objectives of the dissertation will be a two-fold process. Firstly, the study 
will look to acclimatise the reader towards the primary attributes of the African socio-political 
construct. To achieve this goal, an extensive evaluation of the preceding colonial period will 
serve as necessary foundation. Furthermore, when looking at colonial and post-colonial state 
practice it will be essential to contrast examples of African experiences of ethnicity, nationalism, 
citizenship rights and socio-economic policy creation against the traditional definitions of the 
aforementioned concepts. Investigating unproductive realisations of these particular concepts 
that have invariably lead to dispute, conflict and eventual civil war in many cases, it will be 
pivotal to the study to exhibit what set of circumstances are responsible for political instability 
when identity is brought to the table. 
Secondly, it would not be viable to speak of the abovementioned dilemmas of African 
governance and society without proposing remedies that may abate tensions in the African 
context. The objective here will be to explore different ideologies and regime types that have 
shaped the African political arena; the prospects of multiculturalism and constitutionalism for 
strengthening state-nationalism; and in the case of South Sudan, if secession to create a 
formalised self-determination may be the best way to settle identity related disputes.  
Rationale for the study 
An extensive review of existing literature is essential for the purposes of this evaluative study. 
Theoretical concepts to be evaluated include nationalism in ethnic and civic capacities; political 
identity; ethnicity; religious fundamentalism (pertaining especially to Islamic formats of 
governance); African ideology and governance; multiculturalism; and formation of new 
sovereign entities through secession. These concepts will be further analysed from historical 
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perspectives surrounding colonial heritage; post-colonialism; tribalism; conflict; a history of 
exclusive citizenship; and disputes of economic resource distribution. 
Theoretically, some of the most important concepts to be dealt with are that of nationalism and 
ethnicity and how their almost mythical importance contributes to conflict between groups 
within a given territory. Nationalism as displayed by Özkirimli (2005: 13) makes reference to the 
Latin root of natio meaning “something born” denoting that people are bonded together by the 
similar circumstance of their birth. This however, could be gauged a vague comprehension when 
noting the exclusivity it implies to achieve a sense of belongingness. It could be suggested that it 
does not account for those who may have at a time been foreign to a land they call home at 
present day. 
Pre-modern descriptions of nationalism and formation of identity that tend to denote a 
primordial character do not help the African call for a more civic description of state 
nationalism. Apter (1977: 300) confirms primordial attachments as a deep emotional sentiment 
which produces loyalty within defined groups on the basis of shared race, language, religion and 
ethnic affiliation. In addition, he adds that the democratic representative model is oftentimes 
placed under considerable pressure by the rhetoric of primordial attachments and affiliations; 
and suggested that the main objective should have been to prevent separatist notions from 
forming by converting interests into working partnerships (Apter, 1977: 300). Contrasting David 
Apter’s description of primordialism with prevailing sentiments from African intellectuals that 
political identity was constructed during the colonial period, creates a volatile atmosphere for 
the discussion of many competing ethnicities. Mamdani (2005: 2-3) promotes the rationale that 
identity itself was a colonial construct that was maintained in the post-colonial era to ensure the 
status quo of dominance remained uninterrupted. The resultant controversial debates that 
Mamdani’s statements posit will be consulted throughout the literature. 
The brief existence of the unrecognised Biafra state, attempting secession from Nigeria in 1967, 
forms one such discussion of perceived ancestral rights to territory, which tend to strain the 
concept of the patriotic nation-state in Africa. Meredith (2006: 203) writes of the declaration of 
an Ibo-ruled state in the south-east region of the country. Lead by Nigerian military elite, Emeka 
Ojukwa, who placed great emphasis on secession along with fervent Ibo nationalists to create 
formalised state structures. So confident were Ibo under Ojukwa in the prospects of self-
determination that in the short time span of a year preceding their illegally deemed declaration 
of independence, they were able to cut most economic ties with the Muslim-controlled Nigerian 
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central government of the north; take control of administrative areas such as schooling and 
transportation; and were even able to train and produce their own military. Importantly, during 
this short period it should also be noted that many minorities were cast from the region as not 
fitting a predetermined ethnic profile. As the case of the unrecognised Biafra suggests, migration 
is not the only issue at play when considering the vast array of groups that may exist in a 
particular region, but also the reactions by majorities of a particular region to what they feel 
should be exclusively their territory. 
The example above provides a suitable exhibition of the formation of sub-national tendencies 
and identity politicisation that is counterproductive against the ideals of the nation-state.  These 
competing viewpoints are that of (inclusive) civic nationalism and (exclusive) ethnic 
nationalism. Heywood (2007: 150) asserts that a concept of civic nationalism is an ideal with 
regards to the interactions of many different perceived cultures within one territory, in that it 
emphasises constructed bonds of citizenship as the most important facet holding broader 
society together. Apter (1977: 301) proposes that pluralist formations of society that may be able 
to steer away from the recognition of differences to a more holistic view under the state will be 
able to produce a more productive society. This civic nationalist ideal, implemented successfully 
in many liberal democracies elsewhere in the world, presupposes unity under a common 
national goal without subverting the rights of any ethnic or ethno-religious group in the process. 
Ethnic nationalism on the other hand, derived from the concept of ethnicity focuses on 
primordial bonds between people as directing group identity. Based on the earlier example of 
the Ibo people of, it is feasible to consider the formation of this groups with some format of 
primordialism at play. Heywood (2007: 150-151), further contends that primordial fascinations 
have a strong belief investment in the potential of people to see themselves as fashioned of deep-
rooted psychology, culture and biology. What has been thus far impossible to ascertain, in 
accordance with the African situation, is to what extent a conscious emphasis on the primordial 
ties is envisioned in the creation of political identity? Studies conducted by researchers such as 
Ekeh (1975, 106-108), claim that primordialism in Africa provides the haven in which a deeper 
sense of identity is found within separate ethnic groups. Where primordial attachment tries to 
emphasise spiritual, emotional and biological bonds as the criteria for belongingness, studies 
such as Ekeh’s have suggested that loyalty and solidarity becomes impossible to achieve between 
different groups as a result of these strict criteria. As displayed above, the legitimacy of 
primordial bonds across multiple situations deserve evaluation, even though these bonds are 
often left unexplored due to the impossibility of quantifying their emotive nature. 
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The theory of primordialism, however, has many opponents. To uncover the theoretical 
dimension further, analysing the design of separate ethnic nationalism in Africa, Joel Samoff 
states that, “[...] all people have multiple identities- which identity is salient depends on the 
situation” (Samoff in Chazan Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman, 1999: 107). This 
introduces adequately the foundation for the concept that strategic construction may be 
involved in the conception of identity.  The insinuation in the above quote and work to follow 
requires the analytical eye to perhaps divorce itself from the mysticism of primordial 
undercurrents, to entertain what is oftentimes a strategic tangible and materialist goal attached 
to the recognition of identity. That in its raison d’être, the concept of identity can act as a 
construct to achieve goals of autonomy, acquisition of territory and the desire for a portion of a 
defined resource pie.  
For the statement above to attain any sense of validity, one needs to delve deeper into the 
concentration and volatility of ethnicities to gravitate towards conflict, especially when 
confronted with the perplexity of their existence and heritage since independence from colonial 
rule in the 1950’s. Many find conflict the most applicable tool to gauge the fervent nature to 
which ethnic bonds are maintained. Conflict denotes that realised ethnic bonds must be strong, 
ingrained and even institutionalised in some format that would spur civilians to kill or be killed 
in aid of achieving defined objectives. The Rwandan case of prolonged ethnic conflict and 
subsequent genocide in 1994 provides an effective example to exhibit a breakdown of a civic 
sense of nationalism, or potentially where it had never been promoted or respected in the first 
place. As a disclaimer, it is naive to suggest that even though Rwanda and the study’s focus 
region of Sudan are found in relatively close vicinity to each other geographically, one needs to 
give each separate conflict the respect of its very unique subtleties and not attempt to classify 
each ethnic dispute as exactly the same as the next. In terms of the consequences of a set course 
of actions, it is however possible to fashion a few similarities between differing African identity 
disputes. 
The Rwandan case from a historical perspective, outlines two competing groups within a single 
territory, the Hutu and Tutsi people, of which since decolonisation have contested dominance 
over each other politically, to be the most dominant ethnic classification in Rwanda. 
Traditionally the Tutsi had been favoured by the former Belgian colonial regime, even though 
they were a perceived minority in comparison to the Hutu demographic. A post-colonial 
Rwanda was relatively stable until the late 1980’s showing good economic growth figures and 
thriving agricultural and tourism sectors. Yet bubbling under the surface was the long standing 
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ethnic rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsis. The Hutu directed governance of the period was of 
the opinion that the Tutsi minority had invaded Rwanda and because they had been favoured by 
the Belgian colonial powers, had helped to enslave the Hutu people during the colonial period. 
This was used as a psychological tool for Hutus leaders to promote the Hutu people as the only 
true indigenous people of the land (Meredith, 2006: 487).  For further elaboration of the 
complexities of the Rwandan conflict, it is pertinent to discuss the constructed ethnic categories 
used by the Belgian coloniser, how the Tutsi were favoured over the Hutu. This would lay the 
foundations for the resentment which fuelled the genocide in 1994. Ethnic categorisation which 
led to the brutal ethnic cleansing of Tutsis will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
In Burundi’s case, what has often blighted the concept of unified statehood has largely been 
attributed to the manipulation of ethnicity as a tool secure gains. Okwudiba (1989:2) states that, 
“[...] ethnicity can change its form, place or role in society during the existence of that given 
society”. The intimation here is that certain levels of manipulation through a process to evolve 
makes ethnicity a very difficult concept to accredit a blind legitimacy if you will. Ntahombaye 
and Nduwayo (2007: 242-243) add deliberation by introducing the concept of “Stakeholders” as 
the chief manipulators in the development of political identity. In the case of Burundi, the 
authors are able to categorise a pre-colonial hierarchy of the dominant Baganwa group 
overseeing the Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa ethnic denominations. They describe the formalised 
language of Kirundi spoken by almost all inhabitants and the belief of a king “Mwami” who is 
attributed this position, in the traditional monarchical fashion, as an act of their god. 
Nduwayo and Ntahombaye (2007: 244-246) describe that today’s current identities in Burundi, 
similarly to Mamdani’s exposition of Rwanda, exist as a result of manipulation of the initial 
structure of Burundi society by colonial restrictions, which was ultimately carried over by post-
colonial government. The accusation contained herein is that political elites may utilise identity 
as a tool to create “[...] a fear of the ‘other’, fabrications of perceptions, clichés and stereotypes” 
(Nduwayo and Ntahombaye, 2007: 244-246). The declaration that Bahutu and Batutsi had once 
inter-married, exchanged gifts and shared in the consumption of local beer amongst other social 
integration, suggests evidence of a preceding time where identity was not primarily conceived as 
a means to politicise claims of dominance. Continuing the rationale of identity formation in 
Burundi, Chretién and Mukuri (2002: 73), describe again drawing similarities with Rwanda, the 
use of colonial favouritism to give master status to Batutsi and make them accountable as 
supervisors and officers over Bahutu serf-orientated labour. The Batutsis also maintained 
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exclusivity over chieftaincy positions offered by the coloniser; and in a post-independent society 
these institutionalised formats of dominance were merely carried over.  
Analysis of the existing theoretical and practical rhetoric in this study uncovers a particular 
pattern where politicised identity is used either to perpetuate dominance or resist subjugation in 
the face of dominance. Derived from the tendency of ethnic groups to form separate political 
identities and use them as a means to destabilise or challenge the state for the recognition of 
certain rights, the study offers a theoretical triangle with which to evaluate the socio-political 
construct in Africa: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1.1. Theoretical triangle explaining the formation of politicised identity in Africa. Constructed 
from: (Ekeh, 1975; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Mamdani, 2005; Ntahombaye and Nduwayo, 2007; 
Haynes, 2007) 
For now, the study posits an assumption that there exists a predictive rationale behind the need 
to bolster ethnic political identities in Africa. To condense, one can say that the mysticism of 
primordial attitudes is punted toward civil society by elites to cultivate an aura of difference 
between competing groups. Through independence, conflict or electoral victory, elites in power 
propose policy to play ethnicities off against each other, the implication that the ethnic group in 
power may rightfully claim the lion’s share of rights and access to resources. The way this 
triangulation occurs in a repetitive or renewing process, is that those groups left alienated by the 
political order of the day tend to re-affirm their identities in opposition to the governance status 
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quo. This study aims to test this triangulation, drawing from diverse African experiences, but 
focussing on the applicability of this theory to the case study of Sudan and the eventual 
secession of South Sudan.  
The case of Sudan, the aspects of identity conflict as precipitating a breakdown in the possibility 
of a successful nation-state, is not greatly dissimilar from the preconditions displayed in the case 
of Rwanda. The contemporary analysis of Sudan is different in that religious fundamentalism 
instead of ethnicity is propagated as the primary tool of dominance in the region. Haynes (2007: 
305) contends that civil war in Africa can best be described by economic disputes coupled with a 
deep seated cultural, religious and ethnic diversity in society. The study uses the theoretical 
constraints uncovered in the literature on politicised identity in Africa, ultimately to analyse 
whether Sudan and South Sudan followed the same progression until the secession of the latter 
was achieved. Systematically looking at the progression of Sudan during the colonial era, post-
colonial independence and eventual split into two separate nation-states, a further objective will 
be to examine to what extent political identity has become intertwined with economic interest.  
Secondly, in successful multicultural environments, an aura of acceptance and tolerance 
surrounds the recognition of different groups. Kymlicka (2009: 61) stresses that the formulation 
of society in the modern era devoid of minorities and the potential for an ethnically homogenous 
society is now impossible. Development in this field suggests that liberal multiculturalism 
prompts states to think outside of the normative values and rights of civil society; and that it is 
able to provide for, “group specific rights or policies that are intended to recognise and 
accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethno-cultural groups” (Kymlicka, 
2009: 61). This substantive requirement, on the basis of the exposition of examples thus far, has 
not been met in most African countries. In analysing of the history of Sudan and formation of 
South Sudan, challenging the traditional fascination with dominance of groups over others, the 
study seeks to rationalise ways for a more inclusive society. This objective could be seen as 
particularly important to the development of South Sudan. 
In Sudan, historically, ethno-religious violence, oppression and assimilation tactics were 
commonplace in multiple Khartoum governments since independence from Britain. These 
policies were termed largely as the main contributor to the North-South conflict over the course 
of the last 60 years. Essentially, although with a few more refined policy measures, the case of 
Sudan is not vastly different from that of Rwanda and Burundi amongst other examples 
introduced earlier. 
 
18 
 
Sharkey (2008: 21) discusses the possibility of “Arabisation” of the country by the controlling 
powers of the state. The implementation of a top-down Islamic cultural assimilation programme 
over the years to proceed decolonisation in the 1950’s known as ta’rib, ultimately failed on 
numerous occasions in its attempts to centralise people under a religiously homogenous state 
prescribed identity. The process entailed the implementation of Arabisation as state policy post-
independence, making Arabic the primary language of the land. At independence in 1956, 
statistical representations of the demographic through census placed roughly 3.98 of the 10.2 
million (38.8 per cent) recognised citizens of the land as ethnically Arab. Further results claimed 
that 51.4 per cent of the overall population spoke Arabic to some extent (Sharkey, 2008: 23). 
The Khartoum government felt these results provided the legitimacy to continue with 
assimilation even though the Arab majority expressed was evidently not conducive to making 
Arabic the only official language of the country.  
Furthermore, unification and the attempt at denying ethnic legitimacy to the South were 
promoted for decades by the constant implementation of Arabic education in Southern schools 
(Sharkey, 2008: 34). The response to these programmes seemed to spur on retaliation against 
the Khartoum government as more people in the South turned disobediently towards practicing 
Christianity in an attempt to discourage the absolutism of the state. Attempted suppression and 
domination by ruling governments over ethnic groups are commonplace in the African context. 
In Sudan, the enduring ethno-religious domination of the Muslim-led Khartoum government in 
the north over the Christians in the south provides yet another example to potentially tie to the 
theoretical triangle of African socio-politics expressed above. In this instance, the retaliation of 
people in what is recognised today as South Sudan, displays adequately how attempts at 
dissolving identity through suppressive means tends to motivate groups even further in the 
seeking of rights recognition. The response by Southern intellectuals and rebellious movements 
such as John Garang’s Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) will be 
expanded upon in the chapters to follow. 
The reinforcement of political identity discussed in the theoretical triangulation provided earlier 
assumes that political exclusion or oppression eventually drives groups to seek greater self-
determination. In 2005’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), South Sudanese political 
elites sought the opportunity to demand greater autonomy from Omar Al Bashir’s National 
Congress Party (NCP). In the CPA, mention was made of formal power sharing, proposing a 
government of national unity that would ultimately allow the right to unbiased education, 
freedom of religious association amongst the general right to freedom of speech and a host of 
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formal political and civil liberties (CPA, 2005: 12-17). In addition, it prescribed formal state 
structures including elected judicial, executive and legislative branches as well as a refined 
constitution (CPA, 2005: 19-20). In the midst of civil war, these appropriations seemed fair on 
the part of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), considering the decades of 
oppressive authoritarian governance that had preceded the agreement. However, the call for 
greater autonomy through political rights recognition and constitutional reform were largely 
ignored by Sudan’s incumbent, Omar al Bashir, who continued to personalise state power and 
decision-making within Khartoum. 
By 2011, according to leading political and civil liberty monitor Freedom House (2011), Sudan 
was seen as one of the most political and socially restrained states in the world. Under the 
conditions prescribed by successful modern states, Sudan had failed to meet the requirements 
necessary to uphold a credible system in both governance and social life. Freedom House (2011), 
reported that on a numerical scale of 1 to 7 with “1” indicating complete freedom, Sudan scored 7 
on both political liberty and civil liberty scales, mostly due to the large portions of society 
oppressed by government policies mentioned earlier.  The April 2010 elections were deemed 
unfit by international overseers, as it was accused that Omar al Bashir’s corrupt NCP paid off 
many parties to stand down in the electoral race amongst a host of other indiscretions. Freedom 
of the press is very heavily restricted by the Khartoum government in the North; and even 
though the proposed Islamic implementation of Sharia law had failed in the South, non-
Muslims in the north of the country still faced unrelenting discrimination (Freedom House, 
2011). 
Though, to say that disputes between ethno-religious groups is restricted only to the socio-
political arena, would  be to ignore the relationship between resource distribution and the 
instability it creates between competing ethnicities. Noting the tendency of socio-economic 
policy favouritism implemented by the dominating political structure, results often show 
economic exclusion of certain groups. Sudan acted as no exception in the disputes between 
separate political identities and their perceived legitimate or illegitimate claims to the 
entitlements of resource distribution. One of the primary grievances in Sudan before the 
secession of South Sudan was largely centred on the NCP government’s control of most revenue 
derived from the oil fields in the south of Sudan. The section below will expand on what political 
implications were derived from this economic exclusion. 
The theory of political identity recognition as attached predominantly to economic interest is a 
model argued fervently by Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 3), as they proposed that common 
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economic interest nurtured by a minority may be constructed to serve a purpose as radical as 
political secession, that communities may invent themselves further when the results of such an 
endeavour may prove economically fruitful.  Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 5) promote that the 
discovery of natural resources specifically may speed up the process of identity reaffirmation 
within a given territory because natural resources are purported as wealth in mere ownership 
without necessarily having to put in any direct effort to acquire the revenue thereof.  In other 
words, in their study they attribute it quite bluntly to winning an economic lottery. Of course the 
next logical step is to secure the natural resource for the disposal of the most concentrated group 
possible, hence claiming exclusive ancestry to the territorial area concerned. Haynes (2007: 315) 
confirms that since Sudan became a major oil exporter at the turn of the millennium, the 
political situation had become even more volatile. The politically precarious situation is centred 
on the fact that the majority of the oil is sourced in the non-Arab now independent South Sudan. 
However, as South Sudan is a landlocked nation, the oil can only be exported through the ports 
controlled by the Arab North of the country. Settlement of these and other disputes between the 
north and south formed the guidelines for the production of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005.  
 To show the potential economically strategic modus operandi of the SPLM during the peace 
negotiations, the CPA made well defined reference to how wealth should be shared between the 
National Government (NG) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The CPA proposed 
that the wealth of Sudan be shared equitably between each level of government so it may be able 
to carry out all constitutional duties; that numerous parts of excluded territories in Southern 
Sudan would need funds for infrastructural development so as to carry out basic governance 
functions; that territories in Southern Sudan should not be prejudiced against; and areas in 
need of post-conflict reconstruction be raised to the same level of socio-economic and public 
services as the Northern States (CPA, 2005: 47). What these instances detail was a proposed 
correction of the exclusive mechanisms of state distribution by the Khartoum government 
before 2005.  Whether or not the main reason for the production of the CPA and secession 
referendum was purely used as a means to annex oil for South Sudan will be discussed later in 
the study. 
One particular occurrence that has caused difficulty in the case of South Sudan relates to the 
remnants of disputed territories that remain after secession. At present a host of areas along the 
South Sudan northern border and Sudan southern border are immersed in on-going conflicts 
However, the study looks more closely at the potentially the two most contentious disputes of 
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the Abyei region and Nuba Mountains. Abyei, is a resource rich state situated between Sudan 
and South Sudan. It has been steeped in contestation for ownership since the referendum to 
secede was proposed by South Sudan. The CPA (2005; 65) recognised Abyei as a bridge between 
the north and south linking the people of a once united Sudan. In light of this, Abyei was 
accorded special administrative status and a referendum was proposed to settle its placement 
and demarcation by the proposed secession South Sudan in July 2011. Whilst the Abyei region is 
claimed by South Sudan, due to amount of Ngok Dinka (considered a southern ethnic group) 
who reside in the area, it is also similarly claimed by Sudan due to portions of Arab Misseriya 
nomads who sporadically inhabit the area (Johnson, 2007: 2). At present, the area of Abyei 
remains unsettled as Sudan continues to promote the Misseriya nomads as traditional 
inhabitants of the region. South Sudan had attempted in the past to exclude the Misseriya from 
referendum undertakings due to their nomadic status and tendency to migrate out of the area. A 
2013 referendum was rejected by Sudan in October 2012 in favour of their new proposal to 
partition the Abyei state between themselves and South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2012(a)). 
Needless to say, proposals by either side have been rejected by the opposing counterparts and 
the Abyei region remains deadlocked. Abyei and other contested areas are scrutinised in further 
detail in chapter five. 
Many states around the world currently grapple with trying to successfully accommodate socio-
cultural or multinational diversity at an intra-state level through greater federal principles 
(Stepan, Linz and Yadav, 2010:51). Comparatively, the Abyei region posits a different 
conundrum to territorial contestation than common examples such as the Quebec region of 
Canada. There is no seeking of greater autonomy for one particular group, but rather numerous 
ethnicities caught up in a demarcation stalemate between two existing states. By looking at the 
Abyei conflict in more detail, the study also seeks to determine potential solutions to diffuse the 
current conflict. This encloses an overriding objective of this study, which is to propose methods 
for the management of political identity to sustain successful governance in Africa. Whether or 
not this may most successfully be determined through secession prompts an analysis of the 
establishment of South Sudan. The study also seeks to analyse the viability of secession by 
making a few policy prescriptions that may assist in the democratic consolidation and 
promotion of good governance in South Sudan in the near future. 
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Research Design 
Methodology, theory and approach 
Qualitative methodology perhaps provides a more suitable atmosphere for analysis to occur 
more meaningfully within the context of identity politics.  According to Kothari (2008: 5) 
qualitative assessment is best utilised in the collection of information pertaining subjective 
attitudes, opinions and behaviour. As it is felt that none of the fields mentioned can be 
quantified adequately by survey method, a basis for deeper interpretation will be discussed 
below. As the topic deals with potentially sensitive and emotive subject matter, conducting 
surveys may be detrimental to the process of attaining feasible results. Identity, whether seen as 
a distinct racial classification, religious preference and perceived ethnic loyalties, further 
coupled with historically bolstered attitudes, is in the opinion of the researcher indeterminable if 
a feeling is asked to be measured to a quantifiable scale. 
In essence a qualitative approach should give greater in depth validity to the socio-political 
subject matter promoted in the bulk of the study. Data collection will need to be directed from 
the results of relations between competing groups, the analytical rhetoric produced thereof and 
the interpretation of political statements and policy implementations by incumbent regimes. 
Dealing with sentiments of political identity, it is supposed that it is not characterised only as a 
political condition but taps into psychological and sociological spheres as well. It is agreeable 
then to note that qualitative research has one of its most commanding foundations in 
interpretivism (Sarantakos, 2005: 39).  The key to generating meaning is based on the subtleties 
of how situations may be interpreted. As a framework for conducting research, interpretivism 
primarily looks for “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social 
world” (Crotty in Sarantakos, 2005: 40). If one contrasts this philosophical approach to the 
literature in the study, the importance displays even greater credence. On this basis of 
interpretivism, the piece will be able to analyse aspects such as the colonial categorisation of 
peoples in Africa and the extensions of formulated ideas of identity in the post-colonial realm. 
Additionally, tangible conceptions of ethnic versus civic nationalism; and the mysticism 
surrounding prolonged primordial attitudes expressed in approximately 60 years of 
independence in African comprise a few of the issues to be studied.  
The concept of emergent design is a particular component of qualitative methodology that has 
drawn the study to this method of enquiry. Qualitative design foundationally recognises that 
when entering into a study, the full details are never known or cannot even be assumed. Within 
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any phase of the process initial questions and assumptions may need revision or may need to be 
entirely reconstructed (Creswell, 2009: 176). One can suggest that with an emergent design, the 
researcher enters into the process of learning about a problem or existing issue. As an example 
of this, at this moment the study operates only under the presupposition of why a civic sense of 
nationalism has been lost to the African nation-state since independence from colonial rule.  
Cresswell (2009: 176) further discusses that qualitative design finds its strength in construction 
of analysis through pre-existing theoretical lenses and the practical interpretation that follows 
this method. The study utilises theory as the tools with which to measure the attitudes expressed 
in the collected documentation. In light of this, through theoretical lenses we look at normative 
expressions of concepts of good governance, nationalism holistically expressed as ideology and 
issues pertaining exclusive citizenship to name a few of the most disputed issues.  
With a philosophical detailing of the necessity for the research to be modelled qualitatively, it is 
desirable to expand upon the types of qualitative methodologies that may be utilised. As was 
alluded to, the procession of the research is envisioned as a dual faceted process. The first task 
entails an evaluative study of the African socio-political atmosphere, exhibiting how it is steeped 
in a long historical tradition of identity disputes with regards to governance. Secondly, a case 
study of Sudan and the recently seceded South Sudan will be analysed to determine the latter’s 
conduciveness towards good governance under its newfound political autonomy. The objective 
of the case study is to note a contrast or if any changes in the performance of governance occur 
in a post secession environment. 
As a result of the vastness that the study undertakes, by looking at multiple African states before 
engaging the case study, there are obvious limits to the opportunity to choose from a host of 
interactive or participatory methods such as interviewing processes. In light of the fact that 
entire political societies will be evaluated as a whole, the study proposes unobtrusive methods of 
research as the most viable means to study the complex political landscape in Africa. 
Unobtrusive research posits the best format with which to conduct research under these 
particular constraints. According to Babbie (2010: 332), the process of unobtrusive research has 
become somewhat re-popularised in a host of social science studies. Its primary premise is built 
on the collection and deeper investigation of existing data within a specific field. To this accord, 
noting the amount of pre-existing literature on identity politics and the history thereof in Africa, 
it is not difficult to see why unobtrusive methodology provides an attractive basis.  
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To necessitate the usage of unobtrusive measures, according to Baker (2008: 904), is to allow 
for the use of multiple methods in order to uncover a more accurate and comprehensive 
exhibition of the subject matter being investigated. To this extent, unobtrusive approaches 
provide a wealth of different materials that can be utilised to give the results of the study a 
strong sense of validity. The primary focus is on engagement with print materials. A study in this 
tradition uses archival documentation, diaries, letters, newspapers, historical pamphlets, 
government documents and census data that comprise only a few of the materials available 
(Baker 2008: 904-905). To have many of these particular resources at one’s disposal can 
certainly contribute to the production of a strong evaluative study in terms of the amount of 
contrast on offer.  
Furthermore, it is intriguing to note that unobtrusive methods of data collection offer one 
particular advantage that is absent in interactive participant methods. Importantly, this factor is 
the elimination of subjective individual bias (Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee, 2006: 135). Using 
existing documentation then gives the researcher the opportunity to avoid obscure personal 
accounts that may be inflated, or to avoid the tendencies of participants to lie or exclude vital 
information. An extra consideration to note is that not all bias is ruled out by the process of 
unobtrusive measures. As Bless et al. (2006: 135-136) state further, bias may occur as a result of 
reports or accounts having been written from a particular institutionally biased perspective, or 
that a report may have been commissioned by an incumbent government to display a regime in 
a positive light. Taking note of these potential credibility reducers, extra precaution must be 
ensured in the research collecting process by contrasting information across different sources. 
In terms of unobtrusive research, Babbie (2010: 332) outlines three common methods that may 
be utilised: content analysis; analysis of statistics; and historical/comparative research. To this 
particular study the method that appeals the most is historical/comparative research. To 
understand the suitability of historical/comparative research as a method of analytical approach 
requires a short suitable working definition. Historical/comparative research; historical 
research; and historiography are terms that will be used interchangeably as they denote the 
same method in this context. Historical research is an all-encompassing process in evaluating 
past events as a means to enhance knowledge of present occurrences (Lundy, 2008: 395). In the 
evaluation of African ethno-religious identities during colonialism and post-independence, 
many accounts have claimed historical factors to have shaped the way identities are socialised in 
Africa’s present day governance. Lundy (2008: 396) further defines historiography as a process 
that: 
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[...] goes beyond data gathering to analyze and develop theoretical and historical 
conclusions about historical events and periods. It includes a critical examination that 
focuses on the narrative, interpretation, and use of reliable evidence that supports the 
study conclusions. 
From this description, historical research presents a medium of intensive revision of 
occurrences, the contrasting of different situations and the development of patterns after 
interpretation. As described in the literature review, there is no shortage of examples with which 
to analyse disputed identity in Africa noting from the majority of the states discussed that many 
disputes are rooted in the progression of the political society through an extensive timeframe. 
Further descriptions present historical analysis as a notably conducive method for political 
scientists, sociologists and other social scientists. Babbie (2004: 332) solidifies this notion by 
suggesting that researchers seek to trace the development of social forms over time, all the while 
judging those developmental processes across cultures. Similarly, Esterberg (2002: 128) also 
contends that history is not merely the recording of events. Its greater meaning is contained in 
how “we need to identify what assumptions we can make about how people live, what are the 
meanings of things in particular times and places, and how the past impinges on the present”. It 
is clear then that historical evaluation is paramount to the formation knowledge about how 
socio-political circumstances came to exist in a certain way. An historical evaluation is certainly 
called for in determining why a sense of nation-state has been hard to implement on the African 
continent.  
Discourse analysis was the second method that was consulted in the writing of this piece, 
particularly with regards to the case study of the formation of South Sudan. Discourse analysis 
forms a pivotal undertaking in the understanding of socio-cultural phenomena, in the case of 
this thesis it will be used specifically in the language used to construct political identity. Van Dijk 
(cited in Greener, 2011: 164) defines discourse analysis as referring to ‘text in context’. It has a 
specific resonance with the essence of language that is used to construct social environments or 
norms. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011: 238) further articulate that discourse analysis, 
[…] is a strategy employed when one is concerned with the social meanings with language 
and discursive practices. [In the Foucault tradition] discourses are practices that are 
composed of ideas, ideologies and referents that systematically construct both the 
subjects and objects of which they speak. Researchers can investigate how the dominant 
discourse is produced, how it is disseminated, what it excludes, how some knowledge 
becomes subjugated, and so forth. 
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Thus discourse analysis can be applied in multiple different ways with regards to the subject 
matter of this piece. For instance, one must analyses the thematic intent of traditional 
discourses of post-colonial African governance, the rhetoric used in construction and 
perpetuation of political identities. In the case of South Sudan, the study also looks at some of 
the language concerning oppression and subjugation used by South Sudanese intellectuals, 
amongst them their great inspirational leader Dr. John Garang. The following section will briefly 
explain some of the methods and techniques that may be used in both historiography and 
discourse analysis approaches. 
Method and techniques 
As the study proposes an extensive literature analysis, the primary methods used for the study 
will be based around the analysis of existing concepts, historical accounts and existing research 
conducted in the fields of political identity, ethnicity and citizenship within the political 
territories outlined in the first section. The interpretation of the research has been proposed 
over the two broad methodologies of historiography and discourse analysis. 
Gerhardt (2004: 5) recognises techniques to qualitative data on six different levels namely: 
archival records, direct observation, documents, interviews, participation observation and 
physical artefacts. Relevantly to this claim as indicated earlier, the research conducted will be 
centred on a non-interactive level concerning the groups, regimes and states involved in the 
study. Rather, analysis will be drawn from the documentation, reports, records and historical 
analyses produced within the field of identity politics.  
Due to the strong tradition of conducting research in the field of political identity in Africa by 
looking at the nuances from historical contrasts between colonial and post-colonial governance 
structures, it was noted earlier that a suitable method to use in the undertaking of such research 
would be the method of historiography. Historiography uses techniques such as the contrasting 
of information and different accounts, triangulating certain events and revisiting occurrences 
when further evidence is obtained. What is importantly noted by Andrews (2008: 400), is that 
“...focused on specific historical accounts, historiography reflects on the theories and 
philosophies that inform and motivate them and how they both might influence the conclusions 
drawn.” The technique then is not to exhibit history as a historian would, but to analyse 
occurrences against the background of pre-existing theories determined of past interactions. 
Historical research has changed to a great extent when contrasted against the reasons for its 
existence a century ago for instance. It was previously a design that focused on the documenting 
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events, whilst more contemporary historiography seeks to provide interpretations as to why 
certain events occurred within a specific cultural milieu and during a certain periods (Potter, 
1996: 142-143). Furthermore, the modern technique of historical analysis determines that “...it 
must use various levels of generalisation to describe, interpret or explain collections of data” 
(Nord cited in Potter, 1996:142). With regards to these statements it becomes ever more 
apparent that there exists a well-rounded process in the development of an historical analysis. 
Below is a suggested layout of the method that should be utilised in the construction of 
historiography. 
Methodologists have proposed designated guidelines for the manner in which historical 
research should be conducted. Lundy (2008: 396) outlines four particular stages that precede 
the writing of a report. Firstly, it is required that the researcher obtains and reads literature to 
identify the focus of the researched phenomena. The examination of background information is 
pivotal to allow for a better understanding of the topic. Secondly, a theoretical framework must 
be provided to guide the research collection process and the interpretation thereof. In terms of 
political science, theory on political identity and the norms of good governance are often what 
need to be challenged and revised through meaningful research. Fundamental to the overall 
quality of the study, will be the thorough checking of validity and reliability of sources. At this 
stage the researcher is tasked with evaluating materials collected, noting the implications of 
missing data and making generalisations that will either prove or disprove the hypothesis. 
In the objective of this study a similar process would be determined to evaluate whether colonial 
categorisation has produced stronger group identity than national identity; if this has assisted in 
the formation of states that are reluctant to promote models of inclusive citizenship; and 
whether this environment is maintained to allow for the stranglehold of resources by groups 
that dominate the state. In relation to these criteria and the existing theories used to explain 
them, noting the stages prescribed by Lundy (2008: 396), care needs to be taken at all stages in 
the data collection method to ensure validity and reliability. An historical evaluation of political 
identity and its relation to the nation-state in Africa is bound to produce a wealth of information 
of similar patterns and contradictions.   
The second method of analysis as briefly outlined earlier is discourse analysis. This method 
presents a suitable platform for studying the statements and textual rhetoric developed from 
African identity politicisation and the case of the secession of South Sudan.  In terms of the 
latter, the study looks specifically at the institutionalised discourses of Islamised state-
nationalism and the politicised response rhetoric of Southerners to this restrictive process. In 
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this way, the reader should be mindful of the common features of discourse analysis. Punch 
(2005: 222) refers to discourse analysis as, 
1) Rule governed and internally structured; 2) produced by speakers who are ineluctably 
linked situated in a socio-historical matrix, who’s cultural, political, economic, social and 
personal realities shape the discourse; 3) Discourse itself embodies important aspects of 
the socio-historical matrix. 
Veritably, the criteria listed in this excerpt propose that discourse is not created devoid of a 
sense of human experience. Sometimes it is forgotten that the context within which speech and 
text is developed is implicitly the personal experience of those that composed it. It expresses 
their ideals, ideology and a subjective perspective of morality and justice. 
Punch (2005: 222) continues that discourse is social, that words and their inherent meaning 
depend on who wrote the words, who exactly those words were meant for and where they were 
written. One such instance of the afore-mentioned description in this study is found in the 
debate between primordialism versus ethnicity as a construct. Both terms are value laden with 
an uncompromising belief system used to propagate each. Discourse analysis gives us the means 
to respect each debate in the context of how they were produced and with goals may have been 
attached in the process.  
Deeper analysis provides the opportunity to uncover not only the conscious but also 
unconscious attitudes expressed in the rhetoric. In this way texts can reveal certain recurrent 
occurrences of which themes may be developed. Julien (2008:120) further notes that in 
identifying themes or categories an iterative process is undertaken whereby the researcher 
“spends time revisiting categories identified previously and combining or dividing them, 
resolving contradictions, as the text is analysed over and over”. From this statement it becomes 
apparent that it is by no means that a full understanding may be taken from any particulars 
source by engaging its data only once. In reading further texts, statements made in previously 
analysed work may become more important where once considered initially irrelevant.      
By tying the concept of discourse analysis into the evaluative historiographical process, the texts 
become less limited than what their pure factual content prescribes. Grbich (2013: 245) 
propagates that discourses may be written practices that characterise a topic, era or cultural 
practice. Meaning is implicit and upon analysis the hidden contexts of practices by dominant 
individuals or groups become more tangible. To this accord, the piece may assess from the 
nurture of African philosophy and ideology, the profounder objectives elites and intellectuals 
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looked to achieve. One may then delve deeper into an interpretation of “what is meant” by what 
is stated by political elites or by the institutions that were fashioned. Discourse analysis 
articulates that there is much hidden under the surface of what is said or written. In discourse 
analysis one could look to evaluate the language and rhetoric used in research papers and news 
media articles, to assess whether stable governance can be achieved in South Sudan since 
secession. In this way, the regularity of the occurrence of conflict and dispute may be a good 
variable to use.  
Looking at research articles relevant to primary resource development; governance and state 
policies; intra-state ethnic group relations; and South Sudan’s interstate relations with other 
states to name a few relevant sectors, it may analysed how often these interactions have 
produced violent or non-violent dispute in the region. The discourse analytic model provides a 
framework for studying persisting issues in and surrounding a post-secession South Sudan. 
Furthermore, discourse analysis in political science is intrinsically built from the framework of 
entrenched power relationships (Pederson, 2009: 7). In the case study, by delving into intrastate 
governance and interstate diplomatic rhetoric, we may be able to better understand the 
persisting power jostling, contestations and conflict in the region. 
Discourse analysis is additionally applicable to the case study, as it proposes not to explain why 
certain actions occur (i.e. such as conflict as a result of politicised identity); but rather how a 
persisting institutionalisation of contestation rhetoric may predictably fuel unproductive 
interactions between players, for instance, such as the Sudan’s NCP and South Sudan’s SPLM/A. 
The implicit meaning in certain discourses creates a normative frame that prescribes inevitable 
occurrences based on the nature of the rhetoric as an invoker of a given result (Potter, 1996: 5). 
It is pertinent to this piece to contrast the entrenched rhetoric of politicised identity against the 
political realities of a seceded South Sudan. One might then be able to diagnose certain 
problems and potential solutions for the new state in order to avoid the redevelopment of 
politicised identity based on previous examples.  
Instruments for data collection 
As the study will not delve into any formats of quantitative analysis or qualitative interviewing, 
there will be no need for survey techniques, the production of questionnaires and development 
of interview schedules. The instruments needed for data collection on a theoretical level will of 
course entail the collection of research documentation through library research, journal 
research, the extensive use of internet and news media research. It has been suggested that 
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qualitative study, especially constituting case study formats may not need to entail a qualitative 
versus quantitative distinction of data collection methods. As the approach is interpretative, any 
method of data collection whether the researchers own or conducted from previous study is 
relevant to increasing integrity of the study (Yin in De Vaus, 2001: 10). The methods outlined 
thus far allow the basis for data collection to be derived from previously conducted research and 
other textual accounts. 
In the first instance, for the evaluation of political identity and its effects on governance in 
Africa, the method of historiography requires the researcher to investigate existing literature to 
uncover patterns and make analytical propositions. The majority of the research should be 
conducted from the analysis of primary and secondary resources. Esterberg (2002: 130) notes 
that secondary resources provide a good starting point for the collection of data. Babbie (2004: 
334) agrees with this process, stating that to obtain good grounding on a particular subject, the 
researcher is obliged to examine that which has already been produced. More often than not 
research relies on the analysis of existing works produced by contributors within particular 
fields. It is usually these contributions as expressed in books, journal articles, news media and 
other publications that present the basis for where evaluation can be conducted. Primary 
resources, if available, can provide much needed extra reliability and validity to the study as they 
are devoid of the interpretations attached to them by researchers.  
In the coinciding manner of using discourse analysis simultaneously throughout the study, 
written and augmented accounts of ideological and philosophical theory will also form the focus 
of the data to be used. In the examination of prospects for suitable governance in post secession 
South Sudan, statements by Southern Sudanese intellectuals and elites, research papers, and 
academic and news media articles will form the majority of work that will need to be 
deconstructed. Grbich (2013: 247) intimates further that in the Foucaldian tradition, discourse 
analysis becomes a process of looking in from the outside. In other words the researcher looks at 
the, “ historical development and tracking of discourse over time, identifying the players and the 
social, economic and political climate which fostered the development of the particular 
dominating discourse.” Therefore the study should digest the dominating political discourses in 
eras of pre-colonial, colonial and post-independent African countries to note the fundamental 
evolution of governmental rationale. Similar to unobtrusive historiographical research, 
Discourse analysis follow a similar sampling pattern in choosing documentation from archival 
information and constructing a corpus of material with which to evaluate the persisting 
conditions (Flick, 2007).  In both methods of analysis then, the study will conduct research from 
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primary and secondary written resources, plunging into the finer details of “what was meant” in 
the devising of those articles at intervals where the opportunity arises. 
Presentation of the study 
The course of action follows an evaluative literature review to set the historical context with 
which to outline patterns of socio-political governance in Africa. This will be followed by a case 
study pertaining to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011; and whether or not 
secession may afford the opportunity for more conducive governance. As discussed earlier, 
firstly, a refined historiography of the colonial and post-colonial periods will be offered with an 
analysis to exhibit what processes shape the formation of political identity in Africa. Secondly, a 
qualitative discourse analysis of statements and policies of governance since the initiation South 
Sudan will hopefully shed more light on prospects for political stability in the future. A brief 
chapter layout will be provided below. 
Chapter two seeks to frame the African socio-political context by elaborating on the pre-colonial 
African position of political orientation without the parameters of the Weberian state set in 
place. It will further look at the consequences of direct and indirect colonial interception of the 
continent; paying specific attention to British indirect policies of colonial categorisation and 
how it may have laid the foundations for the future politicisation of identity on the continent.  
Chapter three seeks to refine the causal link between colonial categorisation and a resultant 
imbued sense of ethnic and ethno-religious categorisation extending into the era of 
independence in Africa. It will examine the significances of political philosophies and African 
ideologies in attempting to augment societal perceptions of the nation-state. To this accord, the 
segment will deconstruct the intricacies of Pan-Africanism on the African continent, African 
socialism and Pan-Arabism. The purpose here is to analyse to what extent these ideological 
manifestations were able to successfully or unsuccessfully shape the independent African socio-
political arena. There are a number of points of contention within this chapter that influence the 
requisite identities within African civil society. Concepts that need extensive investigation 
include the fleeting attempts of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism (as in the case of the Sudan) 
in presenting a model for inclusive state nationalism. Furthermore, the presentation of African 
socialism as obscurely promoting authoritarian structures in an attempt to build unified nation-
states will also be expanded upon. 
Chapter four takes a more pragmatic approach by analysing numerous African authoritarian 
models as upholding an imbalance of either ethnic or ethno-religious discrimination. This 
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promotes the discussion of how the lack of an indiscriminate sense of constitutionalism may 
lead to continued identity politicised contestation. The study bases the premise of this argument 
on the second point of the proposed triangle, which intimates that without the availability access 
to democratically representative structures, the opportunity for potentially violent identity 
politicisation increases exponentially. A number of examples will be produced to supplement 
this interpretation, including the consequences of successive Sudanese regimes in limiting the 
access of Southerners to the central government. The effects of restrictive state policies will also 
be analysed to the extent that they promote not only contestation with regards to socio-political 
rights, but also heighten the potential for resource-based conflict as groups seek to contest 
access to an economy that they suffer exclusion from. If all three points of the triangle are 
proven, then one may better attempt to prescribe potential solutions for this perceived dilemma 
of socio-political governance in Africa. 
Chapter five focuses solely on the case of the Sudan and the political implications which led to 
the secession of South Sudan. In this chapter reference will be made of the proponents of the 
proposed triangle. These are, namely, the impact of indirect colonial rule of the British over the 
region. Secondly, the chapter will look at methods of post-colonial authoritarian subjugation of 
the Arab Northerners of the region over, but not exclusively, the Christian and Animist 
Southerner identities in the South of the country. It will look at a variety of both militant and 
Islamic authoritarian post-independent eras and how they affected Sudan before the secession 
of South Sudan. The vastness of the Sudan provides for a number of potential analyses, 
including that of the contemporary political upheaval in the Darfur region of the country. 
However, due to the complexities of the Darfur conflict and the limited spatial constraints of the 
study, not all conflicts of the formerly unified Sudan could be accommodated. 
Thirdly, the chapter five will look at both socio-political and economic policy impositions which 
led to the Southerner protest for emancipation from the Sudan. It will be of pivotal importance 
here to analyse whether the proposed triangle explicating the politicisation of identity in Africa 
may be applied successfully to the case of Sudan. To this accord, the piece will also look at the 
economic motivations for secession, as claims to the rightful access to resources by mobilised 
identities may have the tendency to motivate and guide protest and/or rebel movements against 
the state. Finally, if the triangle explaining politicised identity may be applied to the case of 
Sudan, a final course of action obliges the study to look at policy measures that a seceded South 
Sudan can implement to prevent a redevelopment of intrastate conflict. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The course has been set for an evaluation into the greater trappings of politicised identity in 
Africa. The study shall attempt to discuss the pertinent consequences of exclusive state 
nationalism, weak constitutionalism and the implementation of authoritarian governance in 
Africa. With an evaluative literature-based method engaging the socio-political historiography of 
many African states, the first objective will be to discuss to what extent these states uphold the 
continuance of politicised identity. As this chapter has contextualised, this will hopefully be 
achieved through analysing different eras of African governance, both colonial and independent, 
the particular ideologies and policies implemented during each era, and the methods 
undertaken to perpetuate the exclusion of categorised groups. 
With this contextualisation achieved, the study turns to a refined analysis of the successful 
secession attempt of South Sudan. The purpose here will be to evaluate whether the case follows 
a similar pattern to other African states, by viewing it through the interpretive lens created in 
the first four chapters. If it is found that South Sudan was birthed of the same proposed 
triangular process as other groups in Africa, then the next clear course of action will be to assess 
possible policy measures and remedies for current issues in South Sudan to prevent the 
resurgence of politicised identity. An overriding objective of this study will be to make 
recommendations for states to finally clear the hurdle of identity disputation and build more 
equitable and inclusive systems of governance. 
The first step in this regard will be to study the roots of ethnic and ethno-religious 
categorisation. Chapter two will thus commence with studying the socio-political consequences 
of colonial interception of the African continent.  
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Chapter Two: The Pre-colonial State and Socio-
political Colonial Inheritance: Conceptualising 
African Political Development 
“... it has proven difficult to get the [African] citizen to be patriotic, work hard and be 
faithful to public service, pay taxes, and oblige the state with other duties” (Ekeh cited in 
Osaghae, 2006: 237). 
Introduction 
The above statement denotes a conundrum that has blighted African politics since well before 
the 1975 publication of Ekeh’s seminal piece describing the two publics in African politics. The 
rhetoric he offers, along with other renowned African scholars such as Ekeh (1975), Ake (1993), 
Mamdani (2001) and Clapham (1985) since then, describes an environment of unstable 
governance almost entirely precipitated by a disconnection between African political leadership 
mentalities and civil society. There are a host of theoretical and practical explanations, mostly 
centred on seemingly irreconcilable ethnic conflict that have assisted in producing irregular 
state nationalism in African democracies. This chapter seeks to evaluate Africa at the historical 
root of its dysfunctional political evolution. It is a commonly held belief by many an African 
scholar that the period of colonial interception has dominantly shaped the political, economic 
and social atmosphere on the continent, which suitably accounts for much of the quandary 
African states find themselves in at present day (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 2001; Merideth, 2006 
and Berman, 2010).  
 It will not suffice an evaluation of African nationalism and democratic governance, without a 
preceding discussion of the root causes that have both effected and affected socio-political and 
economic development on the continent in the 20th and 21st centuries respectively. To this 
accord, we are obliged to analyse the colonial interception of Africa and the intricacies of 
governance and socio-economic factors that have shaped its existence. This chapter provides a 
discourse analysis and historiography of pre-colonial and colonial socio-politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The objective will be to study the historical configurations of African ethnicity and 
culture under colonial dominance; the contrasting systems of indirect and direct rule during the 
period of occupation; incorporating specifically an exhibition of how the often rigid ethnic 
categorisation of Africans under colonial administration has affected the African sense of 
identity. For the purposes of practical legitimacy and validity, this section will expand on a few 
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pertinent examples of colonial rule in Africa, drawing on both situational similarities and 
differences along the way. 
African Ethnicity: Primordial Nature Vs Nurtured Social Construction 
Potentially the greatest contention that exists in discussions of ethnicity in Africa is the 
dichotomy of opinion that presumes ethnicity to either be natural and genetic; or the accusation 
that ethnic categorisation was constructed purely for unproblematic imperial administration 
and exploitation (Ekeh, 1975; Newbury, 2001 and Berman, 2010). To analyse this contention 
from a historically methodological lens, this section commences with an analysis between pre-
colonial and colonial societal configurations at the local ethnic level. 
Any detailed pre-colonial analysis of Africa usually presents a historical minefield of subtleties, 
exaggerations, ambiguity, misconceptions and misrepresentations. It is unsurprisingly not hard 
to ascertain an acceptable exactness about the way African societies were organised prior to 
European interception.3  Most of the ambiguities exist due to the disjointed method in which 
history was captured before colonisation by the West. Most of the pre-colonial information that 
dates before the middle of the nineteenth century is written and adapted from a rich culture of 
oral tradition (Thomson, 2010: 9). Much of the information may have been misplaced, twisted 
or lost in translation when rewritten by African and European authors. The simple symbolism of 
the ‘broken telephone’ may apply in this instance. 
Writers such as Loomba (2005: 20-21) as a result have professed that the pre-colonial period is 
often ‘romanticised’ as a result of the ambiguity of the way it is taught. Some fields within 
colonial studies conclude that pre-colonial history will always be heavily diluted by the colonial 
period and that it, “[...] is not available to us in any pristine form that can be neatly separated 
from colonial history” (Loomba, 2005: 20-21). Colonialism itself is a philosophical discourse 
that dictates the African gravitation not only towards modernity, but also a glaring loss and 
manipulation of culture along the way. It bears no importance to eulogise pre-colonial African 
culture with valour, as most imperial powers saw it as backward and either tried to abolish it 
through assimilation or limit its access to the civic administration through ‘traditional 
authorities’. Furthermore, a common misconception that has since been corrected concerning 
the colonial period proposes that separate African societies were not as homogenous as colonial 
                                                          
3
 It should also be noted that Europeans were not the only imperial influence on the continent, as there is the 
commonly held belief that Arabs from the Middle-East extended an imperial hand over North Africa centuries 
before the arrival of Europeans on the continent (Deegan, 2011: 22-23). 
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powers categorised them during the period of formal political occupation (Thomson, 2010: 9). 
As a means to break down the vagueness that exists in discussing African identity, it becomes 
significant to the overall study to establish conclusively an appropriate frame to view African 
identity as predominantly primordial or constructed. The only period that can provide the 
answer to this conundrum is cased within the imperial interception and colonial administration 
of Africa, roughly between the 1880s and 1950s. 
Suffice it to say, peculiar perceptions about African identity predates the 1850s, where 
predominantly British anthropologists were allowed to develop many unscientific musings 
about African people. One such pre-colonial fascination was found in the creation of the Hamitic 
categorisation code that still blights states such as Burundi and Rwanda in the twenty-first 
century. Simply put, Hamites were known to be lighter skinned (the Tutsis of Rwanda) and 
labelled on very little scientific basis as more intelligent than darker skinned Africans by the 
anthropologists of the time (Newbury, 2001: 275). The premise of the Hamitic hypothesis was 
that ethnic categories were defined exclusively by biological criteria (Newbury, 2001: 275). This 
evaluation hardly took into account instances such as modern migration patterns in Africa or 
intermarriage between groups. Needless to say, anthropology was a severely underdeveloped 
field before the twentieth century and Africans suffered much misappropriation as a result.  
The tradition of Europeans identifying and categorising ethnic groups in Africa existed some 
time before Chancellor Bismarck oversaw the physical partition of Africa at the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-1885. However, the reason we shall focus on a post 1885 Africa as a point of 
entry is that the Berlin conference offers us for the first time a clear physical partition of Africa 
into modern geographical states. This mere fact propels any mild conversation about African 
nationalism and identity into the devastatingly hot melting pot of ethnic conflict over territory 
and resources that has forged the continent’s politics ever since. What concerns the study for 
now is determining an appropriate frame with which to consult ethnicity as an original 
phenomenon in the African context. Invariably then one must turn to the evaluation of the 
primordialism described eloquently in Ekeh’s (1975) Two Publics. 
The concept of primordialism has thrived on the African continent. It is the fascination with 
attributing traits of ethnicity to a strict genetic code. The limitations to integration and 
nationalism as a result are obvious.  Apter (1977: 300) describes primordial attachments as a 
deep emotional sentiment which produces loyalty within defined groups on the basis of shared 
race, language, religion and a certain ethnic affiliation. The assertion then is that primordial 
configurations are set as strictly as the lineage on a common family tree illustration. The most 
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important concept to draw from primordialism is that to the average member of civil society 
who believes in impermeable ethno-religious distinctions, there can be no value in a state 
composed of groups outside of his own. This stance is what Ekeh (1975: 92) uses to legitimise 
the argument that the typical African of this time period, moulded by colonial administration, 
was only able to affiliate him/herself morally with members of their own kin. 
As a means to give credibility to both concepts of primordialism and identity construction, more 
attention must be given to Ekeh’s expression of primordialism as a realm where genetic and 
emotional bonds exist. As a firm believer in the dichotomy of ethnic and civic publics in Africa, 
Ekeh contends that the former realm is where the only sense of morality and communitarianism 
reside in Africa (Ekeh, 1975: 92). One may consider, and what will become thematic of this 
section, is that the concept of primordialism is confined to an African understanding of self. 
Whereas from the perspective of Euro-centric analysis, emotional and genetic bonds are met 
with cynicism as European researchers denote superstition and ulterior agendas attached to 
promoting primordial group identity (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 5). Interestingly enough, the 
Oxford dictionary’s synonyms for the term “primordial” include archaic, primitive and primal 
(Oxford, 2004: 353). There is little doubt then that in the minds of the modern liberal world that 
primordialism can be easily attributed the sentiments of backwardness.  
Ekeh’s main point of contention is that the embrace of primordialism creates dysfunction in the 
political formation. The African citizen and political elite was alienated from the second of 
Ekeh’s two hypothesised publics, 
The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the 
private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm which is historically associated 
with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in 
post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the 
police etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I 
shall call this the civic public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the 
generalised moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial 
public (Ekeh, 1975: 92). 
The above noted a divergence in attitudes about governance between Africa and the West. Due 
to the evolution of African civil society, citizens found solace in the primordial private public 
because, as Ekeh alludes, the civic realm is one of foreign instalment and has moral significance 
to the African who finds greater communitarianism within his/her defined ethnic group. The 
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result is that in colonial Africa, the majority of citizens oppressed by the civic administration felt 
alienated from it once they inherited those political structures at independence. Ekeh bases the 
primordialism expressed in his first public as an offshoot of the alienation faced by Africans at 
the bureaucratic-administrative level. It however begs the question, and what many researchers 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Mamdani, 2005; Ake, 1993) compete: Did the colonial 
administration promote a facade of primordialism through categorising African, or were 
primordial attitudes implicit in African ethnic psyche? Later in this chapter, the piece will turn 
to practical evaluations of states such as Burundi and Rwanda to further analyse whether 
primordialism has become redundant in post-colonial identity discourse. Notwithstanding, as 
the case study on the political history of the Sudan is introduced in chapter five, the study will 
revise this same discussion from an ethno-religious perspective. 
In analysing the discourse of ethnic definition, this section is further obliged to entertain the 
strong analytical position of researchers such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 3) that contend 
ethnicity to be no more than an African traditional fabrication entertained readily by imperial 
powers. This is built primarily on the concept of colonial ethnic categorisation, of what is 
candidly referred to as ‘tribes’ in the 21st century. Many analysts of the 21st century firmly believe 
that ethnic groups were cemented and perpetuated by colonial powers as a means to control 
them easier (Thomson, 2010: 62). This is especially apparent in the indirect ‘separate 
development’ mantra of the British as opposed to French and Portuguese direct rule which 
attempted to assimilate Africans into their respective religio-cultural dogmas. The consequences 
that these policies had for African political development will be discussed again at a later stage. 
Significant to this portion of the debate, one must give credence to the positions held by Philippe 
Ntahombaye and Gaspard Nduwayo (2007) and the methodological framework they used in 
analysing colonial and post-colonial Burundi. A suitable excerpt to promote ethnicity as a social 
construct is contained below, 
[...] ethnicity can change its form, place or role in society during the existence of that 
given society. Its content can enrich other new elements. Its limitations vis-à-vis other 
social phenomena may be modified and in doing so, be subject to other new questions. 
[...] ethnicity in its purist form does not exist. It is always associated with political, 
economic and social issues that make up its essential components (Ntahombaye and 
Nduwayo, 2007: 242). 
What is most valid about the argument above is that ethnicity is not absolute and unchanging. If 
ethnicity is malleable and able to be manipulated then most assuredly is it not more a social 
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construct than something primordial, emotive and genetic? The modern reluctance to constrain 
identity or even citizenship to a distinct genetic code, however, has its roots in the most 
repressive periods of the 20th Century in Europe. From an ideological position, discussions of 
genetics and identity cased together often lead to accusations of ultranationalist sentiment that 
are part and parcel of fascist intolerance for others (Heywood, 2007: 215). As a result, the 
transferral of these sentiments by Euro-centric research often assists in discrediting African 
primordialism as much as it does European fascism. Primordialism, in definitions offered above, 
one may consider produces an ethnic value that is as exclusive as the dictates of fascist 
nationalism expressed during World War II. 
The argument advanced is that with fervent exclusive self-definition details chauvinism towards 
others as inferior. The most relevant example we can attribute to this in Africa, is the Tutsi belief 
that they were superior to Hutus in Rwanda as supplemented by colonial powers playing the two 
groups off against each other. This subsequently resulted in Hutu aggression and the climatic 
execution of Tutsi in 1994 (Meredith, 2006: 487-488). Primordial attitudes tend to strengthen 
concepts of genetic superiority or inferiority, which can be said, influenced both Nazi genocide 
of Jewish citizens in World War II; and similarly Hutu genocide of Tutsi people in 1994. Of 
course both examples need to be given their own situational respect but nonetheless parallels 
may be easily drawn between the results of European fascism and African primordialism. 
Nonetheless, through modern science and education, we are now able to bring closure to the 
defunct argument that genetics dictates a hierarchy of human races. 
Turning our attention to the other side of the spectrum, ever increasingly in the modern era we 
have become aware of ethnic categorisation and the advent of definitions such as ‘political 
identity’. These sentiments have stemmed from a field of thought in sociology called social 
constructivism. Simply, it is built on a foundation that gained more popularity from the 1970s 
onwards, whereby sociologists argue that humans construct and manipulate their identities and 
environments to suit political, social or economic ends (Given, 2008, 147). This trend in the 
humanities has since traversed to social anthropology and political science. This element of 
constructed reality assists us in understanding better the contemporary sentiment that ethnicity 
and identity are fundamentally nurtured by societies conscious not only of their raison d'être, 
but also their need to survive in changing political climates.  
For theorists such as Claude Ake (1993: 244) ethnicity was seen as a tool used primarily for 
acquisition of the resources allocated by colonial administrations. One can suggest that the 
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politics of economic contestation as a result are most applicable in states where there are 
multiple different ethnic groups competing for limited resources. Ake (1993: 244) continues,  
The strength of primary loyalties, especially those with an ethnic base, is due as much to 
their cultural significance as to their practical utility. More often than not ethnic and 
national groups are the locus of the individual’s primary loyalty. They have largely 
displaced the state, which is often seen as contested terrain on which contending primary 
groups fight for the appropriation of what is supposed to be the common wealth. 
The second half of the excerpt posits a familiar distinction. Ake seemingly concurs with Ekeh 
(1975: 92) about the African disconnection from the civic state as it holds no nationalistic 
legitimacy in its arbitrary geographical entirety. However, Ake also posits that this distinction 
was promoted as a means to secure ‘practical utility’. Semantics such as this seem to form the 
basis for the dismissal of primordialism as redundant and devoid of modern legitimacy. In 
essence, what he alludes to here is that from a governance perspective, primordialism serves as 
an irrational tool to attain support in a non-liberal secular manner. 
Chazan et al. (1999: 108) cement the concept of ethnicity as utility (as termed by Ake) in their 
broadest definition. While Chazan et al. recognises that ethnicity is a refined sense of 
peoplehood that has the essential features of combined remembrances of the past and shared 
common inspirations, values and norms, they also agree that the “[...] ethnic group pertains to 
organised activities by persons, linked by a consciousness of special identity, who jointly seek to 
maximise their corporate political economic, and social interests” (Chazan et al., 1999: 108). By 
this it is confirmed that the recognition of identity usually, in some format, constitutes the 
seeking of certain materials or resources exclusive to the competing group in question. This 
further assists the argument of constructed identity in the way that the process is undertaken 
predominantly for tangible resource gain. This theme will be deconstructed further in chapters 
three and four when viewing examples of how controlled ethnic policy promoted the politics of 
exclusion from resources. 
Imperial powers played an important role in perpetuating the differences between ethnic groups 
in Africa through policies of categorisation. Raised earlier when looking at tribalism, these were 
largely based on misconstrued anthropological assumptions about race, culture, religion; and 
intellectual capacity presumed to be relative to physical characteristics and genetics. To expand 
upon the categorisation debate, one may consider the colonial historiography of Burundi as one 
of the most volatile situations the continent has ever experienced. Similar to Rwanda, the socio-
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political landscape of Burundi is composed almost entirely upon the colonial categorisation of 
Bagangwa (superior group) Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa ethnic groups (Ntahombaye and 
Nduwayo, 2007: 243). It is interesting to note that before colonial influence, according to the 
findings of Ntahombaye and Nduwayo (2007), the ethnic groups all spoke the same language of 
Kirundi and all believed in the same animist God affectionately known as Mwami. 
Similar to the techniques of indirect rule employed by Britain4, Germany before and Belgium 
after the World War I were crucially responsible for the disfigurement of the Burundian 
indigenous atmosphere during their respective interventions in the region. Colonialism by many 
was considered a triumph for modernity in Africa but Europeans were unfortunately considered 
inconsiderate, careless and/or malicious in their intentions to bring ‘civilisation’ to the 
continent. This is represented sufficiently in the German and then Belgian categorisation of 
Burundian people to suit their administrative needs. Ntahombaye and Nduwayo (2007: 244-
245) determined that the post-colonial crisis experienced by Burundi was “[...] ideological, 
socio-cultural (degredation of values), psychological (suspicion, fear), political (fight for power) 
and economic (unequal access to economic and social opportunities with regard to education, 
employment and health)”. As will be displayed during the course of this dissertation, all the 
factors mentioned above were influenced in some manner by identity categorisation in colonial 
administration.  
Ntahombaye’s (2005: 51-52) seminal piece on Burundi directs the reader towards the 
understanding that the imperial interception of different groups did more to cause post-
independence conflict between them than create a stable socio-political environment looking 
forward. There is much that can be taken from the following passage to validate this claim:  
The terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘tribe’ are therefore out of place when used in Burundi to 
designate the various sections of the population. The Bahutu and Batutsi especially live 
together, spread over the entire region and [had] warm relations with intermarriage, 
exchange of gifts, sharing of the drinking straw (gusangiran umukenke) when beer is 
consumed, and mutual help in agricultural work  (ikibiri). [...] nothing defines or justifies 
the existence of ethnicity in Burundi. The Bagangwa, the Bahutu, the Batutsi and Batwa 
are not casts, social classes, ethnic groups or tribes (Ntahombaye, 2005: 51-52). 
To Ntahombaye, one can consider that which discredits state nationalism today in Burundi has 
much to do with the damage caused by colonial powers in qualifying certain people to certain 
                                                          
4
 Indirect rule will be evaluated further in the next section. 
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‘tribes’ on the basis of their physical attributes. One may question the validity of the research on 
the basis that it may be attempting to create a greater sense of Burundian national unity, but on 
the basis of this assumption at least, we can conclude further that ethnic construction is 
certainly found above primordialism in this case. The catalyst for ethnic construction was of 
course whichever colonial incumbent held power at the time. 
Analysts of the socio-political history of Burundi were not the only ones to infer that colonial 
ethnic categorisation assisted meteorically in promoting a sense of distinctiveness between 
competing groups in Africa. One of the primary historians consulted extensively in this area is 
Christopher Clapham, who may indeed be considered the benchmark in colonial studies. 
Clapham often took a cynical approach towards European involvement in Africa, once referring 
metaphorically to the West’s imperial jingoism as a “ripe melon” that by the nineteenth century 
was primed perfectly to be carved open (Clapham, 1995: 23). This mentality contributed greatly 
to his evaluation of Europe in Africa as not only bringing modernisation, but also destroying its 
cultural subtleties through categorical ethnic administration in the process. This of course went 
hand in hand with the implementation of arbitrary boundaries, exploitative economic policies 
and unequal allocation of rights and citizenship (Clapham, 1995; Thomson, 2010). The focus for 
now will not be on these factors, as this section continues with the concept of nurtured ethnic 
construction. 
To this accord, Clapham (1985: 18-20) agrees that the consequences of imperial interception of 
Africa deepened ethnic cleavages that were only marginal during pre-colonial Africa. Clapham 
continues his explanation of the intricacies of colonial rule by detailing that it had a distinct 
hierarchical administrative structure that was built on coercive rhetoric and force. It was 
developed of civic governmental systems and, importantly, tribal administrations that used 
chiefs, clerks or missionary school educated Africans as a buffer to control the requisite ethnic 
groups (Clapham, 1985: 19). The result of this was a deepening of ethnic divisions, as indigenous 
administrative staff was invariably used for the maintenance of the colonial regime, whilst they 
also pitted their wits against each other to secure resource distribution from the colonial 
incumbents. It can be considered that this in turn supplemented the colonial categorisation of 
ethnic groups by adding economic incentive to the recognition and maintenance of difference 
between competing groups. 
Mamdani’s most prolific works were centred on the socio-political relationship between the 
coloniser and the colonised. Whilst emotively capturing the despair of oppression as adequately 
as philosophers such as Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Memmi, Mamdani was also strikingly adept 
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in arguing the premise that much of African ethnicity’s refinement came from the role colonial 
powers played in categorising and segregating them.  
Mamdani (2001: 655) was particularly occupied with the intricacies of indirect colonial 
administration, most famously developed by the British. He describes perfectly the rationale 
behind what this dissertation will term the politicisation of African identity. Consider the 
following, 
The point is that each ethnic group had to have its own law. If Europe had nations, Africa 
was said to have ethnicities, then called tribes. If every "historical" nation in Europe had 
its own state, every tribe in Africa had to have its own native authority to enter history. If 
every nation-state in Europe promulgated its own civic law, every native authority in 
Africa had to enforce its own customary law (Mamdani, 2001: 655). 
Mamdani suggests in the passage above that African ethnicity was further refined by European 
misappropriations of their tribalistic nature. One may suggest that upon his arrival on African 
shores, the European imperialist had no way to comprehend the unsophisticated and loosely 
defined borderless societies that occupied the continent. The coloniser only knew of geographic 
limitations that forced Europeans to compete and wage war to secure territories. With this came 
distinct nationalism to attribute to the statement: This is our land. The vastness of the African 
continent meant that Africans before the arrival of imperialism were less concerned with the 
political self-definition attached to confirming specific portions of resource abundant territory. 
Mamdani (2001: 655) further contributes that Europeans established the notion of tribalism to 
frame African identities within their own idiosyncratic ‘nationalities’, hence perpetuating the 
recognition of differences between them. 
This section has detailed the primordial conception, which is dominantly found in traditional 
African philosophical thought as the validation for the existing diversity of groups within Africa. 
Primordialism was conceived of the genetic, mystical and emotive attachments that groups 
suggested formed the basis in difference between them. However, this was not the only 
interpretation to explain ethnic group consciousness on the continent. Recognising the growing 
European analytical trend to suggest that social realities are by and large constructed in some 
manner, this can be firmly attributed to the African continent when looking at the effects of 
colonialism. In this regard, many popular analysts such as Berman (2010) and Clapham (1995) 
agree that beyond primordialism, the progression of ethnic realisation and group identity in 
Africa also came as a result of colonial categorisation of different groups and propagating the 
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differences between Africans to further promote an aura of disunity, whilst organising identities 
into neat groups to administrate and control them in a simplified manner. 
There are of course dissimilarities in the different policies employed by different colonial 
powers. This chapter will delve briefly into the historical differences between indirect rule 
employed predominantly by the British, Belgians and Germans; and direct rule, which was 
promoted mostly by French and Portuguese colonisers. 
 
Indirect and Direct Imperialism: The Intricacies of Varied Socio-political 
Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The types of colonial administration of ethnic groups was not conformed to a certain set of rules 
but that different colonial powers subsequently used diverse techniques in ‘organising’ natives 
into manageable societal sectors and communities.  
When discussing the two publics, civic governance inherited from colonial powers and the 
primordial public espousing ethnic identity above the state, Ekeh (1975: 92) used mostly British 
indirect rule in West Africa (especially Nigeria) as the lens through which to describe African 
socio-political development. Mamdani (2001: 655-666) later concurred that the policy of 
separate development employed by British indirect rule further developed the complexities 
between different ethnic groups in Africa. Indirect rule was a systematic development whereby 
the British colonial administration hierarchically provided dissimilar rights and resources to 
different ethnic groups by liaising with pre-designated chiefs and African elites who were in 
some manner distributed indigenous authority (Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001: 473). The 
greatest consequence of this process was only fully understood when the withdrawal of colonial 
powers, in a post-independent environment, left these different competing groups for the same 
resources without the necessary state authority and liberal multicultural policy implementations 
to placate those tensions. This is not to say that rudimentary attempts at democratic 
institutionalism were not tested by post-independence elites (Van Hensbroek, 1999), but the 
idea of multicultural structures to cement an inclusive sense of citizenship were certainly not 
present. A further discussion of the concentrated liberal multicultural policy measures needed 
by many African states will be expanded upon in chapters four and five. In the case study of the 
secession of South Sudan, the added tension of combined religious and ethnic difference will 
also be highlighted.  
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In much of North Africa, ethno-religious societal integration often suffered the affliction of 
Islamic fundamentalist political suffocation. This process was seen as a medium that caused 
clashes with those who did not wish their political lives influenced by a religion alien to their 
historical socialisation (Sharkey, 2008). As a result, conflict arose in areas such as Sudan when 
post-colonialism brought constitutions codified by Sharia Arab law; an exclusive social contract 
other ethno-religious groups were not willing to abide. This will be explored further in chapter 
five. 
Indirect rule has acquired much critique for the miscalculation that separate cultural 
development between the coloniser and the colonised native would prove successful. 
Categorisation and separate development, supplemented by giving more rights to certain 
ethnicities than others5, provided adequate means of administrating natives but left an enduring 
hindrance on post-colonial ethnic tolerance. Mizuno and Okazawa (2009: 405) have criticised 
indirect rule heavily for the natural willingness of, especially the Belgians in Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi, for willingly dividing ethnicities into a privileged ruling group with subsidiary 
underprivileged ruled groups. The theory extends, although not inclusive of every example, that 
the format of indirect rule allowed for political power to be distributed unequally by the colonial 
ruler to a ruling indigenous group that would be able to exploit the resources of the ruled group 
for its own consumption. The extent of exploitation may vary depending on the amount of 
‘altruism’ the elite ethnic group feels for the ruled group (Mizuno and Okazawa, 2009: 406). 
This dichotomy is easily confirmed by the example of the Tutsi (ruling) and Hutu (ruled) 
differentiation in the states provided above. What is important to take from this evaluation for 
now is that colonisers, firstly, constructed hierarchy between different ethnic groups; and, 
secondly, perpetuated conflict between them by providing more rights to some over others. This 
will constitute another common theme to be expressed in the duration of this study, including 
the case study of the formerly unified Sudan. 
The institutions of indirect rule have produced varied debates. Blanton et al ( 2001: 473-474) 
advocate that indirect rule was the most harmful format of colonial rule because it assisted 
ethnic stratification in a system pitting groups against each other. Others such as Spear (2003: 
3-4) insinuate that indirect rule, instead of parasitic, was a mutually beneficial arrangement 
between colonial administration and chiefs/indigenous elites. Buttered with much intrigue, 
there is a credible amount of evidence to suggest that African elites were able to manipulate 
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their environment and became quite adept at political bargaining with the British colonial 
powers. Ranger (1993: 78-82) notes, 
Invention implied a conscious construction of tradition, focussed on colonial power and 
agency. Further, it essentialised tradition and disregarded historical processes of 
reinterpretation and reformation. Finally, a focus on invention construed Africans as 
gullible subjects. In short, this was misleading and ahistorical. 
What Spear (2003) and Ranger (2001) then concur is that the cunningness of African elites 
during the colonial period was severely underestimated. This further bolsters the claim from the 
previous section that African identities, in the face of colonial categorisation, were constructed 
and manipulated to suit an ever changing political environment in the quest to secure tangible 
resources. 
Regardless of how much the colonial environment was manipulated by chiefs, Blanton et al. 
(2001: 479) still produce a fairly competent demonstration of the difficulties produced in the 
environment indirect rule created. They describe indirect rule via the techniques implemented 
by the British government who, 
[...] preferred to leave in place indigenous local elites and simply co-opt or coerce them 
into serving as agents of British rule. Through this means, British colonial state 
established a network of indigenous intermediaries ‘who combined the useful authority 
derived from some customary title to office with the literate skills exposure to basic 
administrative training that would make them serviceable auxiliaries of the Weberian 
state’ (Young cited in Blanton et al., 2001: 479). 
These indigenous intermediaries had the advantage of being able to engage in the civic politics 
of colonial administration as well as education about the complexities of chieftaincy and 
indigenous politics. This engagement with Weberian politics undoubtedly left elites with an idea 
of political geography and how it is tied in prominently with conflict and competition for 
tangible resources within defined borders. Indirect rule left an indelible mark on the post-
colonial politics, as will be displayed in the chapters to follow, in countries such as Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, the former unified Sudan and newly formed South Sudan. 
Finally, it does not do justice to an evaluation of colonial ethnic identity without looking briefly 
at direct rule and ensuing discussions of the espoused tradition of assimilation. In French and 
Portuguese colonies predominantly, the most glaring difference between indirect rule and direct 
rule was that the latter configuration had little to no respect for local traditions. Chiefs were 
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used purely for administrative purposes to the absolute colonial state (Mizuno and Okazawa, 
2009: 408). Indigenous cultures and institutions were often seen as backward; consequently 
with techniques of Francophone cultural assimilation and Portuguese Assimilado, African 
ethnic identity was reconfigured and sometimes even replaced entirely, such as in Mozambique. 
Direct rule provides an appropriate lens with which to critique indirect rule and vice versa. 
Noting the difference between the two systems, direct rule in the French tradition for instance 
was based on, 
[...] the ideal of integrating its colonial peoples into a ‘Greater France’ through cultural 
assimilation and administrative centralisation. All aspects of French colonial rule 
reflected this push for a centralised state, which incorporated individuals from different 
regions and ethnic groups into a single social system, all under control of an 
administrative state modelled after and controlled by the French state. Many colonial 
subjects were educated in France and the language and Francophone culture was 
disseminated across the colonies (Blanton et al. 2001: 479). 
The greatest consequence of this was the perception that this format of colonial administration, 
whilst diminishing drastically the influence of indigenous culture, did achieve more nationally 
unified states in the post-colonial context than did indirect rule. For now it is applicable to note 
that direct rule, perhaps even more insensitively, tried to abolish African cultures it encountered 
in their entirety; and in achieving this Europeans would be able to conform Africans not only to 
modernity but what they condescendingly decided was Euro-centric cultural refinement. One is 
also able to consider from this brief demonstration of direct rule that it was so absolutist that it 
focussed not on ethnic categorisation but ethnic absorption and reconfiguration. This one can 
consider left many Africans of former French colonies with an existential crisis of identity. The 
result of this was to conform in a post-colonial capacity to the ideals of Les pays Francophone, 
an organisation espousing a modern French commonwealth across the globe. Direct rule did not 
play off ethnicities against each other as much as indirect rule, but was equally responsible for 
the manipulation of identity in Africa by allowing indigenaires to celebrate very few of their 
ancestral traditions.  
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Concluding Remarks 
With the evidence exhibited, this chapter can only conclusively agree that ethnicity in Africa; the 
concept of an unfettered identity is heavily tainted by imperial interception of the continent 
specifically during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Furthermore, whether using 
techniques of indirect or direct rule, there is definitive evidence to infer that ethnicities evolved, 
were manipulated, categorised and pitted against each other all in the name of simplifying 
colonial administrative systems. To note all of these subtleties unquestionably leaves a 
primordial definition of ethnicity in a redundant state. Hence the most important conjecture of 
this analysis is that identity in Africa was most certainly mutated, nurtured and consolidated by 
social construction undertaken by colonisers and African elites in creating the catchphrase of 
political identity. As far as identity construction is concerned, there remain two more important 
discourses that need further evaluation.  
The following chapter will look at the development of pan-Africanism by Western theorists and 
African elites in an attempt to promote African nation-building. This would be seen as the most 
important ideological tools to legitimate decolonisation on the continent. Chapter three will also 
seek to analyse African socialism as an ideology for policy implementation and development in a 
post-colonial Africa. In this regard the piece will note some of the successes of socialist theory 
adapted to the African continent, but mostly its failures in practical application. The purpose of 
these foundational chapters is to come to a conclusive understanding of what drives socio-
political interaction in Africa. 
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Chapter Three: Pan-Africanism, African Socialism 
and Pan-Arabism: The Ideological Foundations of 
Post-Colonial Development 
Consciencism is the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of force which will enable 
African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in 
Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African 
personality is itself defined by the culture of humanist principles which underlie the traditional 
African society. – Kwame Nkrumah (cited in Young, 2001: 245) 
Introduction 
In recent times it has not been considered an exceptional achievement the ability to diagnose the 
primary affliction affecting socio-political dynamics in Africa. Broadly, the recognition that there 
is a distinct disconnection maintained by the ruling elite (and bureaucracy) from greater civil 
society highlights the principal symptoms defining a lack of political and economic growth on 
the continent. However, these symptoms should not be understood as resultant of some 
transcendent abnormality that cannot be explained. What the renowned African intellect and 
scholar, Kwame Nkrumah, (cited in Young, 2001: 245) refers to in the above passage is an 
idealistic account of the African as an identity conscious African, nationalist and  
communitarian at heart. 
In chapter two, the study aimed to systematically unravel the semantics of the separate 
discourses of Ekeh (1975: 91-112) and Mahmood Mamdani (2001: 651-664) amongst other 
notable contemporary African political philosophers. The objective was to exhibit particularly, 
that the configuration of the typical African politician and citizen was irrevocably shaped by the 
experiences of the colonial period through direct and indirect rule. This constituted the first 
level in developing a greater understanding of modern African political identity. 
This chapter seeks to explore further the premise highlighted by the authors mentioned above. 
The archetypal persona of the African elite has been shaped by a colonial experience that did 
little to bolster the concept of the traditional Weberian state in the political psyche; and how it 
could thrive in the ideological grandeur promoted by of post-independence leaders. The failure 
to create thriving 20th century democracies in Africa was characterised by a number of 
foundational and incremental issues which shall be explored further in this chapter. 
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At the core of these issues lie ideological manifestations proposing sustainable Pan-Africanism 
in order to build a sense of African nationalism or ‘Africaness’; adaptations of Marxism using 
abstruse class struggle rhetoric to develop African socialism; and ethno-religious dominant 
nationalist policies the that would shape and or deepen factional identity development on the 
continent. As many ideologies usually meet their demise not at a theoretical level but rather in 
practical application, via philosophical inquiry into the semantics of constructed nationalisms 
and re-furbished ideologies, this chapter will display to what extent Pan-Africanism and African 
Socialism seemingly failed the African continent.  
Secondly, noting that the combined case of Sudan and South Sudan is delicately poised upon a 
traversable North African and Sub-Saharan complex, it will be equally important to look at the 
effects of Pan-Arabism and the accompanying Islamicisation (or Arabisation) of North Africa 
briefly in this chapter. In chapter five the ethno-religious challenge in Sudan and South Sudan 
will be revised more extensively, though for now it will be important to demonstrate that not 
only British indirect rule shaped identity in the Sudan, but so too did the political trajectory of 
Islam (Ruay, 1994: 156). In relevant context it is important to ascertain the overall contribution 
of any foreign imposition of culture on indigenous Africans. 
The Independence Conundrum: Transcending Unsustainable Pan-African 
Nationalism 
In a post-World War II Africa, the continent’s civil societies leant on the cusp of violent revolt 
and revolution to end European domination over them, a procession that had lasted centuries. 
Remarkably, with the exception of a war of independence fought against the French in Algeria, 
most prospectively free African states favoured what was described as positive non-violent 
action (Legum, 1964: 35). This in itself was a conundrum, the fact that whilst indigenous 
Africans had what most would deem justifiable reason to be bitter and seek violent recourse, 
they were content to follow a peaceful transition to independence. Gripping tales of the 
inhumanity they suffered sound no louder than in African poetry of the era. David Diop (1965) 
writes, 
The white man killed my father 
My father was proud 
The white man seduced my mother 
My mother was beautiful 
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The white man burnt my brother 
beneath the noonday sun 
My brother was strong 
His hands red with black blood 
The white man turned to me 
And in the Conqueror’s voice said 
‘Hey, boy! A chair, a napkin, a drink’. 6 
 
The emotive portrayal above details perfectly the indignation suffered by many Africans at the 
hands of colonialists. They were perceived as malleable objects to be used at the disposal of 
imperialists and for various methods of economic exploitation. Europeans that had settled prior 
to the decolonisation period could be grateful for the methods utilised by African Diasporas in 
seeking independence, exiles that would one day return to be the first leaders of a politically 
liberated African continent. For these African intellectuals such as Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, 
Kenyatta and others had been inspired by the positive non-violent action employed by WEB Du 
Bois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore in attempts to socially liberate black people in the 
West years before decolonisation (Adrian, 1962: 6). The ideology implemented to promote non-
violent activism and rights recognition in a distinct claim of ‘Africaness’ was deemed Pan-
Africanism. This section will look briefly at the Western foundations of Pan-Africanism and its 
application, followed by an analysis of how it was transferred by political elites to the African 
continent. 
Due to its inherently expressive nature, there exists no concrete definition for the term Pan-
Africanism.  Instead, most contemporary descriptions offer is an overview of its ideals and 
practical applications in the hope that its goals are tangibly applied. No substantial inquiry is 
required to realise that Pan-Africanism, in the sense of the West and the African continent, was 
a tool to create unity and purpose in the seeking of equal rights dissemination to people of 
colour. In this light, Pan-Africanism was first popularised in the United States by WEB Du Bois 
in the early 20th century. Du Bois was a traditional intellect and a scholar of social literature. He 
was known best for his unequivocal non-racialist activism and humanitarian concern (Young, 
2001: 236). The sardonic atmosphere surrounding the disrespectful treatment of people of 
colour had a profound effect on the emotive quality of his writing: 
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 David Diop was a West African Senegalese colonial poet, the poem above is simply titled: The Time of the Martyr 
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Immediately in Africa a black back runs red with the blood of the lash; in India a brown 
girl is raped; in China a coolie starves; in Alabama seven darkies are more than lynched, 
while in London the limbs of a white prostitute are hung with jewels and silk (Du Bois 
quoted in Mazrui and Tidy, 1984: 16). 
The frightful disdain openly exposed by Du Bois at the turn of the 20th century describes a world 
blighted by discrimination and inequality on the basis of genetics. The excerpt’s appeal is 
momentous as it draws reference to a dysfunctional global moral compass which allows a 
prostitute to live lavishly, as long as she is white and an innocent person of colour to be 
dehumanised and persecuted without sufficient reason. Disheartening and vivid descriptions 
such as these assisted in stirring the masses towards civil disobedience and protest in America in 
the early 1900s. 
Evidently, as Colin Legum (1965: 15) appropriately mirrors the writing of Du Bois, Pan-
Africanism is based upon the premise of deep feelings of dispossession, oppression, persecution 
and rejection. The emotions derived from these adjectives supplement a theme termed ‘alien 
and exile’. The term alludes to the period of slavery by which African Americans were cruelly 
exported to the Americas to be owned as property and put to work not for personal economic 
gain but rather for the sake of their self-preservation. Legum (1965: 16-18) further specifies core 
ideals within Pan-Africanism such as black solidarity; the rejection of inferiority to express pride 
within their colour; and the recollection of a shared continental descent and history.  
However, it does not serve Pan-Africanism the respect it deserves to view it through academic 
interpretation. Nationalism, the search for identity and rights recognition is most often an 
emotive campaign (Heywood, 2007: 148). It is defined somewhat mystically upon the 
primordial attachments couched in likeness and common historical experience of similar 
persons and groups, in the case of pan-African development, a shared ‘blackness’ and the 
maltreatment it entailed acted as a unifier. Pan-African thought leader, Ali Mazrui (1995: 35), 
termed this non-academic propulsion with slight condescension as ‘romantic primitivism’. 
Further consideration suggests that the use of the word ‘primitivism’ was not to condemn 
Africans as primitive but to suggest that primordial attachments by study of new-world 
rationalist empiricism was considered illogical. To this accord, many have scoffed at the 
analytical offerings by Western scholars on Pan-Africanism that only someone of African 
descent could rightfully understand its ideological position. Nevertheless, Pan-Africanism as a 
proponent of nationalistic endeavour found fortitude in literature and poetry. Aimé Césaire, one 
of the most celebrated Pan-Africanist versifiers, sarcastically yet defiantly wrote, 
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Hooray for those who never invented anything 
Hooray for those who never discovered anything 
Hooray for joy! Hooray for love! 
Hooray for the pain of incarnate tears. 
My Négritude is no tower and no cathedral 
It delves into the deep red flesh of the soil.7 
The poem above, although devoid of subtlety, portrayed perfectly the inferiority that was 
attached to being black or of African descent. It was not to say that indeed Africans had no 
history of their own, but rather that Césaire lambasted the Eurocentric view of the time that only 
the history of the West should be respected and glorified. Essentially, by suggesting that which 
Europeans had conquered and invented, they had in the process disregarded the prospective 
development of other continents and left them only with interrupted history and progression as 
viewed through conditioned Western lenses (Mazrui, 1995:35). Négritude (or blackness) was 
seen as a non-violent expression of pride in one’s black race. With incredible composure, 
négritude stated furthermore that these expressions should not be chauvinistic or innately 
arrogant. Léopold Senghor, who would later become the first independent leader of Senegal, is 
accredited most with the concept of négritude as an important facet contained under the 
umbrella of Pan-African philosophy. Further evaluation of Senghor’s work will be explored later 
in the chapter. 
For now, it is important not to ignore a second grand contributor to Pan-Africanism outside of 
Africa. Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican residing in America, would become yet another significant 
challenger to the discriminatory status quo maintained globally in the early 20th century. He 
notably formed the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Harlem in 1914. 
Protesting societal and economic inequality suffered by African Americans in the United States, 
Garvey was able to canvass significantly for the causes of liberty and equality, ironically the 
ideals underpinned by the Enlightenment period and showcased in American liberal 
constitutionalism (Geiss, 1969: 191). Intriguingly, such a fervent African nationalist was Garvey, 
that he later inspired the likes of Mohamed Ali Duse, who would become a key figure in the 
struggle for Nigerian independence along with his organisation the National Council of Nigerian 
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Citizens (Geiss, 1969:191). Even more famously, after Ghana gained independence in 1958, 
Garvey relocated to the former labelled Gold Coast to serve as a political advisor to Kwame 
Nkrumah, the man widely regarded as the father of African nationalism. 
Upon looking at the foundations of Pan-Africanism, it becomes pertinent to look at its 
manifestations in the truly African continental sense. The most important inquisition begs the 
question: How did a theory constructed as an opponent to racism in the West develop into a 
nationalistic movement for Africans in Africa? This question tends to baffle even the primary 
contributors on Pan-Africanism. Perhaps it will be important to come to some sort of 
characterisation for this movement in the African sense. Charles Adrian (1962:6) simplistically 
defines Pan-Africanism as a search for organisation and community. This is indeed a fitting way 
to describe any kind of nationalism, as we consider it from an elemental stance, as an 
introspective search for identity and the recognition thereof. Adrian (1962: 6-7) goes on to 
describe the fundamental goal inspiring pan-African theory, 
[Organisation] is needed to mobilise resources and directly implement such goals as the 
full achievement of African freedom, rapid economic growth, societal modernisation, 
unity in foreign affairs and a restoration of African culture. These goals of Pan-Africanism 
coincide with the objectives of African nations [...] as a general goal, the inclusive idea of 
Pan-Africanism seeks the eventual unity of all African peoples. In more particular senses, 
one form of Pan-Africanism desires to attain economic and social progress through 
pragmatic or functional unions. 
What Adrian describes here is the sense of togetherness and camaraderie expressed by Africans 
in unison. Theoretically, these sentiments appear sound in an argumentative sense to promote 
independence. What of course was not considered, highlighted on numerous occasions in the 
previous chapter, was that Africa’s intercepted history had re-routed the continent on a course 
whereby the recognition of microcosmic ethnic diversity was treasured above the fleeting 
concept of a ‘nation’, let alone a sense of continental nationalism. Authors such as Claude Ake 
(1965: 534) contend that Pan-Africanism in this regard would assist in rousing the masses to 
seek independence from colonial rule, but as an artificial form of communitarianism, its 
longevity could not possibly be sustained. Ake, as was seen in the previous chapter, was one of 
the biggest critics of African leadership. His most scything insinuation was that African leaders 
promoted both Pan-Africanism and later African socialism in a feeble attempt to remain 
vanguards of their respective political kingdoms (Ake, 1965: 537). An evaluation of the 
aforementioned statements may shed light on why overwhelming perceptions of failure 
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surround institutions such as the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the concept 
of the nation-state in Africa. 
To reiterate, the key challenge one is faced with concerning Pan-Africanism, surrounds how it 
became applicable and pliable to the African continental strife for formal political independence. 
This first causal link that can be drawn is in looking at the regular attendance of African political 
elites at pan-African congressional meetings. This attendance was most famously witnessed 
from the periods of 1919 till the end of World War II where a climatic peak of indigenous African 
elite attendees was noted at the Manchester Pan-African Congress of 1945. Up until 1945, pan-
African congressional meetings had been led by esteemed figures of the West mentioned earlier, 
such as WEB Du Bois and Marcus Garvey and only sporadically attended by indigenous Africans 
in exile (Legum, 1965: 28). Perhaps there was limited engagement from Africans due to the 
ideals the congress espoused at the time, as little mention was made of the African 
independence plights. By a fervently displayed resolution at the Paris convention of 1919, WEB 
Du Bois’ resolutions called for, 
International laws to protect the native; for the land to be held in trust; for the prevention 
of exploitation by foreign capital; for the abolition of slavery and capital punishment; for 
the right of education, and, finally, it insisted that the natives of Africa must have the 
right to participate in the Government as fast as their development permits (Legum, 
1965: 29). 
Interestingly, although no direct mention of the African continent is made in the statement 
above, it is simple to draw a causal link between the ideals of Pan-Africanism in the West and 
the plight of Africans. What is displayed in the excerpt above, beyond the rejection of racial 
discrimination, is the strife for liberty and equality. At a substantive level within American and 
Western European democracies, black people sought greater freedom of movement and equality 
in government services and resource distribution. Linking this to the African independence 
plight, the result of formal independence for African state would constitute the same allowances 
of freedom and equality sought by Afro-Europeans and Afro-Americans in the West. 
These sentiments were further cemented in analytical contributions by Young (2001: 237) who 
stated that, 
[...] African and American Pan-Africanism gave both constituencies particular strength 
by virtue of a combined international solidarity and common political programme 
demanding representation, land rights, education, economic reconstruction, and an end 
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to racism and institutionalised racist practices. Moreover, it developed as an independent 
project beholden to neither of the great world powers or their ideologies. 
The point at which these sentiments were unified between Africans of the West and indigenous 
Africans was at the Pan-African Manchester Congress of 1945. The event was considered 
ground-breaking in terms of drawing potential on the new young African leaders. Exiles of 
considerable notoriety such as Kwame Nkrumah, Kurankyi Taylor, Joe Appiah, representatives 
of Dr. Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, Togolese 
poet Dr. Raphael Armattoe and Otto Makonnen who served as director of the African Affairs 
Centre in Accra, Ghana. The mission statement this time around was clearly inclusive of the 
African continental plight. The congresses made demands for the autonomy and independence 
of Black Africa “[...] so far, and no further, than it is possible in this One World for groups and 
peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation” (Legum, 1965: 32).  
This provocative statement outlined the right to self-determination that Africans had been 
stripped of since their very first substantial contact and subjugation by Europeans centuries 
before. 
Other momentous recognitions at this particular congress were the unanimous decision to use 
positive-action in protest of the mistreatment of Africans in Africa, within the dignified moral 
framework and borrowed from Gandhi’s teachings of humility and patience in India’s search for 
independence from colonial rule. Furthermore, whispers of the development of political 
institutions also appeared formally around this time. A political resolution of “One man, one 
vote” to express equality amongst African citizens was motioned and although no direct mention 
of socialism was made it was certainly insinuated in socio-economic terms. This was seen in the 
“[...] condemnation of the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone” (Legum, 
1965: 32). Unfortunately, due to centuries of colonial domination by Europeans over Africa, to 
contemporary African elites of the time, a capitalistic mode of production was seen as inherently 
flawed by its penchant for exploitation. To the detriment of the concept of capitalism, it could 
not be divorced from the effects of imperialist economic conquest. 
As these attitudes progressed, the ideological counteraction to the West’s socio-economic model 
would be conceptualised as Black Marxism (Young, 2001: 239). As the African position within 
their homeland was signified by a perceived racialised class struggle, the European colonialists 
standing as the ‘bourgeoisie’ and Africans as ‘proletariat’, it would become easy for African 
intellectuals to draw comparisons and similarities between the era of industrialisation in Europe 
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and the economic subjugation of indigenous Africans on the African continent. In this regard, 
African socialism found an ideological foothold. 
In continuum of evaluating African politics by looking at primordial socio-politics in opposition 
to more rationally conceived ideological thinking, Ian Duffield forwards an intriguing argument. 
Duffield (1977: 598), in the process of delineating the search for a truly African political 
ideology, surmised of mid twentieth century African thought that,  
Throughout [the conceptualisation] occurs, in opposition to each other, the words 
romantic, irrational, eclectic traditional, emotional, on the one hand; and rational, 
modernising, modern on the other. We already have ‘Socialism, Utopian and Scientific’. 
Highlighted above, we are exhibited to some degree, the makings of a political renaissance in 
Africa, much like the Enlightenment period in Europe. The onus here is on a veritably African 
interpretation of modern ideologies and governance i.e. models they could call their own.  Even 
though Africans did not truly seek to model their political systems in the same manner as those 
that had colonised them, a certain modernisation away from archaic socio-political traditions 
had occurred. Pan-African nationalism signified everything that was irrational to the modern 
secularly inclined thinker, the genetic and historical bonds of a shared négritude. Although 
unsustainable because it did not prescribe a specific political and socio-economic state of affairs 
for a free African state, Pan-Africanism could still be used in its primordial capacity to unite 
Africans against the colonial oppressor. Once this was achieved, a remarkable amalgamated and 
reconstituted format of socialist ideology would be applied by elites in the post-colonial era. This 
method encompassed elements of négritude and communitarianism in the pan-African sense, 
but also to create a sustainable model of governance, these facets were merged to the trends of 
socialist and communist attitudes prevalent of the bi-polar power structure characterising the 
post-World War II world. One of the greatest offshoots of decolonisation was an atmosphere 
where new African elites of the 1960s such as Senghor and Kenyatta for instance affirmed that, 
“[...] above all, that African leaders no longer need or want us to look after them, or tell them 
what to do. In this they might be wise or be foolish; but this is a fact of modern Africa” (Legum, 
1964: 186). Legum solidifies the stubbornness and belligerence that many African leaders 
showed towards taking political guidance from the West that had colonised them. Not to 
undermine African leadership of the time, but evidently it was considered more fashionable to 
take inspiration from elsewhere when configuring African governance in a post-colonial Africa. 
The next section will deal exclusively with the theory and initially perceived pragmatism of 
African socialism. 
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African Socialism versus African Vanguards of Authoritarianism 
Socialism, although similarly found on the left of the ideological spectrum, as is the 
phenomenon that is orthodox communism, propose a dissimilarity that make the two 
ideological premises fundamentally different. Pertinent to this section, this fundamental 
theoretical difference must be explored before one can term African socialism as indeed 
socialism. 
Socialism and orthodox communism (in the Leninist configuration) share more fundamental 
ideals at a theoretical level than they do differences (Heywood, 2007: 101). At its foundations, it 
is commonly held that the left of the ideological spectrum purports equality. The further along 
the spectrum one travels left, the greater the egalitarian influence. African leaders of the 
independence era revelled in just how much equality was prescribed by socialism. 
Socialism strives for equality of outcome, above conversely, the liberal insistence on equality of 
opportunity. Hence, socialism’s ideologically utopian world proposes social equality without 
racial, ethnic, gender or any other format of discrimination; equality at the political level 
whereby each member of the state has equal political rights and is considered equal in the eyes 
of the judicial system; and finally, equality in terms of economic standing which is often the 
most difficult of these ideals to attain (Heywood, 2007: 102-108). These goals can be achieved in 
part through equal resource distribution and near astronomical state expenditure on social 
welfare policies.  
Conceivably then, socialism to African leaders could have served as the perfect ideology to apply 
to a newly independent African state. However, the problem statement is one that is implicit in 
most ideological failures throughout the history of human political society: incorrect or 
mismanaged application of the theoretical model into a sustainable practical governmental 
policy framework. As with the demise of mid twentieth century Nazi fascism or late twentieth 
century Soviet communism, examining the failures of African socialism in practice should be the 
next avenue to travel. 
Disregarding the unenviable task of living up to the theoretical premises of any ideology, so as to 
frame it within the complex historiography of twentieth century African politics, African 
socialism requires an assessment in its own right.  
Socialism, as understood by studious African academic diasporas (who subsequently became the 
continent’s political elites at independence), valued the ideology simply because they found 
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many similarities in its prescriptions for society in relation to their philosophical musings of 
natural African society before colonial interruption. As a means to provide social welfare for all 
and reduce poverty within a ravaged post-colonial Africa, political elites sought to limit 
dependence on the West. Even though many African states favoured a socialist state capacity, 
they were careful not to ‘Easternise’ their politics either (Thomson, 2010: 38). Distinct of 
African socialism was the unanimous claim, captured perfectly by Senegal’s first independent 
president Léopold Senghor (1959: 91) that, 
It is evident that African socialism can no longer be that of Marx and Engels, which was 
designed in the nineteenth century according to European scientific methods and 
realities. Now it must take into consideration African realities. 
Of course what Senghor intimated with this statement was the consideration of vastly different 
situational development between Europe and Africa. Evident in Marxist literature was a formal 
practical application based on the perceived injustices of a European status quo. In other words, 
Marxist socialism required a socio-economic environment that contained an oppressive 
industrial bourgeoisie (middle-class) and a disgruntled subjugated proletariat (working class) 
(Heywood, 2007: 119). Africa at independence had none of these foundational requirements, 
therefore classical Marxist socialism was not an achievable reality. Instead, the only facet of 
African public that marginally reflected a similar prestige and standing to that of European 
bourgeoisie were the patrimony propagating bourgeoisie (Ekeh, 1975: 97-99). However, this 
African administrative-bourgeoisie was not independent of the regulatory branches of the 
patrimonial state. Africa during this period would then be left with only elitist propagated 
authoritarian governance and a large peasantry that had little to zero access to the state and its 
policy making decisions. 
Socialism, however, still seemed to suit the goals of African leadership in the 1960s, as 
embedded in its configuration was the ideal of communitariasm that had been immortalised in 
pan-African nationalist discourse, and the same type of camaraderie expressed in Senghor’s 
négritude, Nyerere’s ujamaa and the vastly advocated innate sense of ubuntu found in many 
African group identities. To this extent, policies orientated in an African socialist manner would 
have been welcomed by greater civil society in the African continent. 
Some advocates of African socialism such as the renowned Kenyan political thinker and 
politician, Tom Mboya (1963: 17), bolstered these claims with statements such as these, 
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We have already made a very positive beginning for in the concept of Pan-Africanism, 
with its insistence on African brotherhood, non-alignment vis-a-vis ideological Power 
Blocks, the African personality, democracy etc... We have a set of values and beliefs which 
give meaning and direction to our political demands and objectives. You all know that 
Pan-Africanism is a movement based on our common destiny and the presence of 
traditional brotherhood. 
Mboya describes here what he saw as the inherent socialist traits contained in traditional and 
indigenous African ways, to act as a legitimating force for the implementation of African 
socialism. He further imbues the attribution of socialism to Africa by discussing the natural 
African way of life,  
In Africa the belief that ‘we are all sons (and daughters) of the soil’ has exercised 
tremendous influence on our social, economic and political relationships. Arising from 
this belief is the logic and practice of equality. [...] The hoe became the symbol of work, 
every able-bodied male and female worked. Laziness was not tolerated and there were 
appropriate social sanctions and ethics to encourage hard work and industriousness. 
Poverty existed but it was not due to man exploiting man [the insinuation that this was 
the result of imperial occupation and capitalism] (Mboya, 1963: 18). 
Tom Mboya would go on to contribute little else to the concept of African socialism due to his 
untimely assassination on July 5th 1969. As seen as a true inspiration to the people of Kenya as 
one of their most incomparable government officials, it was said that his assassination was 
fuelled by the paranoia that he may have defeated the great incumbent Jomo Kenyatta in a 
presidential election had he lived (Anyang’Nyong’o, 1989: 241). Yet, regardless of whether 
African regimes of the post-postcolonial era implemented democratic procedure correctly or 
ethically, it was clear to many African thinkers that in socio-economic policy the most African 
way of building an economy would be in a socialist manner.  
What this would entail of course was the concept of a strong centralised state; capitalism of any 
format would be state controlled (for the benefit of the greater citizenry); and a new format of 
public enterprise fuelled industrialisation to promote labour, modernisation and economic 
growth (Thomson, 2010: 39).  
Although the political atmosphere became increasingly unstable during the period between 1960 
and 1970, remarkably the economic policies that the first African leaders espoused and 
subsequently implemented appeared initially to have worked, 
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Enthused by a permissive international climate with an avid appetite for raw material 
from Africa, post-colonial leaders embraced the notion of rapid development was 
possible through intense industrialisation. For indigenous leaders, independence was an 
opportunity to demonstrate not only their qualities as human beings but also their 
competence as state managers. Nkrumah [of Ghana] believed that with self-government, 
Africa could be a ‘paradise in ten years’. Nkrumah’s optimism derived from his 
unshakable faith in dominant development theories of the day: modernization and 
industrialisation theories (Poku and Mdee, 2011: 31-32). 
Knowingly, and that which socialism could never account for even as far back as in its Marxist 
foundations was: Who/what type of state would drive this growth? The unequivocal answer to 
this was the same as that which reinforced orthodox communism in the Soviet Union. The 
state’s authority in decision-making needed to be centralised and it needed a vanguard structure 
to regulate the correct method for growth and steady the proverbial reformist ship (Poku and 
Mdee, 2011: 32). In the case of Africa, this would entail the construction of authoritarian 
regimes or pseudo-democracies8 sustained by independence era incumbents and their inflated 
loyal bureaucracies. A portion of this section should be dedicated to exhibiting how the concept 
of African socialism evolved into an amalgamation of communism and authoritarianism to add 
practical value to this proposed critique of Africa’s first independent governments. 
Unbeknown to African incumbents of the postcolonial era, the Vanguardian9 super-structure 
intimated above would prove to be their undoing only a few years after independence had been 
achieved. Socialist or not, besides the lineage defined rule instituted by monarchy, there is only 
one way in which a regime can transition from one incumbent to the next. This transition could 
only occur by forceful removal, most commonly by means of military coup d’état. In the period 
between 1960-1982, most African states were granted independence from their colonial 
oppressors; and during this period almost 90 percent of the 45 independent African states had 
incurred a military overthrow of some format. In total there were 52 successful coups in the 
same timeframe, evidence enough to label military overthrow as the only ‘institutionalised 
mechanism of succession’ on the African continent (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990: 862). 
                                                          
8
 The term loosely characterises democratic systems that merely pretended to espouse democratic values, but 
tended to be authoritarian at their core. 
9
 Vanguardism is applied in the method that Heywood (2007) intends, which describes a strong overarching and 
restrictive government, which controls the egalitarian progression of society as a legitimation of and justification 
for authoritarianism. 
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Responsible for the majority of the coup d’états expressed above, were the failures of African 
elites to become true champions of the African socialist ideals they had prescribed as plentiful 
for nation-building and state building. In reality, these leaders became immortalised and 
mystique laden figures to their greater civil societies. In this context it is interesting to note the 
latter stages of Nkrumah’s political career. The more successful, accredited and reputable he 
became, the more distrusting and isolating the affect this had on him (Merideth 2006: 179-180). 
Africa’s big men were cursed with a sense of self-assuming divinity that made them stubborn in 
their political position, conspiratorial and unrelenting in the achievement of their respective 
visions. In many cases, even with defeat staring them blankly in the face, they persisted with 
dictatorial fervour until they were subsequently overthrown. With regards to Nkrumah and 
many other African incumbents, socialist state economic policy had bled much of the continent’s 
leading agricultural sectors dry not long after formal independence was granted (Thomson, 
2010: 40). Fighting a losing battle to prop up failed industrialisation policy and wasteful public 
enterprises, would prove to be a war that these incumbents could not win. Weakened by 
bureaucratic inflation and economic decline, these suffering African socialist regimes became 
ripe for the taking by factional militia groups who saw control of the regime as the only real cash 
cow any African state had to offer. 
Astoundingly, in some harsh critiques of the first independent African regimes, accusations of 
fascism were levelled at some of Africa’s great liberators. Russell Howe (1966: 27) cited quite 
unsympathetically the disposition of Kwame Nkrumah’s governance of Ghana by noting the 
differences between communism and fascism, 
[...] in economic ideology: Communism favours state ownership of everything, and 
compromises with this ideal only in the measure that expediency dictates. Fascism 
believes in ‘National Socialism’ with a strong government sector of the economy, but 
encourages the existence of large and efficient private enterprises. In this respect, Ghana 
under Nkrumah was a fairly typical fascist state. 
Howe, a pan-African fundamentalist writer, spared no respect in this critique of Nkrumah’s 
Ghana in the lead up to the incumbent’s eventual political downfall. What he describes in the 
excerpt above is the condition of an African leader so obsessed with exponential socio-economic 
growth that he, knowingly or unknowingly, abandoned the principles of socialism in order to 
achieve it. As Nkrumah clamped down on civil rights and liberties and centralised state 
processes towards the executive wing in his final years as Ghana’s incumbent, it became more 
evident that governance had taken a fascist turn. With the pressures of a rampantly materialistic 
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bureaucracy under him and a large civil society yearning for rapid progression and social 
transformation, Nkrumah would not be the only founding father of an African regime to contort 
his ideals in a vain attempt to advance prosperity.  
The insinuation from Eurocentric critics of African socialism was widespread during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Typically, their separate evaluations inevitably drew the same conclusion, that 
socialism was not any more suited to Africa than it was to areas of Europe where it had been 
implemented incapably. Even the Soviet communist approach so admired by aspiring socialists 
the world over was proven an authoritarian farce. Russia’s most historically relevant revolution 
in October 1917, which implemented Vladimir Lenin as vanguard of the achievement of socialist 
ideals, was ultimately a transfer of power characterised by an elite overthrow of the existing 
order. At the time, Russia’s industrial economy was underdeveloped, there was no industrial 
bourgeoisie to overwhelm; and the proletariat was less an urban working class and more an 
ignorant rural peasantry (Heywood, 2007: 123-124). A famous critique of socialist ideology, 
Marina Ottoway, expressed a similar opinion of socialist implementation in Africa. Ottoway 
(1978, 478) had a similarly cynical opinion of African socialism, 
Socialist transformation is seen as an integral part of the process of development, not 
simply a political choice. Thus, there can be no socialism without sufficient development. 
African countries are too backward to be socialist. The condition of underdevelopment 
which makes a socialist choice impossible at the present time is an age-old condition, the 
result of a historical failure to develop technologically and culturally. 
There are a few points of contention within this remorseless appraisal of socialism on the 
African continent. The first failure is one that has blighted the application of the ideology since 
Marx first prescribed a revolution of the masses. As the practical requirements for socialist 
development purport, there was neither a capitalist middle-class nor a blue collar proletariat in 
existence in Africa. As examples thus far have shown, there was the colonial administration that 
had just relinquished its power; an African political elite and their supporting governing 
bureaucracies; and finally an impoverished uneducated, mostly rurally based African civil 
society. The necessary precursors for socialism did not exist; it was no more adaptable to the 
African continent at the time than the concept of democracy had been.  
Secondly, true socialism would be required to reach its zenith or climax in an already 
industrialised society. African states left ravaged by the colonial era were hardly considered the 
pinnacle of the industrialised world. On the contrary, at independence most African states had 
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an agriculturally based, primary goods producing economy. Industrialisation was rather 
introduced in nationalisation driven economic policy by the first independent leaders.  
Despite a flagrantly desperate promotion of socialism to Africans by their great liberators, the 
ideology ultimately shared very little semblance with the African society that colonialism had 
left behind. Even the much emphasised communitarian idealism that socialism allegedly shared 
with African societies would be called into question by ethno-religious competition and conflict. 
These issues and others will be examined in the following chapter when looking at state failure 
and what William Zartman (1995: 3) fittingly termed the “collapsed state”.  
Some of the characteristics of African socialism, with its distinct Vanguardian nature, could 
further be attributed in retrospect to the post-colonial Sudanese regimes of especially Abboud 
and Nimeiry. A post-independent Sudan would similarly cave to the disfigured ideological 
underpinnings of one-partyism, government controlled economic growth and social policies 
promoting culturally intolerant “unity-in-conformity” format of nationalism (Viorst, 1995; El-
Battahani, 2007; Mamdani, 2011). Furthermore, whilst a unified former Sudan formed part of 
the wider North African region at independence from Europe, it is also important to note its 
historical connection to the path of Pan-Arabism. 
Pan-Arabism, Identity as perceived through Islam’s North African 
Trajectory 
Noting the contributions of Pan-Africanism and African Socialism to the advance of the post-
colonial African citizen, there is one further phenomenon that has greatly influenced the 
African’s modern sense of political identity. In this instance we cannot avoid assessing the 
advent of Pan-Arabism to an already diverse political landscape in Africa, especially in the 
formerly unified Sudan. Whilst the specific dates may be contested by historical estimates, one 
thing is certain, Arab conquest and assimilation in North Africa (a contested concept in itself) 
was well established before the formal partition of Africa at the Berlin conference of 1884-1885. 
The concurred sentiment was that Arabisation had progressed from the North-East of Africa 
westwards well before the completion of the first millennium AD (Ruay, 1994: 157). In terms of 
the Sudan the first formally documented Arabisation project appeared with the Mahdists in 
1881, as Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Abdallah ascended to leader of the Sudan, forcing the Turks out 
and implementing Sharia directed governance (Ruay, 1994: 159). Evidence here suggests then 
that Arab influence on the African continent has even longer standing historical legacy than the 
European colonial period. What should also be briefly highlighted for now is how these 
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caliphates (Islamic dynasties) collided with European imperialism (especially with the British) 
from the late 19th century onwards; and subsequently how that affected the identity landscape. 
What is not doubted is that separate ethnic and cultural development was not easily entertained 
by the Islamist trajectory through Africa. By the fifteenth century AD, the assimilatory hand of 
Islam had already traversed Africa and reached as far west as the Senegalese river valley 
(O’Brien, 1981: 158). With such influence throughout Africa, diplomacy would inevitably become 
a delicate affair for, most notably, French and British colonial forces on the continent. The most 
apparent reason for stating this, manifests in the manner in which Islamic rule on the African 
continent had been bolstered for centuries. If religious fundamentalism can be indulged as 
ideology, as it is widely recognised at present day, then the Islamic trajectory westwards through 
North Africa can be widely accepted as one of the African continent’s first real interactions with 
an all-encompassing ideology. This is certainly what Sharia governance entailed. To 
contextualise, ideology in this instance is seen as, 
[…] a set of political and social ideals which guide the policies of a government or party, 
and which tends to constitute a dominant doctrine in as much as it becomes the 
ideological expression of a ruling power. From this perspective the concept of ideology 
presumes not only a structured body of ideas centred around a vision for society, but also 
a political power or at least the will of a political authority (Ibn Khaldun would have 
called it asabiyya), aspiring to realise that vision. In general, an ideology is the doctrinal 
expression of power (Merad, 1981: 37). 
 In this way, Islam is affirmed as more profoundly a political and socio-economic way of being 
than merely a reflection of religious conscription for the Africans historically socialised to live a 
Sharia way of life. This is imperative to understanding the North African complex, that the 
perpetuation of Islamic politics was not a superficial cover but more substantially instilled in 
society. In essence, political Islam in colonial and pre-colonial North Africa presumes a rule 
conveniently associated with the authoritarian exploits of monarchical rule in Western Europe 
during medieval periods. Associations are apparent in the way the social contract between the 
citizens and the incumbent are tied together by a non-secular and faith-based bond. Islamic rule 
produces political authority for the preservation of the community and status quo. Anderson 
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(1991: 95) highlights the existence of Khalifa10  to guide the faithful towards achieving the 
common good.  
More eloquently displayed, Albert Hourani (cited in Anderson, 1991: 96) described the ruler as, 
The ideal of the absolute ruler, standing apart from the society he rules, responsible only 
to God or to his own highest self; regulating the different orders of that society in the light 
of the principles of justice, so as to enable each to act in accordance with its own nature, 
to live in harmony with others, and to contribute its share to the general good. 
Such a portrayal depicts one glaring central issue that may be contested by some if not many. 
This is the issue of legitimacy. What is dealt with here is a brand of moral authority encased in 
political legitimacy that is not acceptable to those who do not subscribe to the faith-based 
proposition of the common good at hand. This highlights one of the primary reasons for ethno-
religious conflict in non-secular states, not least disregarding the case of Sudan. Sharia law is 
largely problematic in that it offers no constitutional solution of inclusive citizenship to the 
many that do not associate themselves with Islam at a greater level. Within the constraints of the 
study, this accentuates the most pertinent issue in the struggle for identity rights when looking 
at the case of Sudan.  
As was previously indicated earlier in this chapter, the greater Sudan provides an absorbing 
ethno-religious identity complex that sets it somewhat apart from many of the examples dealt 
with thus far. Generally agreed upon when assessing the political history of the Sudan, it is 
commonly known that the area experienced two separate colonial periods in its recent history. 
The first of these periods, between 1820 and 1885, Sudan was under the custodianship of Egypt; 
and later between 1898 and 1956 it formed part of the colonial empire of Great Britain (O’Fahey, 
1996: 258). In this time it is safe to assume that a considerable amount of influence and 
institutions were imposed upon and eventually socialised into Sudanese politics and society. The 
Islamist movement progressed more enthusiastically through the Sudan from the 1800s 
onwards, which saw the entrenchment of Islamic riverain elite throughout the north of the 
country, extending predominantly from Aswan to Khartoum and including also Gezira in and 
around the Nile valley (O’Fahey, 1996: 259).  Sufi Islam brotherhoods of Khatmiyya, Isma’iliyaa 
and Rashidiyya of origin of the Moroccan mystics were also prevalent in the area at these times. 
                                                          
10
 Khalifa refers to the caliph i.e. someone who is divinely ordained by the Prophet Muhammad to rule over a given 
territory. 
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The British colonial interlude also did much to promote the continuity of Islamist dominance in 
the north of the Sudan between 1898 and 1956. This is even highlighted to the extent where the 
reinforcement of the British colonial presence was said to have brought a constitutionally 
orientated refinement of Islamist rule to the Sudan (O’Fahey, 1996: 260). It was no secret, in 
addition to what will be examined further in chapter five that colonial powers tended to favour 
lighter skinned ethno-religious groups such as the Sudanese Muslims over the darker 
indigenous Africans found further south of the country. This would prove to produce severe 
consequences in post-colonial Sudan where the resentment of separate characterisations 
inevitably lead to grievance based ethnic conflict (Sharkey, 2008: 24). 
At first the British colonial influence sought to create a unified Sudan, but after revolt in Egypt 
in 1919 against British opposition, the imperialists subsequently became wary of the Islamic 
Mahdists in the North and decided to arm indigenous military forces in the south and federalise 
the country for reassurance (Mamdani, 2011: 55).  It could be said that at the time this 
development seemed more pragmatic and would certainly be easier for the British to administer 
the region by splitting Khartoum and Juba. Of course, in the event of decolonisation, this 
separation would lay the groundwork for the inability for the Sudan to function as a unified 
state. It is difficult to find an unbiased perspective on the legitimacy of the separate political 
identities formed during the British colonial period. However, trusted scholars such as Mamdani 
(2011: 56) contend that Northern writers condemned British Southern Sudan policy as a 
colonial aberration, which propagated the formation of Christian political elite in the south that 
should not have existed. Furthermore, these sentiments were reflected by the people of the 
south that Northern policy had “coddled a tribal and sectarian (Muslim) elite in the north”.  
Evidently, there was a mutual lack of willingness to accept the legitimacy of the north by the 
south and vice versa. 
A progression of events leading up to independence turmoil in 1956, saw the continued 
strangulation of political power in the Sudan by the Arab dominated North. The British left in 
place a coalition council that was directed towards Northern Sudanisation, whereby all senior 
posts were allocated to Northerners, federal powers were denied, and only 6 of the 800 
committee members were Southerners (Mamdani, 2011: 57). This created an untenable 
situation for Southerners at independence from Britain in 1956, knowing that if they did not 
resist the policies attached to this domination, the process of Arabisation would eradicate their 
ethno-religious identity. In the Sudan, the Arabisation process, first overseen by General 
Ibrahim Abboud would attempt to assimilate all indigenous Africans into an Islamist national 
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profile by banning churches and expelling all foreign missionaries by 1962; and replacing them 
with mosques and Islamic religious schools. One could even advocate for the notion that this 
process shared very similar techniques to that of the European colonisers before. The 
remarkable consequence of the politics of domination is that once the shackles of one dominant 
force are lifted, the preservation of the practises of dominance seemingly remains intact. The 
main point of departure to recognise is that habitual institutional frameworks, even ones that 
cause some groups to dictate the political and social lives of others are not easily broken.  
The extent to which this supremacy was disseminated upon all citizens of the Sudan mirrors 
other formats of authoritarian suppressions that might be considered a hindrance to a greater 
sense of nationalism and its ability to thrive.  Much like national policies of African socialism, 
such as Nyerere’s Ujamaa discussed earlier, Arabisation constituted a similar sweeping 
ideological platform that all citizens of Sudan had to subscribe to since independence from 
Britain. Sharkey (2008: 22) explains, 
Arabisation as a post-colonial policy of national integration has been a failure. By 
provoking hostility and resistance, the top-down policy of ta’rib [assimilation] has 
undermined the very national unity that its proponents sought to achieve in the years 
that followed decolonisation in the 1950s. At the same time, the policy of ta’rib has 
contributed to Sudan’s woeful history of civil strife in Southern Sudan. 
The purpose of portraying the underlying struggles within the Sudan, before discussing the 
secession of South Sudan later in this study, essentially leads to a conversation of how the 
exploits of dominance and/or exclusion contribute to the deepening of fragmented identity 
related struggles. In the case of the Sudan the premise is relatively simple. Citizens who possess 
an alternative religion, culture and ethnic antiquity most assuredly would resist attempts to have 
their legacy consumed and be subsequently wiped from the pages of history. Verily, this may 
also be somewhat compared to the direct colonial policy utilised by the French and Portuguese 
briefly discussed in chapter two. As Thomson (2010: 62) intimates, the implementation of direct 
colonial rule had similarly dire consequential results to that of indirect rule once African 
countries gained independence. The difference was that direct rule creates a platform for revolt 
not because groups suffer exclusion due to categorisation, but rather as a result of a dominant 
group trying to consume and assimilate other identities to promote unity under one cultural-
religious dogma. As the implication suggests that Animist and/or Christian beliefs, for instance, 
are backward and antiquated, this provides the dominant identity group the legitimacy it needs 
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to eradicate the legacy of the group in question. A deeper look into the restrictive nature of 
Sudanese socio-political policy since independence will be expanded in chapter five.  
Being mindful that each examinable case within the African continent may have its own 
situational constraints and underlying circumstances, there is a small theoretical proposition 
that may be made from examples that have been showcased thus far in the study. Alluding to the 
theoretical premise that binds this study, one could recall the theoretical triangle that accounts 
for the deepening of factionalist political identity in Africa. 
 At this stage the arguments displayed in this chapter revolve specifically around the second 
point of the triangle. That is, ethno-religious factionalism as an extension of the legacy of 
difference form the colonial period (point one), appeared too difficult to breakdown or wash 
over with ideology driven policy or constricting techniques of state induced nationalism. Most 
ostensibly noted, either policies promoting unity or policies excluding certain groups are not 
often left without considerable eventual rebellion. Most examples from this chapter provide 
relatively the same socio-political outcome of heightened factionalism.  The main reason for this 
is that the sometimes exclusive, socially restrictive and dominating policies of post-independent 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes alike did not assist in promoting unity under one national 
flag. In essence, these measures had the opposite effect. One can consider that a legacy of 
political rights and access to resources heavily conditioned by group categorisation and 
contestation would certainly not be erased by weakly implemented socialist and nationalist 
policies. This was furthermore aggravated by respective state bureaucracies, which did not 
properly invest in these elitist policies of national progression. In the face of continued neo-
patrimonial exclusion of many groups from the political process, the application of the second 
point of the triangle to many former indirect colonial states seems inevitable under these 
conditions.    
Concluding Remarks 
In each of the instances of Pan-Africanism, African Socialism, Pan-Arabism (Arabisation in a 
modern context), there is one glaring failure to highlight. Fortitude, in terms of tying people to a 
comprehensive sense of national identity or national policy directive, becomes a near impossible 
hard sell when ethnic or ethno-religious factionalism is engrained and institutionalised.   
What began as a harmonious adaptation of Pan-Africanism to the plight Africans and their 
struggle for independence in their respective homelands would unfortunately end with 
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ideological failure laid at the feet of the continent’s first independent leaders. Pan-Africanism 
was largely successful in its initial endeavours. It acted as the unifier to necessitate mobilisation 
towards the goal of self-determination for socio-political elites and broader African societies. 
Although it drew upon such concepts as négritude and the African societal penchant for 
solidarity, fraternity and communitarianism, Pan-Africanism could not assist further in 
promoting state nationalism once independence had been achieved. 
For that claim, many African elites turned to an amalgamation of pan-African ideals and (some) 
of the core foundations of socialist ideology to purport Africa’s own form of socialism. A 
combination of negligent ideological butchering and poor implemented economic policies, 
assisted heavily in plunging most of Africa’s first independent states into a spiral of ethno-
religious conflict, economic instability and countless militia backed coup d’états. It is hardly ever 
questioned that Africa’s great liberators did not have the best intentions. Even in the case of the 
Sudan at independence, General Abboud, at a gentle cursory glance, could have merely been 
seen as an idealist that sought to unify the Sudan. Unfortunately, his miscalculations were 
obvious in the way he undermined the convictions of animist and Christian groups within 
Sudan’s arbitrarily defined boundaries. 
Regrettably, these leaders were too stubborn to admit failure and surrender their ideals to a 
reformist approach that would prevent socio-economic decline any further. This inevitably led to 
a catastrophic and damaging authoritarian stranglehold on the respective states involved, an 
environment that seldom transitions without military overthrow. The consequences of the 
decline of the post-colonial African state will be further digested in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Identity, Ethno-religious 
Factionalism, Claims to Resources and Economic 
Self-determination 
“The national middle-class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary. Seen through its eyes, its 
mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the 
transforming line between the nation and capitalism, rampant though camouflaged… In the [post-] 
colonial countries, the spirit of indulgence is dominant at the core of the bourgeoisie” – Frantz Fanon 
(cited in Shivji, 2003) 
Introduction 
The declaration above by Frantz Fanon (1963) encases perfectly the most prevalent conundrum 
in African governance. A more simplistic way to explain this dilemma may be found in the 
rudimentary definition for a state, “Who gets what, when and how” (Laswell, 1936).  The idea of 
an independent African state was imagined by the elites of the eras considered throughout this 
study. Astonishingly, once this independence was attained, the distribution of rights and 
resources that Laswell refers to above seemed to be the most difficult objective to realise. 
Noted thus far, have been the failures of African socialism; and briefly, how suffocating policies 
of Islamic religious fundamentalism have had an adverse effect on the evolution of post-colonial 
African polities. This chapter seeks to display the pragmatism and political economy of different 
forms of African governance by looking at how seemingly socialist, liberal or fundamentalist 
ideologies manifest as stifling forms of authoritarianism in their respective applications. In this 
regard, it will look at the power relationships within the state.  An analysis of the swelling of 
African bureaucracies; the politics of patrimony and clientelism; and disenfranchisement of 
large portions of society will need extensive consideration. These criteria will furthermore be 
evaluated through the narrowed lens of post-colonial politics in the formerly unified Sudan. 
Within the more narrowed context of this study, it will be necessary to observe how the criteria 
listed above has influenced the salience of ethnic and ethno-religious factionalism in the 
creation of political identity disputes in the case of Sudan. It possibly goes without saying, but 
the majority of these disputes are usually centred on the utilisation of land and the natural 
resources of which these certain territories provide. Therefore, in the latter stages of this 
chapter, the relationship between group identity and political economy will become immensely 
significant. It will be important to study and the proof of the theoretical triangle, to analyse the 
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accusation that South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 in an unquestionable attempt to annex 
primary economic resources.  
 
The Fortification of Authoritarianism in Africa 
The title of this section may not inspire boundless awe, but it is necessary to the study to show in 
a practical fashion how the strengthening of authoritarianism in Africa played a pivotal role in 
the disengagement of civil society from the state; and secondly, the way it contributed to 
factionalism and the formation of group identity in many African states including an post-
colonial Sudan. A suitable point at which to commence should be to uncover more of the 
intricacies of the concept of the Two Publics (Ekeh, 1975). The work of Peter Ekeh has been 
displayed suggestively in chapter two, the way in which he discusses the construction of group 
identity in Africa. The work initially was used purely from an identity perspective, to discuss 
how the relationship between ideology and regime evolution are linked in the African political 
context. In this chapter, one should consider how these perceptions influenced African 
governance in a more tangible sense. 
One would be naïve to remark that Ekeh’s work was a definitive contribution on the mechanics 
of African governance, seeing as though the majority of his toil on the Two Publics had 
situational relevance mostly to what he observed in Nigeria. Of course not all African situations 
are the same, so it cannot be taken as law each statement he makes about the political psyche 
that underpins the African bureaucracy. However, a cursory glance at multiple African examples 
digested thus far indicates a certain universalism about Ekeh’s work. The most relatable rhetoric 
extends from what he saw as a separation of the spheres of civic bureaucracy and the patrimony 
contained in group loyalties (Ekeh, 1975: 92). He used it validly to discuss how the resources of 
the state were personally appropriated by incumbents and their cronies, from the moral 
perspective that the state did not represent an atmosphere where they would have to act 
responsibly. However, in the same breath he purported that these officials would not consider 
doing the same to the beneficiaries of their patrimonial loyalties and the ethnic groups whose 
rights they championed, as that would be considered ethically illicit to them (Ekeh, 1975: 92). 
These realities contribute the perception that African politics becomes a stratified process of 
resource mongering and the tools of legitimacy used by elites to achieve these ends. 
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The contention above takes great strides in explaining a condition seen frequently in Africa, 
notably with differentiating situational complexities, but essentially derived from a similar 
foundation. It simply asks the question, what mechanisms are used to legitimately sustain an 
authoritarian regime? Scarritt (2011: 130) discusses this concept further, 
Civic nationalism was asserted ideologically in spite of its empirical weakness. But 
authoritarian banishment of ethnicity from political assertion merely drove it 
underground, while rulers continued to make ethnopolitical calculations and 
appointments to high political positions and the placement of development projects. 
The excerpt above paints a simpler picture of what Ekeh suggested as a certain divorce between 
what post-colonial governance preached yet did not practice. Ethnically driven politics at 
independence had either been considered sacrilege at a propagandist level and/or it had been 
efficiently controlled and administered away from the eyes of larger civil society. 
Whether discretely managed at independence, or as one of the primary proponents of political 
debate as the twentieth century progressed, the politicisation of ethnicity has become central to 
African governance. To clarify, ethno-political identities are those identities that have been 
shaped by the “[…] interactive causal significance of the ethnic and political components of these 
identities in their formation, continuing mobilisation, and interaction with concrete 
organisations, institutional rules, and international influences” (Gurr in Scarritt, 2011: 134). 
Looking at a definition of this nature shows how multi-faceted ethnic association with the 
greater state can be. Incidentally, for the same reason, liberal ideological practice has become 
pivotal to the success of managing ethnic rivalry elsewhere in the world. Without a 
consociational basis on which to build a tolerant environment for the interaction and integration 
of ethnic majorities and minorities, the unfortunate consequence is that conflict may be used as 
a viable means to settle disputes. The process of political development in Africa is one which did 
not prepare policy for the sustainable interaction between different political identities in a post-
colonial environment. If anything, they often operated in the opposite manner as the instigator 
of contestation between different ethnic or ethno-religious groups. There is notable proof of 
such despotic endeavour in the majority of Sub-Saharan African states, the case of Burundi 
providing a suitable example,  
The crisis that Burundi had been engulfed in since 1993 was multi-dimensional: 
ideological, socio-cultural (degradation of values), psychological (suspicion, fear), 
political (fight for power) and economic (unequal access to economic and social 
opportunities with regard to education employment and health). […] In Burundi, just like 
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in other African nation-states where politics is likened to the milking of a cow, an 
appointment to a political position is likened to the securing of something to eat or a 
place where one could stay forever […] Each case of competition for already scarce 
resources could be used as an opportunity to let the masses sing to the tune of ethnicity 
(Ntahombaye and Nduwayo, 2007: 245-247). 
Not only showing the politicisation of ethnicity, but also the other typical characteristics of the 
authoritarian state, one notices a pattern in the development of governance. The suggestion that 
state clientelism be likened to the “milking of a cow” seems to touch on the same rhetoric of how 
Ekeh described the nonchalant way that the public sphere was presided over. The other 
expletives such as the proverbial “meal ticket” or “climbing upon the gravy train” would all be 
freely utilised in describing not only exclusivity of African authoritarianism but any format of 
authoritarianism in a global sense. As suggested earlier, stringently applied authoritarianism 
under the ideological mask of African socialism, Pan-African or Pan-Arab conformity, formed 
the basis many conflicts in Africa and the case of a post-colonial Sudan. It will be pivotal to the 
study to explain further the political contestation that authoritarianism promotes. 
There are a number of competing definitions to describe the most important facets of 
authoritarianism, but for now we shall use the criteria of trusted theoretician Juan Linz (cited in 
Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 5) who purports that authoritarianism has a weakly refined ideological 
premise. This is seemingly true, as displayed in chapter three that once one scratches beneath 
the surface of African socialism for instance, it possessed no great ideological resilience other 
than to create a tacit legitimacy for the disregard of political pluralism. Along with this weak 
ideological stance, authoritarian regimes are known to undermine political parties (if their 
existence is allowed), partake in terror campaigns and the use of propaganda, and depoliticise 
and demobilise society by excluding them from the political and policy making process (Linz 
cited in Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 5). It is this exclusivity in the realm of African governance that 
supplements the propagation of ethnic or ethno-religious factionalism. This is a proposition that 
will be developed further in the chapter. In the interim, the motion to theorise African 
authoritarianism should be taken to contextualise the scenario further.  
One should consider that there has been a certain duality exercised in the analysis thus far. The 
first, looked at in detail in chapter two and three, romanticises somewhat about African identity 
by looking at binding intangibles such as ethnic primordialism,  the use of religiously defined 
policy and amalgamations of ideology and culture (such as Ujamaa) to name but a few. Where 
these virtuous guidelines for the maintenance of the common good appear to become unstuck, 
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one may consider, is hardly in the way they resonate through society. The evidence thus far 
suggests that the failures result more in terms of how these ideologies for national progress 
translate into formal governance. This is where the second modality comes into play. Of the 
tangible mechanics of governance, bearing in mind the way these regimes hold legitimacy that 
are further tacitly accepted by society, a peculiar inevitability of authoritarian rule is always the 
resultant model implemented. Aside from these ideologies of national progression, this chapter 
will continue to uncover what occurrences persist in African states that assist the maintenance 
of authoritarianism. 
There are a number of explanations as to why authoritarianism persists in Africa. The first, is 
what may often be legitimised by elites as: Ethnically diverse regions, due to contestation of 
resources and land, require ‘strong’ leadership (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 32). These types of 
arguments are not baseless. Work conducted by Horowitz (1993: 22) suggests that ethnically 
homogenous states experience far better pluralist/democratic consolidation than states that 
have many competing ethnic cleavages. In accordance with this trend, it is easily considered by 
elites that a dictatorship or oligarchy may be the best way to bring a sense of order to a 
potentially anarchical environment, where any defined political identity tries to compete for a 
share of resources distributed by the state. 
The understanding that a more restrictive and less representative governance model would 
allow post-colonial African countries to thrive, was not held exclusively by Sub-Saharan elites, 
but also the first independent leaders of the Sudan. From 1956 onwards, Sudan was similarly 
prepared to reject the idea of plural governance in order to achieve socio-economic progression 
(El-Battahani, 2007: 38). Not too dissimilar from other formats of constraining nationalism 
discussed earlier in the study, General Abboud followed a militant authoritarian policy of state-
nationalism. These policies subverted the rights of particular groups who comprehended little 
more outside of the rigors of ethnic group identity and association. Not dissimilar from other 
examples covered thus far in the study; the more restrictive the political environment became in 
post-colonial Sudan, the greater the factional mobilisation of minorities ensued. All practical 
examples, including post-colonial Sudan, appear to point to a distinct recognition about 
ethnically heterogeneous states: the socio-political suppression of group identities only seems to 
fuel their desire to mobilise against the state. 
Obedience to a national project would only become more entrenched in the Nimeiry and Al 
Bashir regimes respectively, as the governments that followed Abboud became increasingly 
restrictive. Even more disparaging for the prospects of societal integration and religio-cultural 
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tolerance, would be the institutionalisation of Arabisation by the Nimeiry and Al Bashir regimes 
(Kalpakian, 2006: 48-49). These systems, which shall be discussed further in chapter five, laid 
suitable foundations for political revolt. 
Authors such as Ekeh (1975) and Mamdani (2001; 2005) that have been used extensively up to 
this point, attribute this sovereign style of governance to the remnants of colonial rule, 
especially with regards to the indirect administrations of the British. Following on from this 
work, Berman (2010: 11) sheds further light on the legacy of authoritarian governance that 
straddles the colonial and post-colonial eras, 
Individual probity, rights and responsibilities were the focus of an active political process, 
while between them an amoral competition for access to the material resources became 
increasingly intense. Social trust was largely contained within ethnic communities and 
embedded in the personalistic ties of patron-client networks that were opportunistically 
focused on access to material benefits. [The] politics of ‘eating’ or ‘devouring’ and 
repeated references to getting one’s ‘slice of the cake’ vividly express personal, material 
and opportunistic character of politics and its dual character: those who aspire to eat can 
also be eaten in the amoral food chain of politics. The ‘politics of the belly’ originated in 
the institutional structures and social relations of the colonial state. 
Berman (2010: 12) continued to suggest that the method described in the excerpt was seen as 
legitimate recourse for the interaction of the African bureaucrat with the state in the post-
colonial environment, as it seemed an apparent natural progression. Even though colonial rule 
had ended, the idea was that the popular foundations of ethnic intermediaries (sometimes also 
referred to as traditional leaders) would not have to end. An opinion Berman shares with Ekeh 
(1990: 661), suggests that they concurred that if the interaction with the greater state be 
considered an amoral environment, then the penchant for looting it for personal or ethnic group 
gain would not be considered unlawful. This course of action then quite easily was able to 
transcend into the post-colonial environment regardless of the loose ideologies espoused by 
these states. In the case of Sudan, the regimes of Nimeiry and Al Bashir specifically mimicked 
these traits of personalisation. For instance, in order to keep the Arabisation project intact, Al 
Bashir showed favouritism towards the socio-economic development of Muslim loyalist areas in 
the north including the state capital of Khartoum. In the south of Sudan, however, he continued 
to promote assimilation projects and religious indoctrination to destabilise attempted revolt 
against the regime (Dean, 2000: 72). These actions served only to perpetuate exclusion and the 
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dominance of a Muslim status quo in the Sudan. The lines of patrimony were evidently well 
established along ethno-religious conscription. 
Political competition in any format was considered counter-productive of national unity and 
progression. If opposition parties or civil movements became popular enough, they were simply 
co-opted into the overarching authoritarian government or coercively dominated. As a result 
Berman (2010: 13) concludes, 
Increasingly authoritarian rule eliminated the political meaning of citizenship and 
offered instead an implicit, tenuous moral contract of material benefits in return for 
political quiescence. The single party state, meanwhile offered a ‘national’ arena within 
which the distribution of material resources between ethnic communities could be 
negotiated between leaders of various groups, without having to resort to public 
mobilisation of their supporters. 
Effectively then, political support needed to be purchased with economic reward. In the event 
that incumbents were unable to keep up with patrimonial payments, or they intentionally 
excluded groups, civil protest would usually bear meagre fruits unless political factions were 
formed to challenge the incumbent. In many cases as a result of what has been loosely defined as 
exclusive citizenship, certain ethnic and ethno-religious groups mobilised as political vessels 
against the state. Political exclusion contributed greatly to the formation of factional rebel 
groups around Africa and in the case of post-colonial Sudan. Groups such as the Anya Nya 
(Snake Poison) and later the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement became major players in 
Sudan’s unrelenting civil wars and the struggle for greater Southern autonomy (Kalpakian, 
2006: 49). The effects of ethnic and ethno-religious mobilisation will be looked at more 
comprehensively in the section to follow. 
Ethnic and Ethno-Religious Mobilisation, Factionalism and Conflict 
A persisting malady on the African continent is constituted by government, whether unitary or 
federal, perpetuating divisions in society by politicising ethnic and ethno-religious identities. In 
the process these governments exclude large portions of society from the political process. As 
was noted earlier, the state of Burundi portrays one such example of this phenomenon. It was 
shown that indirect colonial categorisation of groups often tended to leave behind an 
atmosphere of contestation and conflict. Research conducted on Nigeria provides another 
adequate example for exhibiting contentious ethno-religious politics in post-colonial Africa.  
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One of the most severe cases of violent ethnic factionalism since independence has been 
witnessed in the prolonged civil strife of Nigeria. Unfortunately, becoming a reasonably well 
refined economic hub of Sub-Saharan Africa has done little to calm tensions between ethnic 
groups of its federally composed state. These groups have found themselves in a continuous 
battle for state resources, as there is the universal belief that those who control the state control 
all of its economic policy decision-making (Lewis, 2003: 131).  In this way, when parliamentary 
structures are classically undermined, even in federal compositions certain ethnic groups will 
still feel excluded. Nigeria has an abundant array of sub-ethnic groups but the three primary 
groups often differentiated between are the Hausa-Fulani of largely Muslim faith in the north; 
the Yoruba, which comprise the Christian demographic predominantly to the west; and the Ibo 
(also occasionally termed Igbo) people of the east, of which most possess indigenous animist 
beliefs (Anugwom, 2000: 66). Evidence shows that the necessary ingredients for ethnic 
contestation certainly exist in the case of Nigeria if tensions are politicised. As Nigeria is a 
former victim of British indirect rule, where it was discussed in chapter two that the British had 
a habit of categorising groups on baseless eugenics, it was clear that Nigeria would befall the 
same post-colonial trend of ethnic factionalism.  
Two of the testing complexities that will also be highlighted in the case of the Sudan later in this 
chapter are that, firstly, persisting divisions in Nigeria are of a fundamental ethno-religious 
nature; and secondly, the percentile demographics leave no real majority between the Hausa-
Fulani and Yoruba people, whilst the Ibo remain a substantial minority (Anugwom, 2000: 66). 
Demographic percentiles of different ethnic groups should be taken into strong consideration, 
for the simple fact that smaller minorities are much easier to supress, control and dominate 
than groups that may make up over a third of the state’s entire census. Nigeria, like the Sudan 
before the secession of the South, had two major dominating groups within its arbitrarily 
defined borders. Fulani and Yoruba led governments have interchanged via controversy laden 
elections or coup d’états at regular intervals since independence, with continued trends of 
exclusive citizenship utilised by each respective ethnicities while in power. These disputes take 
centre stage aside from other smaller factional disputes, such as the undermined rights of the 
Ogoni minority in the Niger Delta (Akpan, 2007: 162). The Ogoni are a group that have felt 
excluded by the central state for many years with regards to the means of production and 
business opportunities surrounding the oil that comes from their homeland. The Niger Delta to 
the east of the country is well known as one of the biggest oil reserves 0n the continent. Disputes 
led to vandalism of pipelines, violent clashes and abduction of petroleum company employees 
(Akpan 2007: 164). These instances highlight dysfunctionality within the African patrimonial 
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state. If groups do not possess any political clout they are often easily excluded. Taylor and 
Williams (2008: 139) have highlighted four common characteristics of authoritarianism that 
promote the occurrence of factionalism, 
First, they display the more or less systematic resort to clientelism to gain and maintain 
political support. In other words, political authority is often based on the giving of 
favours in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the 
highest reaches of the central state. Second, clientelism is largely based on privileged 
access to resources, rationed by leaders following a strict political logic. The third 
characteristic is the centralisation of power usually around the presidency, which, in turn, 
is usually located within the capital city. Finally, neopatrimonial states house hybrid 
regimes wherein the informal mechanisms of political authority described coexist with 
formal trappings of the modern state such as a bureaucracy, written laws and the 
institutions of a Weberian legal-rational system. 
The above contribution gives a comprehensive illustration of the mechanical elements of an 
unsustainable authoritarian regime. As systematic as these neopatrimonial attachments may 
come across, their ability to thrive depends not on constitutional frameworks or a viable modern 
social contract that can be maintained. Distribution begins and ends with intermediaries 
employed by the state to administer for large groups of people. If the inflated bureaucracy fails 
to meet its responsibilities, the state hangs on a narrow precipice before a sheer decline towards 
what Zartman (1995: 5) has famously described as the ‘collapsed state’. In Nigeria’s case there 
have been many extenuating circumstances that undermine social, political and economic 
progression. However, two conflicts stand out in relation to this piece that are particularly cased 
within ethno-religious disputes. 
The first conflict, one that displays perfectly the effects of colonial categorisation and how it 
stifled the progression of Nigerian nationalism post-independence, is captured perfectly in the 
failed Biafran secessionist movement. Unpacking the scenario, the highlighting feature of this 
event was that shortly after independence a sense of integrated Nigerian nationalism was not 
the overarching conscription of many portions of broader civil society, most of all in Biafra. 
Sources contend (Benquet, 2012; Birmingham, 1995), that Biafra, an Ibo dominated state 
(province) to the east of Nigeria, declared independence from Nigeria in May 1967. Tensions 
between the Ibo people in Biafra and the Nigerian state in the preceding years had become 
untenable. Ibos had been brutally murdered by Fulani in the north of the country causing a 
displacement of over a million people back to their ethnic homelands in the east of Nigeria. 
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Feeling consistently undermined at a national government level, the Ibo as a now refined 
political identity under their enigmatic leader, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwa, called its 
people to arms in a secession attempt (Benquet, 2012). 
Rich in natural resources, the economics of ethnic mobilisation to be discussed later in this 
chapter, Biafra was seen as pivotal to the fiscal wellbeing of the greater Nigerian state. The 
secession and call for independence as a result was not entertained by Yakubu Gowon’s 
government (Benquet, 2012). Omar Bongo, then Gabonese president, came to the military 
assistance of the Biafrans to provide arms and ammunition for the protracted 3 year war with 
Nigeria. Benquet (2012) also contends in his documentary, that a regional dimension and 
economics of natural resources played a pivotal role in Bongo providing assistance to the 
Biafran guerrilla militia. Cruelly, the Biafran state did not possess a sustainable surplus 
agriculturally to feed the seceded state during the conflict. With food security an 
insurmountable problem, the Nigerian state placing sanctions and barriers to food deliveries in 
the defiant province; and a rising mortality rate suspected to be between 500 000 to a million 
people, the Biafrans eventually surrendered and were reconstituted into the Nigerian state, with 
Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwa forced into exile in Côte D’Ivoire for the rest of his life. 
The consequences of the failed attempt at Biafran secession ring certain alarm bells about the 
politics of ethnic mobilisation that appear in many conflicts. Birmingham (1995: 35) surmises 
about the event that unfolded in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, 
First, it split the Organisation of African Unity, whose members had hitherto defended 
the territorial integrity of former colonies. Some member states felt that the atrocities 
committed against the Igbo justified their claim to a breakaway independence. Secondly, 
the secession highlighted the growing importance of oil politics in Africa. The new 
government of Biafra hoped that it could gain economic viability by selling its petroleum 
directly to the world market without sharing its mineral royalties with less well-endowed 
regions of Nigeria. 
For the purposes of the study we should focus on the two points in the excerpt. The conflict 
established a new issue that had possibly been visualised by many politicised identities, but 
never realised. The best way to describe this event would be through challenging the question: 
why should Africans respect the widely considered illegitimate sovereignty of colonial 
boundaries? As the case of Biafra described, the secession had a valid grievance attached to it, 
which considered objectively, disputes that if people do not consider themselves part of a 
national framework, then surely they should not have to share the resources within their 
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boundaries with other ethnic groups in the manner the state had envisioned. Specifically 
drawing on what Taylor and Williams (2008: 138) described as the effects of unstable political 
culture without the consolidation of constitutionally refined nationalist programs that promote 
civil patriotism whilst simultaneously respecting multiculturalism, the prospects for factional 
politics and militant separatism or revolt against the state are greatly amplified. In the case of 
Nigeria, a nationally disbanded state since independence where ethnic dissimilarities were used 
by political elites to play groups off each other, parochial political culture would provide the only 
sanctuary for civil society (Taylor and Williams, 2008: 138). Remarkably, this pattern of events 
appears in a completely different region of Africa in much the same way when one observes the 
case of post-colonial Sudan. As it did for the Biafrans in Nigeria, the major discovery of oil as a 
primary resource in the Sudan in 1978 instigated a similar type of rationale for disgruntled 
groups in the south of the country. Dean (2000: 78) and Viorst (1995: 50) both contend that the 
conflict in the south of Sudan reached a turning point when the continuance of socio-political 
subjugation was married with a distinct exclusion from the economic profit incurred from oil 
production in the region. As the case study is expanded in chapter five, the intricacies of the 
Sudanese oil conflict will be further analysed. 
To show the frequency of primary resource discovery as an instigator ethnic mobilisation, a 
second major occurrence in Nigeria can be called upon. The continued contestation for the 
dominance of the federal government by Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo ethnic groups, which often 
leaves smaller minorities such as the Ogoni of the Niger Delta feeling excluded. In this way, the 
federal state is conceived as a mechanism for power-sharing, but somewhat backfires to create 
sub-national and local arenas for even more heated ethnic contestation than in unitary 
configurations (Akpan, 2007: 179).  The major problem is that the federal methodology utilised 
by the Nigerian government for the majority of its independence was not the realisation of a 
social contract conceived by Nigerian citizens for Nigeria. The federal wings of administration, 
the Fulani north, Yoruba west and Ibo east jurisdictions were created as a result of indirect 
colonial policy to administer the areas easily. Nigeria is responsible for almost a quarter of the 
entire population of the African continent. Ethnic diversity was seen as a hindrance to the 
advancement of the British colonial juggernaut in the region.  The British solution to the 
Nigerian governance question was realised in two ways,  
In the south they had encouraged the spread of Christian education and created English-
speaking networks of Yoruba people in the west and Igbo people in the east who acted as 
intermediaries between the vibrant local cultures and the foreign economic interests. In 
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the north a quite different solution allowed Islam to retain its supremacy and granted the 
Hausa emirs of the fallen sultanate of Sokoto the right to rule their kingdoms on behalf of 
Britain (Birmingham, 1995: 33). 
Intriguingly, the description detailed here draws a remarkable similarity with the British 
indirect administration of the Sudan covered briefly in chapter three (O’Fahey, 1996: 260). It 
appears that in all of the former British colonial protectorates that contained Islamic ethno-
religious groups, these groups were afforded exponentially greater amounts of political and 
cultural autonomy than most other ethnic groups on the occupied continent. This was in no 
small part due to the tacit legitimacy that accompanied the progression of Islam throughout the 
African continent centuries before the Berlin conference of 1885. Birmingham (1995) and Akpan 
(2007) have both established in their respective research that this perceived favouritism and 
respect shown by the British towards Islamic ethno-religious groups in the area cemented both 
the perception of cultural superiority over other ethnic groups within states; and created feelings 
of resentment and animosity towards these groups. 
These challenges and tensions have continued to dominate the Nigerian national political arena 
for almost sixty years since their independence. Another minority group caught up in the 
turmoil of land and resource contestation were the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Illustrates the homeland of the indigenous Ogoni people placed firmly within the oil 
producing region of the Niger Delta (Source: The guardian)11 
 
                                                          
11
 Map may be found at: < http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/03/shell-liability-oil-spills-
nigeria> 
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The basis of this story is centred on an alleged ignorance of the plight of the citizens of 
Ogoniland as Nigeria became a bigger player in the international oil sector in the 1990s. The 
proclaimed leader and hero of the Ogoni people, Ken Saro Wiwa, formed the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Wiwa, during this period attempted to build a concerted 
struggle against the exclusion of Ogonis from the federal political process (Akpan, 2007: 173).   
It was felt by the much maligned Ogonis that the growing state-capitalist machine that directed 
by the parastatal, Nigerian National Petrolium Corporatian (NNPC), had syphoned considerable 
profits and redistributed them to the three major ethnic groups whilst excluding the people of 
Ogoniland (Akpan, 2007: 174).  
The situation reached boiling point on January 4th 1993 when 300 000 protestors took to the 
streets of Bodo in the Niger Delta against the Shell oil company12 to protest against their political 
exclusion and the destruction of the ecosystem in their native land. After a short period of 
violent conflict, where many casualties were suffered, the protests were eventually quelled by the 
Nigerian military. Ken Saro Wiwa and his colleagues were tried for their sedition and later 
hanged (Akpan, 2007: 175). Wiwa remains a champion of minority rights on the continent to 
this day; and is considered a primary figure in the Nigerian struggle against the effects of neo-
imperialism. However, what is more relevant to this study is that similarities may be drawn to 
other previously mentioned examples, concerning particularly the politicisation of ethnicity in 
the face exclusion from resource distribution. The prospect for economic gain was a 
fundamental pre-condition for the Ogoni revival and many other cases in Africa. Unpacking the 
economic and resource security dimension to ethnic politicisation will form the basis of 
discussion in the next section. 
The Political Economy of Ethnic and Ethno-religious Politicisation  
Thus far the chapter has looked at the consequences of the consolidation of authoritarianism. 
The natural progression then was to evaluate briefly how illiberal, oftentimes single party states 
cling to power with tacit legitimacy, coercion and informal administrative functions such as 
those seen in the maintenance of patrimonial networks. It is well known that governance of this 
manner, without much modern exception, tends to have a much shorter shelf life than plural 
forms of governance that abide by authentic multi-party competition (Osaghae, 2007; Zartman, 
1995). These states unenviably decline into what Osaghae (2007) termed ‘fragile states’ when 
                                                          
12
 It is a now well-known fact that NNPC had established a dubious and exclusive relationship with the Shell oil 
company in the 1990s. 
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evaluating Africa; and later when all administrative functions cease, what Zartman (1995) 
famously described as the ‘collapsed state’. This section will look at how, providing the political 
atmosphere is disordered enough, politicised identities tend to use the informality of poorly 
functioning African states to claim rights to resources and self-determination (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002: 5). It is hoped that the work exhibited in this section will strengthen the premise 
for the theoretical triangulation purported in the contextualisation of this piece. 
However, before ethnic politicisation can be unpacked adequately, one should delve a little 
deeper into the rationale of the disordered state. Unlike consolidated democracies, with 
constitutionally polished minority rights for instance, the authoritarian state provides the 
perfect arena for ethnic and ethno-religious mobilisation amongst other maladministration, 
especially in an African context. Jackson and Rosberg (2003: 28-30) discuss factionalism as an 
important characteristic of the personalised authoritarian state along with political conspiracy, 
corruption, the purging of officials and struggles against regime overthrow. Additionally, Chabal 
and Daloz (2003: 52) contend that with these features in rampant and uncontrollable disarray, 
incumbents effectively plunge the state into a brand of purposeful anarchy. The contention here 
is that with the state in administrative disarray, it makes it all the more easier for executives and 
inflated cliental bureaucracies to exploit state resources.  
Many of these characteristics listed above were apparent in the earlier example of Idi Amin’s 
Uganda. Bearing in mind how all of these features are systematically linked, a more holistic 
approach can be undertaken to understanding factionalism and group politicisation. Moreover, 
to contrast the factionalism that strict authoritarianism produces and nurtures with the case of 
the Sudan will be a further ambition for this section. Ultimately, an attempt to build a frame to 
view ethnic or ethno-religious mobilisation against the state should be the primary focus. In this 
way the trajectory of the analysis thus far has slowly shifted from the more abstract 
characteristics that shape African group identities to a more pragmatic understanding for their 
needs to survival. Now would be a more relevant time than ever to touch on the work of Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002), simply titled The Political Economy of Secession.  
As a means to add value to the debate on the reasons for ethnic mobilisation for greater rights, 
autonomy or self-determination, viewing the core substance of Collier and Hoeffler’s discourse 
and findings, their proposition can hardly be considered objective in nature. In fact, their work 
is fairly sceptical of the more abstract features of identity that were discussed at length in 
chapters two and three, 
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Secessionist movements present themselves to the global public as analogues of colonial 
liberation movements: long-established identities are denied rights of self-determination 
by quasi-imperial authorities. Self-determination is presented as the solution to the 
challenge of peaceful coexistence between distinct peoples [….] a more realistic 
characterisation of secessionist movements is that their sense of political identity is 
typically a recent contrivance designed to support perceived economic advantage, if the 
secession is successful and facilitated by popular ignorance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 
2). 
The excerpt somewhat grandiloquently declares that ethnicity (or ethno-religious) identity is 
fundamentally an enabled means to an economic end. Furthermore, by unloading the semantics 
of language used such as ‘a recent contrivance designed’, the insinuation perhaps is that identity 
is not only a social construct but a social construct premeditated purely for manipulation of an 
institutionally weak political system. The first recollection that one could discuss, is the failed 
attempt at Biafran secession in Nigeria uncovered earlier in the chapter. It would not be 
considered completely baseless to suggest that for Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwa and his followers 
that there wasn’t the recognition that substantial oil wealth awaited the new Biafran state had 
the secession been successful. 
Understandably, each instance where groups call for improved rights or perhaps even complete 
secession, each also possess their own situational intricacies and extenuating circumstances. It 
would perhaps be suitable to look at a few more cases including briefly that of the secession of 
South Sudan before drawing any further conclusions.  
Eritrea potentially proposes an interesting illustration with regards to this part of the analysis. 
Besides the birth of South Sudan as recently as July of 2011, Eritrea had been the only state to 
date that had successfully seceded from another in Africa.  The Eritrean secession is covered 
extensively within the framework provided by Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 3) who suggest that 
political identities are mainly constructs that mobilise to attain an economic incentive. The 
Eritrean case can be briefly examined by the manner in which it sought independence from what 
is termed the ‘rump state’ of Ethiopia (Tir, 2005: 714). Eritrea was known as the wealthiest 
segment of Ethiopia at the turn of independence, when in 1951 the Italians and their successors, 
the British, sought decolonise the area. Eritrea was allowed the chance to exercise federal 
powers within the newly independent Ethiopia. However, approximately a decade after, the 
emperor Haile Selassie, decided to revoke Eritrea’s federal powers and impose a more direct rule 
upon them. This caused conflict as Eritreans were then forced, amongst other issues, to carry 
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the tax burden of the greater Ethiopia. Diaspora initiated protest campaigns overseas and after a 
prolonged military struggle the Eritreans eventually gained independence (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002: 21). The back story is not as interesting as the analytical disputes that arose from this 
successful secession.  Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 21) go on to decry that Eritrea had a quite 
fickle sense of nationalism attached to its independence struggle. Within its boundaries there 
was no sign of ethnic homogeneity either. There were three major religious groups, five different 
ethnic groups and nine official languages prevalent in Eritrea at the time of secession. Eritrea 
poses a challenge then to the argument that secessions are only born out of a strong realisation 
of ethnic or ethno-religious identity. Analysing the case of Eritrea in such a manner will add 
credence to arguments that purport only pragmatic reasons for the seeking of self-
determination. 
Finally, one needs to take into consideration the case of the Sudan before unpacking it more 
comprehensively in the next chapter.  The information produced thus far of the Sudanese 
complex has discussed mostly the dichotomy of two separate contesting ethno-religious groups 
of almost equal demographic weighting, who had been in continuous conflict surrounding rights 
and resource grievances before the Southern secession. What has yet to be discussed is the 
economic dimension behind the proposed secession that has been analysed extensively since 
conflict broke out in the Sudan (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Haynes, 2007). What these authors 
surmise is that ever since the Sudan’s oil sector grew exponentially due to the oil reserves in the 
south, conflict and the cause to promote greater autonomy was amplified. Haynes (2007: 312) 
does afford the situational reverence to suggest that tensions between the South and North may 
not have existed if the country were ethno-religiously homogeneous. He also recognises that 
partially Christian ethnic groups such as the Dinka, Nuer and Nuba were forced to concede to 
state policies of Islamicisation. This began with Nimeiry and was later taken on in a more 
extreme fashion by the current incumbent of the Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. 
This mixture of religious fundamentalism and authoritarian imposition, on the basis of work 
covered earlier, may be considered enough for ethno-religious politicisation to grow into a 
profound movement as it did in the Sudan. One, however, must consider what Haynes (2007:  
316) continues to deconstruct, is an important political economic dynamic that existed in the 
midst of this conflict. With the majority of the oil in the South, a cynical eye may suggest that the 
only true reason for secession may have been to seize complete control of the oil resources of 
greater Sudan for South Sudan. 
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As a collation of the work covered over the last three chapters indicates, one could consider the 
implementation of the tacitly constructed triangle in chapter one13 as a plausible mechanism for 
diagnosing identity laden disputes in many African states. However, caution must be taken in 
trying to ascribe the same underlying factors to each different case. The triangle is only 
acceptable in a manner which is respectful of the finer intricacies of each different situational 
experience. It is evident though of all of the cases that a lack of suitably inclusive sense of 
constitutionalism and democratic institutionalism perpetuated the politicisation of identity.  
The triangle shows a process that is produced from historically exclusive mechanisms of the 
African state, which prevent access of dominated groups or minorities to the rights and 
resources that each state is expected to disseminate. This in turn creates an atmosphere of 
illegitimate and often violent contestation for access to these particular rights and resources. 
Without the constitutional mechanisms available for excluded ethnic or ethno-religious groups 
to engage in the state, conflict orientated mobilisation often arises from continued grievance and 
struggle. This was seen most dominantly in the respective cases of the Biafran, Ogoni and South 
Sudanese during the course of this study.  
The key research utilised to construct the third point of the triangle (Haynes, 2007; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002), is built around a scepticism that posits identity mobilisation as usually 
undertaken for the sole purpose of securing economic reward. This insinuation takes some of 
the gloss off identity rights mobilisation. However, as the examples mentioned above suggest, 
this does not necessarily paint the entire illustration of the politicisation of identity. As was 
especially applicable to the cases of the Ogoni people and South Sudanese, identity politicisation 
occurred of as a result of tangible state despotism and subjugation of peoples within the state’s 
borders. This is not to suggest that the end game for each struggle should be formal 
independence through secession, but rather that if the situation becomes untenable that the only 
potentially viable solution is an eventual war of independence. In retrospect of what was stated 
earlier, in the event that there are no constitutional or parliamentary branches in which 
minorities or excluded groups are able to voice their grievances and desires for satisfactory 
rights, then many of Africa’s regimes leave groups little choice but to enter into conflict. The 
events that led to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan will form the focus of the next 
chapter. However, for now it may be considered relevant to the study to discuss remedies and 
potential policy solutions for states that have not suffered secession as a result of politicised 
identity. 
                                                          
13
 Refer to Figure 1.1. on page 14. 
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Good Governance in Africa: Potential Practical Prescriptions 
As a large portion of this study was dedicated to the diagnostics of how ethnic or ethno-religious 
competition for rights and resources affect the African continent, it would be discourteous not to 
engage literature that may navigate African states towards better governance ideals. By way of 
recognising a theoretical process of identity politicisation developed earlier in this chapter, 
prevailing perceptions would suggest that these African states had never truly recovered from 
the categorisation and differentiation imposed by indirect colonial rule. However, it was further 
noted that elite manipulation, inept ideological implementation and bureaucratic errors in post-
independence Africa also contributed equally to the dysfunctional position many African states 
still find themselves in today. 
Simply, but not exclusively advocated by Ekeh (1975; 1999) and Mamdani (2001; 2005), many 
African states, especially former British colonies, have suffered from the inability to foster a 
refined sense of inclusive civic nationalism.  The failure of independence nationalism to pacify 
maligned groups and their respective grievances against the predatory state, which sought to 
exclude them from the state-building project, inevitably led to protest and violent conflict 
(Zartman, 1995; Mamdani, 2005; Poku and Mdee, 2011; Scarritt, 2011).  One of the factors 
influencing violent competition within the post-colonial state was due in part to a lack of 
avenues that existed for the greater citizenry to engage with the state. Without any formal 
democratic institutions in place, often civil society or politicised groups have had to take extra-
legal action to be heard. 
Naturally, the prescribed course of action in the 21st century implores an evaluation of 
prescribed liberal and/or democratic institutional applications to cure the inherent Third World 
maladies expressed above. Deegan (2011: 76) contends that the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
communism at the commencement of the 1990s, has produced a more ideologically unipolar 
and democratically aspirational world. Pushed by international norms of structural adjustment 
and the ideals of functional electoral systems, Africa has also slowly fallen into rank in recent 
decades. But it is not only international pressure that has turned the continent towards liberal 
democratic values but also a liberal resurgence in African civil societies. Deegan (2011: 77) used 
data from leading quantitative analysts, Afrobarometer, to assert that many Sub-Saharan 
African citizens acknowledge democracy to be the best format of government for Africa. 
However, the elated call for democracy from all corners of the continent unfortunately has not 
practically assisted in the feasible application of the modern democratic model. For many 
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Africans, although the idea of self-representation seemed appealing, they have had thus far only 
limited exposure to the rights and responsibilities that are fundamental to good representative 
governance (Deegan, 2011: 77). In essence then, the contemporary sentiment is that African civil 
society craves democratic governance without fully understanding its implications.  
Unfortunately, due to a post-colonial legacy of limited access to the mechanisms of the 
authoritarian state, the institutional features of a democratic system have not been thoroughly 
socialised in African civil society. An accompanying heritage of parochial political culture 
subsequently producing factional identities has undeniably hurt the prospects for democracy on 
the continent. For African governance to improve in the 21st century, states will need to adhere 
more carefully to the guidelines set out in theories such as Robert Dahl’s (1989: 221) polyarchy 
which essentially requires,  
[…] extensive competition among individuals, organised groups and political parties for 
government positions; political participation in the selection of candidates and potential 
leaders through regular and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties that 
provides a framework for society and permits citizens to express themselves without fear 
of punishment. 
What is striking about the above excerpt is that any or all of the listed criteria are open to 
degrees of manipulation without a reputable consociational constitution set in place; and/or 
when pivotal checks and balances to prevent the centralisation of power are lacking. One would 
need to look no further than Museveni’s Uganda for an exhibition of the consequences 
surrounding the centralisation of power. Ironically, at the inception of Museveni’s rule on the 
29th of January 1986, he had at the time professed to be a great admirer of democratic rule and 
at his inauguration even famously stated, “The problem with Africa in general and Uganda in 
particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power” (Museveni cited in 
Tangri, 2006: 175). The reason why this statement has become an absurdity is held in the 
realisation that at time of writing, 27 years later, Yoweri Museveni is still president of Uganda. 
In addition, there have also been widespread accusations that political opposition has been 
routinely intimated and supressed. The re-emergence of political despotism in this manner 
provides the atmosphere for the resurgence of identity politicised disputation. Dominance and 
manipulation of institutional structures can only be subverted by adhering to the rules of Dahl’s 
(1989) polyarchy expressed above. A political atmosphere that suppresses competition, as the 
theoretical triangle has suggested, may be destined for conflict in the near future. 
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Another glaring socio-political inadequacy in Africa has much less to do with governance and 
more to do with the reaction by civil society to said governance. A post-Cold War era in African 
politics, together with a greater sophistication in communication and the dissemination of 
information demands more interaction from civil society if good governance is to be achieved. 
In this way, the development of political culture, especially a liberal civic culture needs to find its 
feet if democracy is to be substantively consolidated on the African continent (Burnell, 2011: 
266). Burnell (2011: 267) further emphasises the intuitive role that desperately needs fostering 
in Third World politics. This includes civic engagement with the government pertaining issues 
of constitutional manipulation or corruption; and from a societal point of view, to necessitate 
the values of tolerance and mutual respect between different groups. The examples covered thus 
far in the study certainly suggest that these ideals have not yet been fully realised. Long has 
African civil society been apathetic towards the exploits of authoritarian rule, mostly due to the 
general perception that they are invisible or expendable to the regime.  The examples unpacked 
in this study have shown that the exclusivity and coercive nature of the state has acted as a 
barrier to the ordinary citizen’s association with government.  
Regrettably, with the seldom successful marker of free and fair elections achieved, many African 
states still masquerade fallacious pluralist formats of governance to the international forum. 
Civil society in this way is not properly represented as the employer of the state to work for its 
ideals. William Zartman (1964: 15) stated shortly after most African states gained independence, 
a particular ideal that at present day still appears as a pipedream to the continent, 
The leaders of emerging nations have a twofold task. They need to develop government as 
a problem-solving mechanism by establishing adequate institutions and by adopting 
applicable policy. They must also teach their population to articulate its needs and 
wishes, and must create integrative mechanisms to relate the interests and demands of 
society to political power. 
The extract intimates perfectly the old cliché of the necessity of grassroots instruments in 
building a sustainable democracy. This has been a persistent problem for many African states 
since independence, extending from the expectation that civil society would be able to grasp the 
vast complexities of democratic governance through osmosis. It is evident, however, that 
without instructive democratic development projects, civil society will largely become a 
bystander of elitist manipulation. Fundamentally, these criteria that Zartman (1964) prescribed 
to newly independent states in the 1960s to avoid the degradation of the state have not changed 
much in twenty-first century. Chapter five will look at some of the objectives South Sudan will 
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have to meet in order to prevent the formation of politicised identities that may ultimately cause 
state collapse. 
Nigeria, another former British colony analysed broadly in chapter four, has a number of 
persisting issues limiting the growth of democratic values within its torrid federal boundaries. 
The majority of the crisis uncovered earlier extends to a lack of overarching state nationalism to 
placate the tensions between group identities pertaining access to rights and resources. This in 
turn produced violent protest, coercive reaction to these protests by the state; and even the 
failed secession attempt of Biafra in 1967. Political culture has not become any more fortified in 
the modern era in Nigeria. According to Taylor and Williams (2008: 137) Nigeria still struggles 
with patron-client relationships that uphold a façade of functional bureaucratic governance. The 
continued relentless struggle for power is perpetuated by persistent recognition that the state 
offers the most rewarding meal ticket for the aspirational kleptocrat. To cement their legitimacy, 
officials play off groups they associate with against other ethno-religious groups. An incentive 
for the undying patrimony and backing by the politicised identities usually manifests in the gift 
of a larger portion of the state’s resource redistribution mechanism. It is clearly not a system 
inherently built on civil responsibility that casts an indifferent eye towards diverse ethnicities 
and religions, but rather a system that perpetuates dominance of some groups over others. As 
advanced earlier, these traits of governance are not unique to the case of Nigeria, but have 
become part and parcel independent African politics, including the case of the formerly unified 
Sudan. The slightly different characteristics of ethno-religious factionalism in the Sudan will be 
expanded upon in chapter five.    
Taylor and Williams (2008: 139-140) assert further that political culture designed and managed 
by elites in the same manner colonial powers did, acts as a barrier to the progression of a 
meaningful culture of institutional respect and accountability. Over the last two decades, in a 
decidedly more democratic era, the very nature of electoral politics in Africa is laden with sub-
identity competition. Parochial political culture in Nigeria, for instance, largely translates to 
electorates that would rather vote for candidates of a similar ethno-religious orientation than 
candidates who provide the most rational policy ideals. The rhetoric remains the same of what 
Ekeh (1975) discussed over two decades prior. The only tangible difference being a change in the 
type of regime, but not the manner in which services are delivered.  The Taylor and Williams’ 
(2008: 142) argument is probably best condensed by the recognition that patrons and ruling 
elites have a vested interest in the consolidation of power over the democratic responsibility to 
provide services to civil society. Renowned theoretician, Max Weber (cited in Taylor and 
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Williams, 2008: 141) simplified this condition best by stating that in rational and technical 
states, members of the civil service in a liberal environment should be able to distinctly separate 
the public and private spheres. This resonates most assuredly at a cognitive level with the 
respective works of Ekeh (1975) and Ake (1993), who similarly inferred of the African 
bureaucrat’s inability to separate private ambition from public responsibility. This approach to 
governance is severely disassociated from the liberal ideal, whereby public responsibility most 
extends to the upholding of indiscriminate rights and services outlined by a constitutional 
agreement with civil society. Instead, socio-political intolerance in many African states including 
post-colonial Sudan has done little to bolster societal integration and prevent conflict. 
As depicted in the argument above, the most endemic crisis on the African continent is 
contained in how deeply entrenched elitism is in the political fabric of most states. What is also 
glaringly visible is that whether regimes are authoritarian or superficially democratic, decision-
making is still largely a restrictive top-down practice. Although a state such as Nigeria has 
advanced meteorically from the authoritarianism that saw activist Ken Saro Wiwa executed in 
1995 for treason, the democratic outlook still looks fairly bleak. Richard Iroanya (2008: 106) 
laments that, 
Structural conditions, which historically have prevented her [Nigeria] from evolving the 
requisite political will necessary for political, social and economic development, remain 
unresolved. Among these structural conditions are ethnicity, which often results in 
electoral malpractices, corruption, nepotism, and despotic leadership. Others include, 
marginalisation, which has resulted in lopsided development, endemic poverty and the 
ever-present fear of military intervention into politics. 
As political elites have traditionally held a monopoly of decision on most of these outcomes, it 
will be pivotal to the progression of the continent that old methods of perpetuating patrimony 
and ethnic competition are left behind as soon as possible. It has become clear that the only way 
to undercut the sometimes violent politicisation of identity is through creating avenues for 
legitimate engagement with the state. As the triangulation in chapter four has implied, whether 
or not ethno-religious groups had been rationally and purposefully constructed, they were able 
to do so because of the limiting and exclusionary political environment they encountered.  
Returning to Burnell (2011: 267), he proposes that the only solution to this inherent problem is 
through concerted methods of institutional crafting. Institutional crafting supplants the often 
dominant African attitude that democracy is consolidated sufficiently by the presence of 
consistent free and fair elections. Burnell (2011: 267) adds two important criteria to the most 
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general requirements of democracy, firstly, that the state should be a self-restraining entity. 
Simply, it is suggested here that the executive branch (especially in presidential systems) should 
not monopolise uninhibited power, thus undermining parliament and the judiciary. Secondly, 
the process of electoralism and the freedom of parties and associations to lobby for public 
support are vital to strengthening democratic systems in Africa. Again, this pertains to the 
ruthless nature in which elites and the patrimonial networks within superseding politicised 
identities constantly seek to undermine demographic and/or traditionally less favoured 
minorities within diverse states. 
Within entrenched authoritarian regimes, the predictability of ethno-religious domination is a 
reality that continues to steer states away from democratic reform. Haynes (2011: 156) notes 
that the strict conservative nature of religious fundamentalism when applied to governance 
shapes states in a format that is preventative of inclusive democratic governance. The two 
models of democratic pluralism and religious fundamentalism are in direct conflict with one 
another when there is no secular differentiation between state and perceived sacred religious 
codes of conduct. This affects the opportunity for, at the very least, the tolerance of ethnic, 
religious and/or cultural diversity. This is often why the values of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 
1995; 2009) and civic nationalism (Stepan, Linz and Yadav, 2011) are absent in fundamentally 
religious regimes.  
In the case study, South Sudan sought to eventually secede from Al Bashir’s Sudan for that 
precise reason (Freedom House, 2012). Seeking equal political rights and fair democratic 
constitutionalism since the inception of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement over 
twenty years before; and unconvinced of the potential for meaningful solidarity, the people of 
South Sudan chose separation instead of unity in the 2011 Referendum. The next chapter will 
look deeper into the opportunity for democratic consolidation since South Sudan’s secession 
The troubled interactions between the concept of state nationalism and multiculturalist policy 
have long affected the integration of groups within contemporary state boundaries in Africa. As 
one of the most difficult problems to find a solution for, it has garnered the attention of some of 
the primary thinkers in African politics. Mamdani (2002: 493) terms African citizenship as a 
largely exclusive apparatus, whereby elitist politics has always conditioned, on the basis of 
traditional disparities, who is entitled to rights and how many rights they are permitted. It 
stands in sharp contrast to the liberal proponents of civic nationalism, which usually define 
equal rights to anyone born within a state’s boundaries regardless of racial, ethnic, religious or 
cultural disposition (Kymlicka, 1995: 2). Mamdani (2002: 498-499) uses the depiction of groups 
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as constructed ‘market-based identities’ and their recent histories and political legacies as the 
primary exponents of ethnic conflict. This differentiation usually serves as the necessary catalyst 
for the denial of rights. 
As was discussed in chapter two, colonialism of course assisted in the formulation of these 
opinions, but where exclusive citizenship persists well into the 21st century, colonialism can 
hardly shoulder all of the blame anymore. Osaghae (2005: 84) asserts in recognition of this 
claim, that the politics of exclusion have been systematically upheld by “elite opportunism” in 
the modern era. The response to this exclusion has been discussed in this study as the 
politicisation of identity. Osaghae (2005: 84) suggests that mobilisation may manifest in several 
different ways, 
Politicised ethnicity can take several forms, ranging from demand and struggle for 
independent statehood to those for protection of language and culture, local political 
autonomy, and other group rights. It may also be violent or militant, peaceful or 
pragmatic, depending on the history of conflicts and how the state has responded to 
ethnic mobilisation over time. 
These categories cover sufficiently the diverse range of examples used in this study, 
encompassing the plight of the Biafrans and Ogoni in Nigeria; examples from Uganda, Burundi 
and Rwanda; and the case study of South Sudanese secession. A definite triangular route that 
has the consequences of political exclusion at its core, has affected each of the abovementioned 
instances in some way or another. Inevitably, it leads one to the question: What constitutes 
legitimate political opposition in Africa, when only potentially illegitimate avenues exist for 
defending political rights? It may be considered that this question provides an inherently 
subjective answer at each turn.  It has become somewhat of a platitude in recent times, but this 
discussion must prompt the statement, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.14 
State deemed terrorist groups are never exclusively considered as terrorists by all players in a 
given complex, it most often becomes a matter of subjective perspective. Depending on the 
influence of international political forums and alliances, it is easy to attribute the terrorist label 
to groups such as Al Qaeda. However, these same forums may consistently struggle when the 
same question is asked of rebellious movements in Africa. It begs another question that is 
heavily reliant on subjective perspective: When does a rebel group become a revolutionary 
                                                          
14
 Incredibly, this well-known quote does not have a credited author. It has been used more extensively over 
approximately the last 40 years in news media due to the surge in international interstate terrorism, but no source 
can conclusively agree who stated it first. 
 
95 
 
organisation? Notably, in the case of the secession of South Sudan, it is tacitly accepted without 
question that the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was a revolutionary 
organisation and not a terrorist group. However, consider the fact that Sudan before the 
Southern secession was a sovereign nation, its borders respected by international organisations 
such as the United Nations. In the eyes of Al Bashir’s authoritarian regime, could the SPLM/A 
not be considered an intrastate terrorist group? 
Reflecting on brief exploration into the case thus far, it would seem preposterous to most to even 
ponder that the SPLM/A could be a terrorist organisation. Osaghae (2005: 87-88) provides the 
answer to this puzzle that the complex so desperately seeks. Simply, constitutionalism is the 
modern marker for state legitimacy. A functional and inclusive constitution that is appropriately 
applied to broader society within the state provides a reasonable social contract that 
theoretically should pacify the mobilisation of political identities. It furthermore, by the very 
nature of its consociational manufacture, provides the necessary ground rules to keep the state 
in check and limit the excesses and abuse of power on the part of power-holders. It is 
unfortunate, but a realistic outcome of identity politicisation that groups escalate to violence 
when ignorance by the state toward their respective situations become indefensible. A great 
hope for Africa and the newly formed South Sudan in this regard, is that the process and 
application of constitutionalism becomes a more valued endeavour as the 21st century 
progresses. Chapter five will look deeper into the rhetoric promoting the emancipation of South 
Sudan from the Sudan; and whether the secession could be deemed legitimate as a means for 
progress in the region. 
Furthermore, the 21st century should implore states that persevere with techniques of 
domination to desist from this endeavour, as the results almost always plunge these respective 
states into protracted periods of conflict and instability. Ilan Peleg (2010: 38) asserts that 
although ethnic nationalism in its classical form has always been found on the opposite side of 
the spectrum to liberal democratic agenda, the two ideas can coexist. The opinion that ethnic 
nationalism provides sanctuary, meaning and a sense of belonging; and that liberalism is built 
on the inherent prescription of individuality- fear at the loss of identity becomes a realistic 
concern for conservative nationalists. The mind-set that the state will cease to exist if it desists 
from a national project intertwined with the ideals of the dominant ethno-religious group needs 
to be appeased. It has been a mainstay of elitist political opportunism to condition groups to 
attempt to dominate each other for as long as the African continent has been independent.  The 
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continent demands innovative leadership that will not succumb to the pressures of democracy 
but is willing to accept liberal socio-political reform. 
The only way to achieve this is through the reorientation of policy towards a multiculturalist 
agenda. One of the foremost conveyors of this theory, Will Kymlicka (2009:  61), believes too 
that the nationalism of yesteryear is no longer sustainable in states that have been left greatly 
diversified by the unforced or coerced migration of peoples in an out of tangible borders over 
roughly the last 150 years. Kymlicka’s view (2009: 61) is that, 
Until recently most states around the world have aspired to be ‘nation-states’. In this 
model, the state was implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) seen as the possession of a 
dominant [national] group, which used the state to privilege its identity, language, 
history, culture, literature, myths, religion and so on, and which defined the state as the 
expression of its nationhood. 
As this study has concluded from the assessment of multiple examples, this restrictive format 
should no longer be indulged on the African continent. Multicultural policy offers the necessary 
corrective method to follow in this regard. Kymlicka (2009: 64) continues with the affirmation 
that state-building needs to evolve to be associated with equal respect for all groups that reside 
within particular boundaries. The rhetoric of the past allowed states to buttress power-relations 
built on undermining minorities through racist and ethnocentric ideologies. Societies were in 
turn conditioned to accept these groups as inferior, primitive or backward to perpetuate the aura 
of dominance. Kymlicka (2009: 65) provides a list of criteria to assist states in fashioning a 
greater sense of liberal multiculturalism, 
First, a state involves the repudiation of the older idea that the state is a possession of a 
single group. Instead the state must be seen as belonging equally to all citizens. Second, 
as a consequence, a multicultural state repudiates any nation-building policies to 
assimilate or exclude members of minority or non-dominant groups. Instead, it accepts 
that individuals should be able to access state institutions, and act as full and equal 
citizens in political life, without having to hide or deny their ethnocultural identity. The 
state accepts an obligation to accord recognition and accommodation to the history, 
language, and culture of non-dominant groups, as it does for the dominant group. 
This of course requires a change in mentality that has afflicted the progression of African politics 
since most states gained independence. It would not be viable to use examples of the few 
successful states to create guidelines for the manufacture of effective policy, as each different 
situation is beset with dissimilar historical characteristics and unique circumstances that 
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perpetuate factional contestation. One can, however, simplify the task at hand by observing 
areas where diversity has been more suitably managed to assist in the approach to this dilemma.  
Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011: 4) have worked extensively in assessing areas of the world where 
traditional nation-building was replaced by what they have termed the “crafting of the state-
nation”. For Stepan et al. (2011: 5) the fundamental objective in crafting a multicultural state-
nation is contained in constructing a sense of belonging or what they call the “we-feeling” in 
broader society that is usually only exclusively found in ethnocentric nationalism. The liberal 
idea that political identity itself can be constructed for the process of some format of 
recognition, could be used in the very same way by states to strengthen institutions that require 
the recognition of legitimate claims. The homogenous nation-state in the French tradition could 
never be implemented effectively in states such as Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda and the Sudan, nor 
should it ever have been attempted in the first place. To craft a state-nation requires a list of 
difficult but achievable criteria, Stepan et al. (2011: 7) prescribe, 
First, despite multiple cultural identities among citizens of the polity, there needs to also 
be a high degree of positive identification with the state and pride in being citizens of the 
state. Second, citizens of the state will have multiple but complementary political 
identities and loyalties. Third, there should be a high degree of institutional trust in the 
most important constitutional, legal, and administrative components of the state. 
The respect for democratic institutionalism is implicit in this rhetoric. There is also the 
recognition that competition and contestation should not be repressed, but rather the correct 
avenues for inclusive governance should be employed. It is not only the bulk of the states 
analysed in this study that should adhere to more liberal and open acceptance of diversity in 
politics, but these theories should also act as guidelines to the young state of South Sudan as a 
means to foster sustainable governance. Discussing the prospects for implementing sustainable 
policies of liberal constitutionalism and greater multicultural tolerance in Africa’s newest state 
will be an overriding objective of chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The chapter commenced with contextualising the contemporary characteristics of 
authoritarianism in an African context. The most important realisation that one could perhaps 
derive from analysing the authoritarian condition is that limitations on access to government 
through plural and constitutional methods do not essentially hinder political opposition.  It 
appears that a formally restrictive political environment, as envisioned by the incumbent of the 
day, only acts as a medium for disgruntled groups and portions of society to find other more 
extreme methods to interact with a government that is exclusive and non-consociational. Ethnic 
and ethno-religious factionalism is one such tool utilised by elites to mobilise grievance 
enthused groups against the government, oftentimes plunging the state into conflict and civil 
war. 
Secondly, this chapter sought to frame the politics of ethnic and ethno-religious factionalism 
further. Observing the failed Biafran secession attempt and the plight of the Ogoni people in the 
Niger Delta, a contemporary fundamental issue was that these  groups felt their rights had been 
undermined, especially in light of state economic policies that restricted their access to the 
resources of the land they considered most rightfully their territory. Disputes concerning land 
tenure and the resources that said land is able to provide form one of the most universally 
recognised disputes across the African continent.  
Furthermore, aside from apparent techniques of oppression that were noted in the case of the 
Sudan, the presence of natural resources too formed one of the primary reasons for why South 
Sudan sought to secede from the Sudan. As with the two cases taken from Nigeria, the key 
resource at the head of the dispute surrounded the utilisation of oil reserves in these territories. 
Looking at the progression of events in these respective cases, a theoretical triangle became 
apparent to suggest a systematic course of action that ethnic and ethno-religious factionalism 
follows. This adds a certain element of cynicism to the romanticism of nationalist struggles, but 
the economic component cannot tactlessly be ignored. The sincerity too of the South Sudanese 
secession will be called into question in the following chapter, as the case for the viability of 
secession as a means to settle ethnic disputes in Africa takes centre stage. 
Finally, this chapter took up the broader objective of looking at some of the corrective measures 
that could be applied to African governance, in an effort to foster more sustainable African 
democracies. Firstly, it was found that states should look to create more suitable and legitimate 
methods for civil society and politicised groups to interact with the state. The only way that this 
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can be successfully achieved is through the implementation of a truly consociational constitution 
and the provision of open and transparent democratic institutions. Secondly, states need to 
consciously adapt multicultural policies to the political arena at national and local level to curb 
old traditions of exclusion and the perpetuation of patrimony. The nurturing of an inclusive 
sense of civic nationalism is pivotal to the discontinuation of ethnic and ethno-religious conflict. 
Finally, the African state also needs to find methods to decentralise power away from the 
executive. A self-restrained state is less likely to fall into the trap of authoritarianism if their 
power is checked by strong parliamentary and judicial institutions. These and other democratic 
institutions are vital to limiting the overconsumption of power. The potential application of 
these institutional values into the governance framework of a newly formed South Sudan will 
also be carried into the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five: The Creation of Separate States: 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Sudan, Ethno-religious 
Conflict and The Secession of South Sudan 
 The history of the Sudanese people has been one of continuous struggle between the oppressed and the 
oppressors.  From our ancient past to the present day, the Sudanese people have always struggled for 
freedom, justice and human dignity. The SPLA recourse to armed struggle in 1983 was a resumption of 
earlier wars before, during and after colonialism. All these wars and struggles were aimed and are 
aimed at regaining African dignity and nationhood that has been mutilated over centuries. - Dr. John 
Garang (2005, cited in Ajuok, 2008:134) 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have dealt with, firstly, the immaterial elements surrounding identity 
politics in Africa i.e. primordial attachments, African and Islamic nationalist movements and 
reconstituted ideologies. Secondly, the sections that followed evaluated the tangible elements of 
authoritarian governance, elitism and resource driven conflicts that are attached to identity 
politics on the continent. The latter of these two discourses tends to declare many of the 
intangible elements as merely divisive tools used by elites to sustain hegemony over societies in 
Africa in the post-colony (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Mamdani, 2002, 2005; Ntahombaye and 
Nduwayo, 2007; Jinadu, 2007).  
The works listed above, have all in some manner systematically undertaken methods to 
undermine primordial or ethno-religious attachments with the modern yardstick of secular 
liberal rhetoric. However, noting the binding complexities of the intangibles exhibited in 
chapters two and three, one would recommend treading more lightly. Verily, one need only 
engage Dr. Garang’s (2005, cited in Ajuok, 2008: 134) words to understand the perceived 
emotion behind South Sudanese oppression. It might then be insensitive to suggest that the 
politicisation of identity has only resource monopolisation as its driving force. Noted in the 
analysis thus far, the secular mechanics of liberal politics have never resonated as deeply with 
African administration or its wider polities as much as the distinct group identification 
extending from colonial categorisation (Ekeh, 1975, 1999).  
Summoning back the exploits of British indirect rule described in chapter two, one must adhere 
to the perpetuation of ethno-religious difference at an administrative level, especially 
considering that Sudan was a key area where this occurred during the colonial period. Thus, this 
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chapter will commence with a historiography of pre-colonial and colonial Sudan to frame the 
identity conundrum afflicting the territory. 
Islamicisation, a fundamentalist ideology utilised by multiple Sudanese regimes since 
independence (Deng, 2006; Sharkey 2008) will also require invasive scrutiny to determine the 
strength of illiberal socio-politics and the perceived necessity for revolt against it by the South. 
In this section, the piece will take a more discursive analytical approach in investigating post-
independent Sudan; and the rhetoric extending from both the Sudanese government and the 
SPLM/A in the lead up to Southern secession. Decades of entrenched forced integration 
methods cannot simply be ignored when attention turns towards the politics of resource 
contestation.  
Therefore, there are two primary points of departure to assess when examining the events 
leading to South Sudanese secession. First, the chapter will examine the pressures of 
conservative and restrictive Islamicisation on Africans who did not essentially subscribe to 
Islamic beliefs or a Sharia defined political orientation. Secondly, the chapter assesses the 
delicate economic elements which may have assisted in the final push for secession. Discussing 
these two levels are tantamount to the evaluation of whether secession may be deemed viable in 
the long term for South Sudan. 
Additionally, the chapter will take one final prescriptive approach in analysing potential 
solutions to persisting issues in South Sudan since secession. The final objective will be to 
evaluate some of the short and long-term goals that Africa’s newest state should look to achieve 
in promoting equitable democratic governance. The potential for South Sudan to create 
sustainable democratic institutionalism and a socio-economic atmosphere for civil society to 
thrive in, will also ultimately determine whether the secession may be deemed a success. 
Pre-colonial and Colonial Conquest and Categorisation: The Foundations 
of Ethno-religious Factionalism in the Sudan 
Although a short description gauging the trajectory of Pan-Arabism was taken in chapter three, 
there is still much left unstated about the historical trappings of identity politics in the Sudan. 
This first section will provide a short historiography of politics and identities in the Sudan to 
frame the case study. In this regard, we recall discussions of the pre-colonial movement of 
Arabism throughout North Africa. 
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Ruay (1994: 157) suggests that the activities of Arab assimilation and migration were present in 
North Africa well before the end of the first millennium A.D. These sentiments of the movement 
of Arab culture through Africa well before Europeans forged formal colonial policy are backed by 
a number of historical accounts (Ruay, 1994; Viorst, 1995, Sharkey 2008). However, Viorst 
(1995: 48) claims in particular that the hand of Arabisation was firmer in a movement 
westwards through North Africa, for centuries ignoring much of the Sudan. The first Arab 
conquests preferred the arid climates westwards traversing modern day Africa as far as 
Morocco. Centuries later, in the 1700s a second wave of Islamism would finally capture the 
minds and hearts of the Sudanese people. This was said to have come not in the form of 
conquest as in the centuries before, but through the teachings of prophets and merchants that 
braved the region overlooked by the initial Arab conquests a thousand years before (Viorst, 
1995: 48). This would be a turning point for the realisation of Islam in the Sudan 
The Ottoman occupation of Egypt and Northern Sudan in the 1800s was an indifferent spell 
whereby Sudan was mostly raided to traffic African slaves for the international slave trade. 
However, Islamism was reaffirmed by the imposition of Sharia in the Mahdist uprising between 
1881 and 1898 (Viorst, 1995: 48). Arguably one of the most pivotal points in the socio-political 
development of the Sudan happened post-1898 when Lord Kirchner defeated the Mahdists, as 
Britain took full administrative control of the region (Viorst, 1995: 49). This is of course only a 
brief compression of pre-colonial events in the Sudan, the purpose only to exhibit that the 
influence of Islam had been relatively firm in the era before Biritsh occupation. 
As with most African states analysed throughout the course of this study, the primary point of 
socio-political interest occurs at the point of colonial interception. Sudan offers no deviation 
from this pattern. The British were largely responsible for laying the foundations which enabled 
ethno-religious conflict to thrive in a post-independent Sudan. This is fairly accusatory claim to 
make but is well backed by evaluations of indirect policy in the region. In a method that 
Mamdani (2011: 54) terms re-tribalisation, the British sought to distinctly separate the north 
from the south in the first half of the twentieth century. 
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Fig. 5.1. The hazy line depicts the “Closed Door” divide preventing the movement of Muslim Africans 
southwards and Indigenous Africans northwards in colonial Sudan.15 
As the British feared a second Mahdist uprising in the north of Sudan, they continued to support 
a distinctly Islamic administration of the area to keep colonial loyalties intact. They then entered 
into a campaign of formal segregation of the North from the South by instituting the Closed 
District Ordinance of 1922 (Mamdani, 2011: 55). Also known as the Closed Door Policy (Viorst, 
1995: 49). The methodology employed by the British was to separate the indigenous Africans of 
the South from the Arabised Africans of the North, going as far as criminalising movement 
between the regions. Figure 5.1. above provides an imprecise illustration depicting the North-
South separation.  
Intriguingly, the poorly conceptualised policy of the British would be to link North Sudan to 
Egypt to prevent the resurgence of Egyptian nationalism. South Sudan, on the other hand, could 
be more easily incorporated into the British settler administration of East Africa through 
Christian missionary education and influence. It should be stressed that these undertakings 
were not used to respect the value to African territorial identities but rather to simplify 
administration for the British. These policies would backfire following the resurgence of 
nationalism after World War II. Britain tried to revert, terminating its policy of separate 
development, unifying Sudan in light of rampant nationalism in Egypt. However, the damage to 
any possibility of a unified sense of Sudanese nationalism had already been cast. Mamdani 
(2011: 56) condensed the situation with choice words below, 
                                                          
15
 Illustration courtesy: Viorst, M. “Sudan’s Islamic Experiment” in Foreign Affairs 74(3): 45-58. 
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The end of the Southern Policy did not mean an end to its effects. By the late 1940s, 
major structural inequalities were already visible. A cumulative outcome was the 
development of two parallel elites in the country: a missionary-educated Christian elite in 
the south and a riverine Muslim elite in the North. Whereas the latter inherited the 
colonial state at independence, the former felt so cut off from access to the state that it 
took recourse to armed struggle. Northern writers would speak of the Sothern Policy as a 
colonial aberration which had created a Christian and non-Arab elite in the South. But 
the fact was that ‘Southern policy’ was simply the flip-side of Britain’s ‘Northern Policy’ 
which had coddled a tribal sectarian (Muslim) elite in the North. 
Again, as in the example of Nigeria discussed earlier in this study, the British policy of indirect 
rule to assist the administration of tribes (a term now scoffed at by African intellectuals) did 
more to disunite the people of Africa than it did to respect the sensibilities of their specific 
cultures and customs. One could suggest that the accusation of politicised identity for tangible 
gain first began with the categorisation suffered by Africans at the hands of lackadaisical 
colonial administrative techniques. Ethnic or ethno-religious identity may be a leading tool for 
politicking on the continent, but these rules of the game were much defined by the coloniser. 
As the process of decolonisation would have it, the elites of Northern Sudan were able to exert 
more intellectual influence over the British than the much maligned Southerners. Assisting the 
North in rejecting a federal constitution that would disseminate greater political autonomy to 
the South, the British granted a unitary state to the sole command of the Islamised North 
(Viorst, 1995: 50). This would signify the beginning of the longest protracted civil war in the 
history of the decolonised world spanning the best part of 50 years. 
Independent Sudan: Authoritarianism, Islamicisation and Civil War 
Thus far, a litany of examples has been exhibited expressing an innate ethnic politicisation 
influencing African governance since independence. This fundamental basis for analysis does 
not change substantially when looking at the case of the Sudan, but for the recognition that 
identity politics is more deeply linked to ethno-religious than purely ethnic bonds. Picking up 
from the previous section, it was noted that the British colonial interaction with the Sudan had 
left behind a deeply divided nation at independence (Viorst, 1995; Mamdani, 2011). Without a 
clear modern constitutional directive that could promote tolerance and equal rights amongst 
different groups, the colonially favoured Arab North centralised state power within the new state 
capital of Khartoum. Formal independence produced successive eras of dominance of an array 
of authoritarian governments, some slightly more secular than others, some that commenced in 
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a secular fashion but became more Islamic fundamentalist as they progressed (Kalpakian, 2006: 
48). This section will unpack some of the methods employed by succeeding Arab-led regimes 
and the affects they had on Sudan as a nation.   
Notably, Sudan had survived the majority of the twentieth century as a unitary state that 
provided little decentralisation of power to administrative areas outside of Khartoum. The 
regimes of Abboud, Nimeiry and al Bashir respectively, upheld oppressive dictatorships in the 
region for more than 60 years between them (Kalpakian, 2006: 48). This is startling to note 
considering the immense ethno-religious diversity that had been left in the wake of British 
colonialism. According to the census of 1955/56, ethnic diversity accounted for, 
Arabs (39%), referring to a mixture of Semitic immigrants and Indigenous Hamitic and 
Negroid groups; Southerners (30%) as Nilotic-Hamitic and Sudanic Negroids; West 
Darfurians (9%) referring to indigenous Negroids with some Hamitic and Semitic 
element; Beja (6%), indigenous Hamitic; West African (6%), Nuba (6%), indigenous 
Negroids; Nubia (3%) Negroid mixture with Hamitic and Semitic; and Funj (1.7%) as 
indigenous Negroes (El-Battahani, 2007: 39). 
Sudan at independence could certainly be classified as one of the most diverse states on the 
African continent. Displayed in its makeup are groups that are strictly of indigenous African 
descent and groups with varying degrees of mixed Middle-Eastern and African hybridity. 
However, most interesting to note and what researchers have vouched for (Mamdani, 2011; 
Kalpakian, 2006), is that in terms of race and physical characteristics, most Sudanese Arabs 
were physically indistinguishable from the Christian counterparts. The majority of politicised 
difference was developed on the basis of perceived cultural and religious superiority of the 
Arabized north over the Christian-animist south.   
As a result, fashionable ideology for managing diversity in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s 
was developed around national unity (El-Battahani, 2007: 38). General Abboud seizing power 
by a concerted military campaign in 1958 offered no alternative to this trend. El-Battahani’s 
(2007) “Unity-in-conformity” thesis will be elaborated on later in this section. For now, 
however, it is important to note that Sudan, similar to other African states, espoused a 
subversive sense of nationalism which all groups within its borders were compelled to obey. In 
the case of Sudan, nationalist conformity was linked inextricably to Islamic fundamentalism as 
the prescribed unifying tool.  
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General Abboud would be the first to take steps toward a restrictive post-independence 
Arabisation project by instituting the imposition of Islam and the Arabic language on Southern 
Sudan.  Christian missionaries and traditionally Christian schools were forbidden (Kalpakian, 
2006: 49). Meanwhile, during the 1950s, politics had become increasingly evolved in the South. 
It had transformed from uncoordinated grievance based protest into secondary school educated 
graduates who made their way north to Khartoum to seek government representation (Howell, 
1973: 168). Under increasing pressure for federal rights for the South, General Abboud’s military 
coup came at a time when the North strategically needed to reassert the dominance it had lost. 
Howell (1973: 171) continues by stating that Abboud’s governance technique was of strong 
military authoritarianism. Political parties and parliament were officially banned, therefore 
silencing what little voice of plural representation the Southerners had acquired since 
independence.  
As presented in a handful of examples earlier in this piece, the typical political orientation of 
competition is to find illegal methods when formal plural institutions do not exist to engage with 
the state. This simple manifestation seemed destined to occur for as long as the incumbents of 
independent Sudan used exclusionary politics to dictate policy. In the 1960s the Southerners 
formed the belligerently illegitimate opposition party, the Sudan National Union (SANU). Along 
with SANU, the militant rebel group, the Anya Nya (Snake Poison), also came into being. The 
rebels were surprisingly backed well enough by the Congo, Uganda and Israel to sustain a 
guerrilla military campaign that plunge the nation into its first civil war (Kalpakian, 2006: 49). 
This evidently shows that international opinion surrounding the plight of Southerners in the 
Sudan had also gained wide empathetic support. 
Increased pressure on Abboud’s regime forced him to reinstate parliament and unban political 
parties. However, in the face of low morale within the ranks at his decline in authority, Abboud 
lost the validation of the Sudanese army. After his personal guard opened fire on protestors, 
killing 20 innocent civilians in the 1964 riots he was forced to resign. Sudan returned to 
fragmented and tumultuous democratic governance in November 1964 until an agitated military 
left the barracks once more to instate Colonel Ja’afar al Nimeiry to power in 1969 (Kalpakian, 
2006: 50). These events show that even in the early stages of independence, the Arab elites 
would find it impossible amongst themselves to entertain any form of pluralist governance. This 
would have entailed a momentous amount of socio-political compromise that stood in direct 
conflict with the Islamic nationalist experiment (Viorst, 1995) and prophetic cultural realisation 
of Sudan as an Islamic state. 
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With regards to freedom and liberty, life in Sudan would not be much different under Nimeiry’s 
rule. However, it is should be clarified that his rule encompassed a more secular interlude 
(Mamdani, 2011: 61). Nimeiry would institute a regime of modernist change in the Sudan. He 
was far less interested in the schematics of ethno-religious factional politics and rather more 
concerned with Sudan’s urban revival through a communist ideological lens. In this way, he 
formed a strategic alliance with the Communist Party (CP), proceeding with urban development 
in a much similar fashion to African governments of the time that had espoused techniques of 
African socialism. The fact that the Sudan was a strictly dichotomised environment presented 
the greatest dilemma for Nimeiry and the CP,  
[They] analysed Sudanese society through the binary of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, 
whereby the modern represented the technically advanced sectors of the economy, such 
as industry, education, communication and the state apparatus; and the traditional the 
technologically backwards sectors, agriculture, pastoralism and crafts, all bonded by 
religious and ethnic sentiment (Mamdani, 2011: 61). 
One could almost consider that Nimeiry’s attempts at development and innovation was a very 
noble endeavour. Especially considering that the biggest economic sector in Sudan since its 
inception as a modern state had been purely agricultural. It was clear that Nimeiry felt Sudan 
should move with the times, however, his ideals were supported only by the minority of society 
(Mamdani, 2011: 61). The majority of Sudan’s society had been socialised in the primordial 
manner of ethno-religious contestation for the best part of its formal existence, leaving 
Nimeiry’s ideal of a thriving modernist military autocracy severely alienated from the masses. 
The persistence of factionalism made it overwhelmingly difficult for Nimeiry to find an answer 
to the “Southern Problem” (O’Fahey, 1996: 263).  Nimeiry sought further co-optation with both 
Southern rebel movements and the National Islamic Front (NIF) in order to quell conflict with 
Southern and Northern factions respectively. However, O’Fahey (1996: 263) continued to 
suggest that keeping all factional groups content was an insurmountable task.  
Under these circumstances, Ayers (2010: 154) reminds us of the difficulty of subverting 
parochial formats of political identity. These identities appear to resonate more powerfully with 
wider African society than a firmly defined nationalist goal. This was no truer than in the case of 
Nimeiry’s Sudan. Fighting a tide of primordial ethno-religious politics espoused by the elites of 
supressed opposition, such as the Umma party and Ansar brotherhood, Nimeiry’s regime 
eventually collapsed under the growing pressure of re-mobilised identities.  
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The fatal flaw of Nimeiry’s regime was ironically the very tool that he had used to sustain the 
regime until his displacement in the coup of April 6th 1985. Through stringent authoritarianism, 
which was built on the secular process of Sudanism, he attempted to direct the state towards 
progressive national unity over group identity (Mamdani, 2011: 66). This entailed trying to keep 
multiple sects content and included in the national program. The culmination of implausibility 
of this task was seen in promoting the CP’s ideology of development over democracy. The 
Southerners revolted as they preferred an ideal of greater autonomy instead of buying into the 
development agenda. During this period, the Darfuri people also objected violently to the 
appointment of Northern bureaucrat to administrative authority over them (Mamdani, 2011: 
63). One may potentially consider from these events that the majority of people within Sudan 
saw Nimeiry’s strict authoritarianism as similar to the re-implementation of colonialism over 
them, as the repressive measures utilised were certainly not dissimilar. 
Rigid authoritarianism seemed to be the only viable method in an attempt to supress ethno-
religious difference in Africa and the Sudan, but it was also a self-defeating model. The harder 
the Nimeiry regime pushed the national industrialist agenda, the easier it was for elites of 
contemporary religious sects to mobilise groups against the perceived oppression. Self-
definition through group identity and a communitarian disposition was essentially all the people 
of Sudan had known for centuries. Nimeiry would attempt one final ploy to regain the support of 
Muslims in the North by declaring himself the great Imam of the Sudan and reinstating sharia 
law (El Battahani, 2010: 34). This did not prevent his political demise as his support mongering 
across all groups had left citizens feeling that he was divisive and untrustworthy. However, due 
to resurgence in Northern Islamism, it would come as no surprise that the overthrow of Nimeiry 
would lead to the re-installation of Islamic fundamentalist principles. 
During the era of Nimeiry’s reign and the regimes that followed, the concept El-Battahani 
(2007: 45) termed “unity-in-conformity” had enveloped the state functions of Sudan. This 
conformity, however, would not consist of the same mechanics of nationalist driven 
development, but rather one of socio-political transformation of society. Islamicisation would be 
resurgent once more; its primary policy task of religious and cultural assimilation of non-
Muslims was seen as the correct methodology in unifying the Sudan. This was espoused most 
fervently by the head of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan Turabi, who would later join 
forces with Al Bashir to assist in strengthening the imposition of Sharia law in the country. In 
the civilian government interlude headed by Sadiq al Mahdi from 1986 until Al Bashir’s coup 
d’état, Turabi and the NIF would become a pivotal destabilising force in the push for 
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Islamicisation in the region (Mamdani, 2011: 67). Turabi held a somewhat cultic following 
within the region for the best part of three decades, before and during Omar Al Bashir’s 
presidency. He was renowned for his eloquent ability to romanticise the Sudan as an inherently 
Islamic state, cunningly prophesising a modernist Islamism that could attain self-definition 
away from of its Arabic roots (Ayers, 2010: 161). The concept of an Islamic rule specifically 
tailored for the Sudanese created a platform for continued protest against al Mahdi’s short rule. 
These sentiments championed by Turabi’s NIF, along with conflicting factional ideals proposed 
by Darfuri elite and Southern rebel forces alike, made for an unstable and unsustainable 
coalition governement. Not dissimilar from the other examples of British post-colony observed 
in this study, Dean (2000: 72) makes a poignant remark about politics in independent Sudan, 
that “Each [incumbent had] inherited a country but not a nation”. Whether through different 
periods of oppressive secular authoritarianism or Islamic directed governance, a progressive 
national ideology seemed to be the hardest task to achieve. Nevertheless, Turabi and the NIF 
chose to side with the military officer, Omar Al Bashir, in an attempt to make this nouveau 
Islamic ideal a realisation.  
Al Bashir took up leadership in 1989 and Sudan has not wavered from his strict incumbency in 
the 24 years he has presided over the state. It would be advisable at this point to depart from the 
historiography framing Sudan since independence; and commence a more discursively 
analytical evaluation of the theoretical and ideological foundation of Al Bashir’s regime. This 
should provide a better frame to understand the reasons for heightened ethno-religious conflict 
in the south and the eventual secession of South Sudan.  
A Discursive Ideological Analysis of Islamic Fundamentalism in Al 
Bashir’s Sudan.  
The premise of Sharia governance in Sudan was built on the theological principles of clerics 
such as Hassan Turabi and were emphatically implemented and coercively enforced by 
President Al Bashir (Freedom House, 2011). To understand the abstract and illiberal premise for 
the existence of ta’rib (Islamicisation), El-Battahani (2007: 45) gives an adequate exposition of a 
political discourse of fundamentalism espoused within Al Bashir’s regime: 
For its part, the hegemonic centre believes that only by promoting its culture could the 
unity of Sudan be maintained. Submitting to the will of the centre, or to put it in milder 
terms, conforming to the value system of the centre by different groups is taken as a 
prerequisite for Sudanese unity and identity. […] To be more precise, it is derived from a 
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particular idealist (revivalist) interpretation and ideological appropriation of Islam. 
[Islam] is a monist religion with a built in universalist drive which conceives the human 
race as but a target for conversion. 
The most apparent insinuation here is that the land itself denotes a sacred Islamic attachment, 
that which propels an Islamic-centrist government to assimilate everyone within its boundaries. 
Recalling the unrelenting struggle for Southerners to attain recognition as rightful occupants of 
South Sudan, even well before Britain’s colonial categorisation, the task described in the excerpt 
surely could not be upheld. However, Al Bashir’s government attempted to force this integration 
program, regardless of the politicised sentiment expressed by the Southerners. Sharkey (2008: 
23) describes the subversive policy as inconsiderate of other cultures and creeds in a coercive 
method of conforming people towards one religiously based ideology. It had consistently been 
referred to as a top-down policy enforced upon citizens by the elites of the north to obey Sharia, 
whilst tolerance towards any other lifestyle would not be accepted.  
In a liberal dominant ideological climate, we are compelled to evaluate states with the unofficial 
yardstick of their ability to promote racial, religious and cultural tolerance. Sudan shortly before 
the secession of the South stood out in a Freedom House report as one of the most restricted 
states in the world (Freedom House, 2011). Ratings alluding to political freedom and regime 
transparency are all too often lumped together competitively, leaving Third World states 
appearing destitute and in a constant state of anarchy. Aside from the idealistic task of Western 
political orthodoxy, one may rather consider that in a realistic evaluation of what successes 
African governments can achieve, the current government of Sudan had never attempted to 
create a reasonably inclusive sense of citizenship. Sharkey (2008:34) notes the application of 
religiously discursive tools in perpetuating cultural oppression used by successive Islamic 
governments. Al Bashir’s government cunningly augmented policy to sustain the perception of 
an Islamic cultural dominance throughout the Sudan. The practice of any other faith besides 
Islam remained banned and Islamic schools were built in the South to assist with the integrative 
process of traditionally Christian and animist areas.  
Furthermore, Sharia law was strictly enforced legally upon the populace as criminal justice 
institutions were also defined upon Islamic tradition. Al Bashir tried to reinstate the laws of 
hudūd, which forbid apostasy, the consumption of alcohol and a variety of severe mutilations as 
punishment for theft (O’Fahey, 1996: 264). Implementations such as these help paint the 
discursive picture of the attempt to institutionalise a normative relationship between the state 
and society composed entirely of religious interpretation. One takes the simple recognition from 
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these mechanisms of rule that consociational governance would not be entertained under Al 
Bashir’s rule.  
The continuous suppressive rhetoric of the Sudanese state to impose a unified state that ignored 
the different religious and cultural legacies it deemed backward in comparison to the Islamic 
fundamentalist government provides a concrete motive for the development of protest 
movements. Decidedly then, the ideals of many groups were more firmly espoused in creating a 
Sudan that could embrace rather unity-in-diversity (El-Battahani, 2007: 50).  
Rights recognition is what the people of the South had seemingly fought two civil wars over and 
strived for in conflict lasting the best part of fifty years. In the years leading up to the secession 
of 2011, the South would continue to seek a more multicultural and liberally tolerant system 
from Al Bashir. In the next section we will look at the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
ending the second civil war, the continued corruption and oppression of Al Bashir’s regime and 
the potential economic reasons leading to the eventual secession of South Sudan. 
 The Southern Response to Al Bashir’s Regime; The CPA, Oil and 
Territorial Disputation; and the Secession of South Sudan. 
Having presented the extent of the tyranny surrounding Al Bashir’s reign over the Sudan, it 
would be logical for this section to commence by examining the response of Southerners to his 
repressive policies. The best method to use in this instance would be to look at the political path 
of the most popular opposition Southerners have been able to muster since independence, the 
formation of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA).  The existence slightly eclipses Al 
Bashir’s incumbency, but gained the most notoriety during the aforementioned regime. The 
movement was first formed in response to Nimeiry’s last gasp turn toward Sharia law in 1986 
shortly before his political demise in the same year (El Battahani, 2010: 34). However, the 
SPLA’s influence would extend well into the 21st Century as both a resistance army and as a 
political party. The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) under the charismatic 
leadership of the late Dr. John Garang would become the most important party in the history of 
a now seceded South Sudan.  
The SPLA was successful where other movements had failed because of its extraordinary ability 
to traverse and mobilise different groups in the South and even minorities in the North. 
Mamdani (2011: 74) provides a concise elucidation of their political clout: 
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[The SPLA] demonstrated an ability to mobilise beyond the sacrosanct ethnic boundaries, 
first beyond its supposedly Nilotic heartland in Equatoria, and then beyond the old 
North-South border to the Nuba Hills in Southern Kordofan and the Southern Blue Nile. 
The SPLA presence in the Southern Blue Nile Province appeared in 1985, when SPLA 
units began passing through it, as they moved between Ethiopia and the White Nile. 
As the excerpt displays, the political reach of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement at its 
inception extended far outside its home region of Equatoria and was not merely a disjointed 
operation restricted to the confines of the Southern Capital of Juba. The map on the following 
page illustrates the areas where the SPLM was most prevalent during the early struggle, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Full map of Sudan before the 2011 secession of South Sudan. 16 
Visibly, this movement seemed to transcend beyond the barriers that separated many of the 
ethno-religious groups discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The reason it possessed this 
                                                          
16
 Illustration courtesy: United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (2007) www.un.org  
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new unifying ability was due in no small part to Dr. John Garang’s influence on the organisation. 
Garang, one may consider, had a modernist outlook on the socio-politics of the nation-state that 
operated in opposition to the intolerant climate found in the Sudan of the 1980s. To qualify this 
point, it would be appropriate to deconstruct two pivotal statements he made during this period, 
Our major problem is that the Sudan has been looking for its soul, for its true identity. 
Failing to find it, some take refuge in Arabism, and failing in this they find refuge in Islam 
as a unifying factor. Others get frustrated as they failed to discover how they can become 
Arabs when their creator thought otherwise. And they take refuge in separation (Garang, 
1992: 127). 
It would be unfitting to declare Garang as comprehensively secularist, as it is evident in this 
excerpt that he was partial to the notion of a creator. However, one could certainly conclude that 
he believed in a more secular manifestation of the state. Garang (1989) earlier had stressed that, 
I believe that the central question, the basic problem of the Sudan is that since 
independence in 1956, the various regimes that have come and gone in Khartoum and 
have provide a commonality, a paradigm, a basis for the Sudan as a state; that is, there 
has been no conscious evolution of that common Sudanese identity and destiny to which 
we all pay undivided allegiance, irrespective of our backgrounds, irrespective of our 
tribes, irrespective of our race, irrespective of religious beliefs. 
This is a fairly loaded statement with a few points that need to be carefully digested. It is first 
important to clarify that at the conception of the SPLM/A, a Southern secession was certainly 
not on the agenda. Realising this, we note refreshingly that Garang appeared a firm advocate of 
multiculturalism. Looking back retrospectively at the El-Battahani (2007) piece, one could 
certainly suggest that Garang was libertarian in his belief of unity-in-diversity. This stood in 
stark contrast to the fundamentalist ideologies purported by clerics such as Turabi, who 
expressed an unwavering Islamic assimilatory quest for all the people within the Sudan.  
Statements such as the above also provide the broad discursive rhetoric with which to analyse 
the different idealisms purported by both the Sudanese state and the Southerner protest 
movement. As the previous section outlined, the language of governance is couched in resolute 
conservative religious fundamentalism. This provided an atmosphere for the exclusion of 
politicised groups that refuse to buy into the concept of a unified state that sought to steamroll 
cultural and religious legacies. In opposition, Garang’s SPLM/A operated from a modernist 
liberal platform which promoted multicultural inclusivity, constitutionalism and fair 
representation of all groups within the Sudan. 
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However, these values stood in direct conflict with an Arab-dominant Sudan, which sought to 
preserve the categorical colonial dominance which superimposed them above any other group. 
The legitimacy for Northerners served as a continuance of British colonial policy that had 
bequeathed an independent Sudan to their administrative preserve (Ayers, 2010: 158). This 
provided a somewhat antiquated legitimacy, but nonetheless, one that has dominated the 
Sudanese socio-political environment for the majority of its independence. 
Finally, scrutinising the remark Garang (1989) made about a Sudan that had not consciously 
“evolved a common Sudanese identity”, he also alludes to the constructivist position that 
identities are in fact able to evolve. This follows the work of Ayers (2010: 154), who states that 
“[…] identities are not fixed and immutable but rather socially constructed.”  This clarification, 
however, raises more vital questions about the SPLM/A’s ideas of politicised identity. To take it 
at face value we recognise again the advocacy for a new multicultural definition for the state. 
However, this rhetoric also opens the door to scrutinise the SPLM/A’s ideology through Collier 
and Hoeffler’s (2002: 3) lenses of political legitimation for the acquisition of resources. Garang’s 
new nationalist rhetoric took great lengths to legitimise all ethno-religious groups as rightful 
occupants of the Sudan. One then may consider that his statements, even as early as 1989, 
referred to more than just the search for equal rights recognition, but also the resource and 
distributiom benefits attached to more inclusive citizenship. 
As this section looks more closely at the Southern struggle, which eventually culminated in the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, these intricacies become implicit in many of 
the settlements achieved. The political philosophy of Dr. John Garang was certainly not resolute, 
as he too became more frustrated as the years of Al Bashir’s oppression rolled on. Recollecting 
Garang’s quote cited at the beginning of the chapter, having discussed the people of Sudan as 
oppressed and exploited, it was clear that the concept of complete autonomy had grown on him 
through the years of political struggle. This lead him to statements such as, “It is necessary to 
affirm and for the Sudanese to remind themselves that we are a historical People, because there 
are persistent and concerted efforts to push us of the rails of history” (Garang, 2005 cited in, 
Ajuok 2008: 134). As emotive as the non-Muslim search for greater rights recognition had been 
in the Sudan since independence, it is statements such as the above that spur on the cynical 
rhetoric attached to identity politicisation. Evaluating the latter stages of the Southerner 
struggle and the conditions of the CPA should assist in detailing further the somewhat realist 
and tangible goals attached to the seeking of greater political autonomy. 
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If we accept the premise that autonomy is not a well-intentioned end in itself, but rather that it 
is connected specifically to political-economic ideals, then one is obliged to further analyse the 
case of Sudan and South Sudan from this approach. This entails reasserting the theoretical 
triangle developed in chapter four17. To reiterate, the triangulation contends that a politicised 
identity that is sufficiently excluded in authoritarian governance, will eventually find a method 
to engage with the state. In the case of Sudan this has always been enacted through protest and 
rebel insurgency. The evidence of protracted civil war for all but 10 of the Sudan’s 55 years of 
independence corroborates this point. 
Until 2011, in the 21 year period of unrelenting war shaping the Al Bashir regime, it was 
estimated that over 2 million people had died and a further 4 million were displaced in and 
around the Southern regions (Maitre, 2010: 54). Figures like this display the severity of 
oppression during the Al Bashir regime. It details the importance of the on-going struggle to the 
SPLM/A that one would presume surely extends beyond the securing of strategic resources, but 
rather questions of freedom from despotic rule. However, due to the discovery of large deposits 
of oil in the South of Sudan in 1978, Dean (2000: 78) and Viorst (1995: 50) both contend that in 
1983, when civil war broke out again against Nimeiry’s regime that the political stakes had been 
raised.  
The discovery of oil in the South of Sudan then seemed to intensify the conflict. Ayers (2010: 
165) and Harneit-Sievers (2010: 98) further assert that the resource contestation attached to oil 
influenced the political strategy of Southerners and may have intensified identity politicisation. 
These sentiments further supplement the suitability of the triangulation proposed in this study. 
Addressing the oil factor, Ayers (2010: 165) declares somewhat controversially that after the 
discovery of oil in 1978, the North fashioned economic ties with the United States firm, Chevron, 
to pipe unrefined oil from the South to the North, hence excluding Southerners from the 
production process. Ayers (2010: 165) continues and affirms that this exclusion from a potential 
oil deal fast-tracked the formation of the SPLM/A and the outbreak of renewed violence in 1983. 
However, opinions are divided as to how much influence oil had on the renewal of the conflict. 
Harneit-Sievers (2010:98) does not deny that oil was a contentious issue, but moderates to 
reason that it was not the overarching factor leading to the 1983 renewal of violence: 
                                                          
17
 Consult Figure 1.1 on pg. 14 for the theoretical triangle that frames the three levels that many politicised identity 
disputes conform to in Africa. 
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While oil did not cause the outbreak of civil war in 1983, it greatly raised the stakes in the 
conflict. Much of the finds are located near Abyei, right in the middle boundary area 
between North and South, and in Upper Nile, a region within the South. The SPLM/A 
regarded oil operations as a military target. Exploration and production activities were 
accompanied by what human rights advocates described as a systematic strategy of 
“depopulating” the oil regions, with attacks by government-sponsored militias on the 
local population. In addition, livelihoods of local communities were endangered by 
construction activities related to the oil industry. 
As this extract exhibits, the influence of oil in the region was unavoidable. The Khartoum 
government attempted to expel Southerners from their land if their presence created an 
imposition to the acquisition of oil; and the SPLM/A responded by attempting to sabotage state 
economic plans from which they felt excluded. Observing the data, one can hardly blame the 
Southerners for their response to Al Bashir’s attempts to exclude them from the development of 
an economic resource found within their territory. 
As Al Bashir’s totalitarianism appeared unrelenting, continued conflict seemed an inevitable 
product. Maitre (2009: 61) attested to this by describing Sudan before the CPA was imposed as 
exclusively a single party state, singularly ruled by the NCP. All other parties at the time were 
effectively banned and state functions and policy making continued to be held as a luxury of the 
executive in Khartoum. Along with these restrictive institutions one recalls the continued 
program 0f Islamicisation. Therefore, although a concrete resource contention was apparent, 
the sheer restrictive illiberalism played just as large a role in the maintenance of conflict. 
This defining illiberal rhetoric was implicit in most policy rhetoric stemming from Al Bashir’s 
NCP. In 2001, for instance, laws on government censorship of the media were said to be relaxed, 
but the government continued to expunge the influence of dissidents against the state, through 
routine detention and numerous other violent coercive methods, (Sudan Tribune, 2003(b)). The 
underlying rhetoric of domination could be found in most state policy before secession and 
statements made by the Sudanese National Government (NG). With regards to pre-secession 
statements made by Al Bashir, the atmosphere before the acceptance of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement was one of candid political manipulation. With regards to the freedom of 
press and political competition Al Bashir (cited in Sudan Tribune, 2003(b)) noted: 
When we drew up the constitution, we approved multipartyism, a peaceful rotation of 
power, and we acknowledged the existence of the opposition, and it was good to have 
laws governing the press. All these we approved. However, people might differ in their 
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opinions. I might have personal views and convictions on how the [public] interest lies 
regarding a certain issue, thinking that it safeguards the government’s interests, which 
the people may have violated. 
Digesting this statement, the contradictive nature of state policy versus the public language used 
by incumbents such as Al Bashir provides the perfect tool with which to deconstruct the charade 
of governance he sought to maintain. As previous examples exhibited in this chapter confirm, 
the constitution that Al Bashir alludes to in the excerpt above could not have possibly been 
accepted by Southerners amongst other contesting political identities in the region. 
Deconstructing further, the portion of his statement stating, “I might have personal views and 
convictions on how the [public] interest lies regarding a certain issue […]” exhibits a blatant 
contradictory personalism to what an inclusive model of governance should provide. 
Restrictive discursive rhetoric such as that contained in Al Bashir’s above statement provides 
two important arguments. Firstly, it provides the ammunition to supplement the theoretical 
triangle of identity politicisation, as Southerner claims attain greater legitimacy in proving the 
absolutism of Al Bashir’s NCP. Secondly, the tangible manifestations of his deeply conservative 
and authoritarian mantra give adequate fuel to the perception that a seceded South Sudan could 
prosper once released from the despotic grip of his regime.  
As the conflict and international sanctions had strained every functional muscle of both the NCP 
and the SPLM/A, in 2002 the parties finally declared a final ceasefire. The Machakos Protocol 
was signed in Kenya in the same year and later the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
formalised in 2005. As the CPA (2005: 47) was to grant greater autonomy to the South of Sudan 
with a referendum scheduled for proposed secession in 2011, the Southerners finally found 
themselves in a position of strength. Wealth sharing was proposed during this period between 
the new wings of government, the National Government (NG) and the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GOSS). The CPA proposed that the wealth of Sudan be shared equitably between each 
level of government so it may be able to carry out all constitutional duties; that numerous parts 
of excluded territories in Southern Sudan would need funds for infrastructural development to 
carry out basic governance functions; that territories in Southern Sudan should not be 
prejudiced against; and areas in need of post-conflict reconstruction be raised to the same level 
of socio-economic and public services as the Northern States (CPA, 2005: 47). These all seemed 
viable conditions considering the unequal distribution of rights and public resources that had 
plagued the country since independence in 1956 had left the South severely underdeveloped. 
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The CPA further proposed the equitable sharing of oil revenue. In the agreement, the NG would 
be entitled to 50% of the oil revenue and the GOSS would be entitled to the other 50% share 
(CPA, 2005: 54). This 50% revenue allocation to the GOSS was carried to non-oil revenue 
collection as well, including national personal income tax, business tax, customs duties and 
import tax, sea-port and airport revenue amongst a host of other public revenue collection 
processes (CPA, 2005: 55-56). The Southerners advocated for their share of the resource wealth 
on the simple basis that the majority of oil was found firmly within their territories of the state.  
The question of the oil revenue sharing would become the most contentious issue leading up to 
the secession, especially concerning the contention surrounding the oil-rich region of Abyei 
placed squarely between the North-South divide (Johnson, 2007: 2). As a conflict that extends 
well into the post-secession era, the issue of Abyei will be unpacked in more detail in the next 
section. 
As oil represents the potential for exponential growth, development and the instantaneous 
creation of wealth, debates produced by the 2011 referendum for the secession of South Sudan 
were largely centred on this valuable commodity. Patey (2010: 618) notes that negotiations were 
delicately poised on the realisation that the inevitable secession of South Sudan might plunge 
the region into an economic crisis. Territoriality produced inciting comments from both sides of 
the spectrum. In 2007, Al Bashir stated that he would not “give an inch” of the oil fields and 
their prospective revenue to the South, a region that was still disputed between the two 
respective governments. Salva Kiir, the vice-president of Sudan after the death of Garang, issued 
warning shots of his own that destabilisers of peace would be met with military reprisal from the 
SPLA. 
It became clearer with each new dispute that an autonomous federal arrangement in the South 
would be continually undermined by Al Bashir unless the Southerners chose to secede 
completely from Sudan. One final blow to any possibility of reconciliation came in the form of 
the 2010 elections. With excitement plentiful surrounding the first multi-party democratic 
election in 24 years, the event was tarnished by Al Bashir’s NCP through systematic processes of 
vote rigging and coercive intimidation (Freedom House, 2011). The SPLM and other parties 
such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Umma Party condemned and decided to 
boycott the elections. In the aftermath of an election that Al Bashir could not lose, he proceeded 
to clamp down on civil liberties in the North, harassing civil society activists, the free media and 
international aid workers. South Sudan would choose to secede from Sudan just over a year later 
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on the 9th of July 2011. The consequences for both Sudan and South Sudan in light of this 
dissociation will be further analysed in the following section.  
  
The Future of South Sudan: Issues and Potential Solutions Surrounding a 
Fragile New State 
This section will analyse issues and possible recommendations to assist democratic 
consolidation in South Sudan. The Southern Sudanese maintained its referendum to hold 
elections on the 9th of January 2011. A 99% voter turnout voted almost unanimously to opt for 
secession instead of unity with the north (Freedom House, 2012). Since then South Sudan has 
chosen to accept the results of the pre-secession Government of South Sudan (GOSS) elections 
held in 2010, instead of having formal independence elections. The SPLM led interim 
government has chosen as an alternative to hold South Sudan’s first formal elections in 2015. 
This has garnered a critical response from the international environment, who has also found 
that the interim constitution places too much power in the hands of the executive branch 
(Freedom House, 2012). On the basis of work covered earlier on Dahl’s (1989) timeless concept 
of Polyarchy, the leaders of the SPLM should be cautious not to set the country en route to an 
authoritarian reversal. At the point where too much power is vested in one branch of 
government, the opportunity for checks and balances are considerably decreased. This system, if 
left to ferment over time, might eventually leave the GOSS an impervious and unaccountable 
state structure. 
Another standout issue for the new South Sudanese government pertains to the unresolved 
territorial tensions between the Sudan and South Sudan; along with raising intrastate tensions 
within the fledgling state. The study will commence with a brief assessment of interstate 
territorial tensions, before looking at some of the barriers to progress within South Sudan. 
The separate disputes of the Nuba Mountains and the oil-rich Abyei region form arguably the 
two most contested disputes along the new Sudan and South Sudan shared border. The Nuba 
are an indigenous group of people that had long associated with the plight of Southerners in the 
historical context of the previously unified Sudan. Komey (2010: 49) affirms that the Nuba are a 
self-identified ethnic group which for several decades endured long strife against state forced 
assimilation (Arabisation), economic and political marginalisation.  The Nuba Mountains18 was 
                                                          
18
 The Nuba Mountains are also alternatively referred to as the South Kordofan state. 
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situated fairly insecurely in the centre of the old unified Sudan. Even more precarious is the fact 
that the Nuba Mountains are home to several ethnic groups. It has been historically confirmed 
that sedentary indigenous subsistence farmers reside in the area, along with Arab pastoralists 
(Baqqāra) and Arab migrants from West Africa (Fellāta) who have settled expansively in the 
area for the past 200 years (Komey, 2010: 51).  
Importantly though, the Nuba constitute an ethnic majority in the region that have been 
subjugated by Northern Sudan policies since independence was achieved in 1956. Roughly 
between 1960 and 1985 the Nuba demonstrated peacefully their dissatisfaction at the policies of 
the Khartoum government but this proved largely ineffective. When Nuba leaders joined the 
SPLM/A in 1985 they took up arms against the Sudanese government as part of the liberation 
movement (Komey, 2010: 52). However, as part of the 2005 extended Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and 2011 referendum for secession, the Southerners were unable to secure the 
region as part of a seceded South Sudan. A map illustrating the disputed regions of South 
Kordofan and Abyei may be found below, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3. A map illustrating the border of Sudan and South Sudan19 
                                                          
19
The map is adapted from: United Nations Map No. 4458 Rev 2. Sudan (March 2012) 
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The map displays the precarious position of both the Nuba Mountains and Abyei region in 
relation to the territorial boundary of South Sudan. Tensions between the Nuba and central 
government in Khartoum maintained up to and following the ratification of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement of 2005.  Dagne (2011: 5-6) states that tensions continue in the region 
regardless of the secession as members of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement-North, a 
factional division of the SPLM/A, have clashed repeatedly with Sudan’s army during the 
Sudanese government’s attempts to disarm them. Intermittent pressures on the relationship 
between Sudan and South Sudan persist as a result, as the former has accused the latter 
government of supporting SPLM-N, a faction Sudan consider to be an illegitimate rebel 
movement (Dagne, 2011: 6). There would be no possible solution at this time other than to grant 
the Nuba a certain amount of greater autonomy and self-determination, but that is unlikely to 
occur for as long as Al Bashir remains in power.  
Even more disparaging, is that due to the Nuba’s association with the Government of South 
Sudan (GOSS), a growing humanitarian crisis has been caused by Al Bashir’s regime restricting 
international humanitarian aid to the region. Elkins (2013) reporting for Al Jazeera in May of 
2013 stated that the isolated region was on the verge of plummeting into outright famine. Close 
to 1.1 million people in the region face starvation if Al Bashir’s regime does not lift restrictions 
on international aid workers taking food and water to this now desperate region. In instances 
such as these, due to the South Kordofan area remaining under Sudanese territorial jurisdiction, 
the international arena needs to put greater pressure on the Al Bashir regime to prevent these 
acts of despotism. 
The oil-rich region of Abyei provides the other even more heavily contested region between 
Sudan and South Sudan. Both States feel they have equal claim over the territory and neither 
have been willing to budge since South Sudan seceded in 2011. South Sudanese Ambassador to 
Kenya, Michael Ayom (2012), asserted that there should be little to dispute in terms of the Abyei 
situation, as he characterised Sudan’s attachment to the area as the perpetuation of old  
illegitimate colonial barriers. Ayom (2012) stated furthermore that the overwhelming 
indigenous ethnic majority of Ngok Dinka in the region should be enough to classify Abyei as 
part of Sudan. Dagne (2011: 4) and reports from Al Jazeera (2013) back this appropriation by 
agreeing that the Ngok Dinka are the only settled group living in the Abyei region besides a very 
small minority of Arab nomadic Misseriya pastoralists that migrate in and out of Abyei from the 
north every year. 
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This situation in Abyei, however, is more complex than just a mere contention of who should 
rightfully inhabit the land. A tradition of rhetoric extending from both Sudan and South Sudan 
has stated on numerous occasions the importance of Abyei’s oil producing capacity. Sanders 
(2012: 6) in a compiled report of the oil producing capacity of the region, estimated that the 
Abyei district (specifically the towns of Diffra, Bamboo and Heglig) had previously been 
responsible for producing 25% (76,600 barrels per day) of Sudan’s annual crude output. This in 
turn prompted accusation’s form Al Bashir’s government that the only reason South Sudan 
wished to acquire Abyei was not for the purpose of settling a territorial demarcation dispute, but 
rather to monopolise the oil of the region. As the landlocked South Sudan is still reliant on Port 
Sudan’s oil export facility in the North, the issue of Abyei plunged both states into a political 
standoff in October 2012, as the GOSS brought oil production to a grinding halt when the 
Sudanese government encroached militarily on Abyei (Sudan Tribune, 2012(a)). This exhibits 
the culmination of the theoretical triangle to the case of Sudan and South Sudan post-secession 
relations. The dominant argument relies on the GOSS believing the Abyei region, based on the 
history of human settlement, to be conclusively part of South Sudan. The ethnic Ngok Dinka 
majority proves this statement to be true. However, due to the revenue producing potential of 
the region, Sudan is equally unwilling to concede the territory. In this way, the politicisation of 
identity does serve an economic purpose, but legitimacy of these claims is implicit in the 
territorial placement of the groups in question. 
As conditioned by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005: 65), it was tacitly accepted in 
the Abyei Protocol by both the National Government (NG) and the GOSS that the region would 
need special attention and a possible compromise should be found post-interim. The CPA 
(2005: 65-66) stated that at the end of the interim period, 
Simultaneously with the referendum [for independence] for Southern Sudan, the 
residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate 
ballot will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the 
results of the southern referendum: a) That Abyei retains its special administrative status 
in the North; [or] b) That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal [and hence South Sudan]. 
Well into the post-secession era, this is the agreement that South Sudan maintains has binding 
legal implications that Al Bashir’s regime should be obliged to accept. In response Al Bashir 
tried tactically to have the nomadic Arab Misseriya abstain from the proposition of an Abyei 
referendum. The Misseriya heeded this call by protesting against the Abyei referendum in the 
streets of Khartoum on the 28th of November 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012(b)). However, this 
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attempt at garnering publicity was ultimately in vain as the African Union (AU) was called in by 
South Sudan to diffuse growing tensions within the region on the 30th of November 2012. The 
AU tried to bring Al Bashir to the negotiating table to accept a referendum that excluded the 
boycotting Misseriya, but he outright refused this deal (Sudan Tribune, 2012(b)). Amidst 
growing frustration at a lack of resolve, the Ngok Dinka chose to hold an unofficial referendum 
on October 30th 2013 where they voted unanimously (disregarding the Misseriya) to become 
part of South Sudan (Al Jazeera, 2013). This event will certainly hurt the recent improving 
relations between the two states. At a cursory glance, it seems unlikely that a legitimate 
resolution will be found to the deadlock initiated by Al Bashir’s regime anytime soon. Both sides 
have ostensibly chosen to dig their heels in, whilst no regional or international mechanism has 
been able to offer any meaningful mediation either. 
Within South Sudan, the mood has been optimistic even though political progress and socio-
economic growth has been slow thus far. Unlike the persisting interstate conflicts with Sudan, 
there exists the opinion that governance issues within South Sudan can be resolved more rapidly 
with the implementation of strong nation-building institutions, socio-economic policy and the 
manufacture of new regional economic alliances.  
It should not be discounted that South Sudan entered into the international political climate 
tremendously underdeveloped in 2011. This is due in no small part to the purposefully lopsided 
socio-economic development that had favoured the Northerners in the previously unified Sudan 
since independence in 1956 (Ayom, 2012; Jok, 2011). The legacy of this restricted growth has left 
South Sudan with hardly any existing infrastructure or the capacity for suitable service delivery. 
Jok (2011: 2) emphasises that some of the challenges facing the Government of South Sudan 
include, “inherently poor infrastructure, a volatile political climate, limited capacity for 
governance, weak state institutions, a financial crisis, violent ethnic divisions, and an uncertain 
political atmosphere”. It is in recognising these issues that one can suggest gaining 
independence from Sudan could be seen as the simplest task achieved thus far; and that the real 
battle is in creating a viable state out of very poor existing foundations. Additionally, the above 
also exhibits the consequences of the second point of the constructed triangle. The severity of 
exclusion is integrally contained in the tangible infrastructural underdevelopment and lack of 
provision of services, which has ultimately left South Sudan a dishevelled struggling 
independent state. The policy framework of over fifty years of exclusion has left the GOSS with 
an unenviable task of complete socio-economic regeneration. 
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Difficulties have been wide-ranging. As noted in the previous section, continuous conflict with 
Sudan has severely affected the South Sudanese government’s capacity to provide tangible 
public services to the broader public. Sanders (2012: 1) notes that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has recently found that 98% of the South Sudan’s governmental budget comes from 
the sale of oil. If the GOSS is unable to find a meaningful resolution to its oil dispute with Sudan 
then South Sudan may eventually decline into a collapsed state over the next few years. The 
GOSS has not been able to assist in diversifying away from the volatile and unstable sole reliance 
on oil in recent years. Ayom (2012) stated that the GOSS would be looking to use oil revenues in 
the near future to help diversify the economy through revitalisation of the agricultural sector. 
Diversification is important especially considering that fossil fuels are a non-renewable resource 
and statistics have recently shown that the region’s oil reserves may be halved by 2020 (Sander 
2012, 2). Agricultural development from traditional subsistence to commercial production will 
also aid South Sudan’s most pressing current socio-economic problem of food security.  
Unfortunately, even though South Sudan has now officially seceded from Northern domination 
and repression, ethnic conflict remains an intrastate challenge for the GOSS. Recent reports 
suggest that some minority groups within South Sudan have already started to feel excluded 
from vital political processes. Weak institutions and multicultural state-building policies have 
failed so far in this regard to supress the formation of new identity politicisation. Worryingly, 
this propagates the assumption that triangle of identity politicisation may be regenerative if a 
new route in policy-making and implementation is not taken. 
South Sudan remains an ethnically diverse state and there are growing concerns of a Dinka 
ethnic stranglehold within the national executive (Jok, 2011: 5-6). Furthermore, contemporary 
issues linger over national language policy. There has been heated unresolved debate 
surrounding which indigenous languages should become national languages; and whether 
English should remain the language of government, business and education (Jok, 2011: 5). 
Considering the research dealt with in at the end of chapter four, it would be applicable to revise 
the work of Stepan et al. (2011) and Kymlicka (2009) when making recommendations on how to 
effectively placate tensions resultant of these disputes. South Sudan should follow a 
constitutional and policy orientation that is as inclusive of all groups as possible. Kymlicka 
(2009: 66) also asserts that because minority groups tend to feel more threatened due to their 
weakened cultural economic standing in society, special concessions may need to be made to 
accommodate them more comfortably. Without consociational policies set in place to include 
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minority group rights, the theoretical triangle model utilised thus far may become applicable to 
South Sudan in the near future. 
As the field-defining Zartman (1964) text illustrated in chapter four, for the secession of South 
Sudan to be promoted as a defensible realisation, the rules for a successful political endgame 
have not changed much since the 1960’s. For Salva Kiir’s government the challenge remains 
relatively simple, yet difficult to achieve within the current framework of underdevelopment and 
a persistently volatile political climate. South Sudan must seek to build a representative model 
which is inclusive of greater civil society, attentive to the needs of the people and is able to teach 
that populations to articulate its desires through sufficient democratic education (Zartman, 
1964: 15-16).  In this way, the GOSS will be able to foster a concrete foundation of trust with civil 
society that may assist in nation-building. 
Stepan et al. (2011: 9) contend that without a certain loyalty toward the state, factional political 
identities will eventually crop up. The challenge then for South Sudan is to create a civic 
nationalism that incorporates all citizens under the “we-feeling” umbrella. At the point where 
separate groups within a new democracy are unable to associate in a positive manner with the 
overarching state, then it will be impossible to craft a state-nation (Stepan et al, 2011: 10). If the 
ethnic microcosm holds a much stronger association for the people of South Sudan than the 
state, then there exists the medium for the resurgence of elite manipulation of the societies in 
question. 
Veritably, one could easily agree with the statements made by Jok (2011: 12) that nation-
building is just as important as the more tangible criteria of state-building. Oftentimes nation-
building is ignored by newly independent states, which leaves citizens with the inability to 
identify with it. If citizens are unable to identify with the state then unfortunate offshoot is that 
they may become apathetic towards its progression and existence. The construction of national 
pride is an emotionally charged endeavour but is nonetheless important in the consolidation of a 
combined identity. In light of consolidating a civic identity for South Sudan, Jok (2011: 13-14) 
suggests a few nation-building tools such as: Firstly, the commemoration of the revolution and 
connecting society to the strife of the Southerners since 1956 by memorialising the SPLM/A as a 
liberation movement and erecting war museums and statues of political heroes. To this accord, 
the GOSS has already built a mausoleum in Juba dedicated to the late struggle hero, John 
Garang, for people to visit and pay tribute. Secondly, it will also be of great importance to the 
consolidation of the nation to build a national heritage museum. This structure should house the 
remnants of the struggle and be used to celebrate ethnic and cultural diversity within the 
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country. Finally, the education of national unity that is also careful to be inclusive of all cultures 
should become part and parcel of everyday life. National historical education should be of 
fundamental importance and taught from primary school onwards to promote the sentiment of 
national unity. 
Jok’s (2011) nation-building propositions offer many of the answers to the questions of how to 
foster liberal multiculturalism as forwarded by Kymlicka (2009); and the Stepan et al.’s  (2011) 
ideal of crafting an inclusive state-nation. These two objectives are of paramount importance to 
maintenance of a stable socio-political environment in South Sudan. At intrastate level, if 
policies such as these are implemented and given prioritised constitutional respect, then South 
Sudan may be able to continue forward on the path to progression and sustainable democratic 
governance. 
Nationalism is a naturally subconscious undertaking. It can be very easily taken for granted in 
areas where national unity is not a conscious choice amongst people. However, in environments 
where factional political identity has dominated for many decades, strong institutions of civic 
nationalism need to be seeded early in newly independent states such as South Sudan. As 
examples have shown in this study, the state needs to take a central but not restricting and 
exclusionary role in state and nation-building processes. The African states analysed in the 
duration of this study, including both Sudan and South Sudan need to be cautious and tactful in 
their respective administrative approaches as the 21st century advances. In this way, a new 
respect must be found for inclusive policies, multicultural integration, constitutionalism and the 
value of democratic institutions. Evident of the discussions and rhetoric challenged in this 
chapter, it is undeniable that secession in the case of South Sudan will provide a much more 
stable socio-political atmosphere for Southerners. However, the secession cannot be deemed an 
overall resounding success unless underlying regional tensions are placated by the 
strengthening of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, for South Sudan to continue on the path of 
sustainable democratic development, it must continue to adhere to the same principles of 
constitutional and multicultural inclusivity that its initial protest movement was built on. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Paying respect to the historical trajectory of the Sudan as a colony and a post-colonial state has 
been vital to comprehending the extenuating circumstances shaping the politics of the region. 
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On the basis of the information, one might even seem compelled to ask why the South had not 
sought independence from the North sooner than 2011. Arbitrary boundaries observed, the 
depiction of a sovereign state that was devoid of an inclusive sense of nationalism, it appeared 
inevitable that groups would seek to dominate each other in the vastness of Sudan. This seemed 
a natural progression too, as domination had been the way of colonialism ever since the modern 
concept of the state was imposed on Africa. To make the administrative function of indirect rule 
easier on the British, a dichotomisation of the North and South territories seemed the best 
solution. However, as the literature explains, this decision laid the foundations for disunity in a 
post-colonial Sudan than would never be rectified. 
When Sudan gained independence, the restrictive authoritarian system implemented by the 
British was simply inherited by the Muslim Northerners. Sudan, for much of its independence, 
would endure successive oppressive regimes built on exclusive patrimonial institutions. The 
states either served secular state capitalist growth (for the best part of the Nimeiry regime), or 
restrictive enactments of Islamic directed state policy (seen in the regimes of Abboud and Al 
Bashir). These two ideological methodologies both shared an unwillingness to indulge any form 
of plural or democratic consociation. This invariably fostered political unrest and revolt from the 
Southerners who felt deeply undermined and excluded by the post-colonial state apparatus. 
Arguments contend that identity politicisation by groups in the South became more concerted 
after the introduction of oil into the equation in 1978. This follows the pattern of triangulation 
developed that suggests claims to greater rights recognition become more fervent when tangible 
economic benefits are at stake. However, after digesting the entire political history of the Sudan, 
this becomes a very cynical statement to entertain. Even at the inception of the SPLM/A, Dr. 
Garang was more partial to power-sharing and multicultural concessions than secession. 
However, the continued push for “unity-in-conformity” by the NCP would never be achieved in a 
land as diverse as Sudan. Continuing to believe in an ideology of this nature can only be 
considered naïve after 55 years of independence. Secession in the case of South Sudan can viably 
be seen as the last resort under the untenable circumstances created by Al Bashir’s regime. 
Furthermore, oppression was part and parcel of both the Abboud and Nimeiry regimes long 
before the advent of the oil dilemma. This inevitably pervades the thought-process that 
continued illiberal state practice had as much to do with perpetuating conflict between rebel 
groups and successive Khartoum-led governments as the advent of resources had.  
Since independence, a number of challenges remain with regards to South Sudan’s diplomatic 
interaction with Sudan. It appears that tensions will not die down anytime soon over important 
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economic and territorial demarcations, as both states have differing opinions on what 
constitutes legitimate ownership of the disputed areas. 
In terms of intrastate challenges South Sudan has much work to do, but there is the general 
sentiment that these tasks are not impractical bridges to cross. South Sudan will have to find 
strong policy and new fiscal direction in terms of political economic orientation. In governance, 
institutions and the interim constitution need to be revised in the lead up to the 2015 elections. 
With regards to the delivery of public services, the GOSS must keep economic relations intact 
with Sudan in the meantime as oil revenue forms the core of the budgetary resources. Without 
oil flowing for export out of Port Sudan, the country may literally come to a grinding halt. 
Nation-building is also equally important to the survival of the still infant South Sudan. Through 
policies of multiculturalism and institutions of inclusive citizenship, it is of pivotal importance 
to the state’s survival to become a thriving socially unified territory. In this regard, civic 
nationalism needs to be promoted at all levels of the production of history, art and culture to 
maintain the current euphoric feeling attached to independence for future generations. The 
general consensus one could imply is that the secession has been a resounding success for 
solving many identity related disputes in the region. However, there are still obstinate issues 
which may cause socio-political degradation of Africa’s newest state. If the GOSS does not 
implement policies dissimilar from the restrictive measures used by multiple Sudanese regimes 
in the past, resurgence in politicised identity may become a reality in the not too distant future. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
The Foundations of Modern African Political Development 
The journey undertaken by this study began with a discussion that irrefutably agreed that the 
concept of ethnic and ethno-religious identity in Africa was heavily stained by the colonial 
interception of the continent. Definitive evidence was provided to suggest that in both direct and 
indirect rule, considerable techniques of manipulation were used to categorised and pit different 
groups against each other. This indisputably laid the foundations for the first level of the 
proposed theoretical triangle, which purports that the route of politicised identity is found in the 
colonial categorisation of groups. This ultimately set the tone for groups to contest access to 
rights and resources once independence from colonialism was achieved. 
The most important inference of this chapter is contained in the comprehension that identity in 
Africa had been nurtured and consolidated by methods of social construction under the 
guidance of colonialism. This same categorisation would be later used by African elites to 
perpetuate the catchphrase of political identity in the era of independence. 
The Philosophical and Ideological Foundations of Post-Colonial Development 
Chapter three sought to display how the philosophical and ideological concepts of Pan-
Africanism, African Socialism and Pan-Arabism (Islamicisation) had attempted to build bonds 
for which the concept of unity within the African nation-state could be achieved. Unfortunately, 
for the promulgators of these ideologies, the intrinsic and settled nature of group identity had 
become too powerful to simply steamroll with nationalist patriotic projects. Citizens especially 
lost faith in these national policies when the state disregarded politicised group’s attempts at 
seeking greater access to rights and resources.  
This was evident in many of the cases, including that of the Sudan. In the face of failed idealism, 
stubborn leaders tightened their respective authoritarian grips on power, which would prove to 
be catastrophically damaging for political and socio-economic progress in Africa. An analysis of 
these failed national development projects strengthens the argument that the remnants of 
ethnic categorisation could not be easily glossed over by new foreign concepts of nation-
building. In pseudo-socialist and religious fundamentalist models, the cementing of African 
socialism and Pan-Arabism respectively served little consolation to African civil society. They 
had become victims to the aberrant wastefulness of elites and swollen bureaucracies that utilised 
ethnic categorisation to play groups off against each other in newly independent states. The 
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result of this endeavour provides for the second point of the theoretical triangle, whereby a lack 
of constitutionalism and exclusion of groups from the political process heightened the penchant 
for the mobilisation of identity against the state. 
Identity, Factionalism and Tangible Economic Claims to Self-determination 
Chapter four continued to look at the damaging facets of non-consociational authoritarian rule 
in Africa and in the case of Sudan. It was noted that because authoritarianism fosters an 
environment of very limited interaction and access to government, it subsumes an inevitability 
that groups will seek illegitimate ways to engage with the state. Ethnic and Ethno-religious 
factionalism (Sudan) became the best vehicle to protest greater access to rights and resources. 
The lack of viable democratic institutionalism appeared to decrease exponentially the legitimate 
avenues for excluded portions of society to engage government. In this regard, examples from 
around post-colonial Africa tended to conform to climaxes of violent conflict and socio-political 
upheaval. 
In terms of tangible economic resources, it was further established that identity politicisation 
may become even more fervent when the potential economic benefits of such an undertaking 
may be fruitful. This provided enough evidence to prove that a distinct theoretical triangle exists 
in the exploits of ethnically factional politics. The fact that the typical African state is renowned 
as an economic monopoly sustaining authority over greater civil society makes it an inevitable 
target for excluded groups to seek economic reward from extra-legal interaction with central 
government. 
In chapter four the study also looked to provide some reasonable policy measures to potentially 
assist in the creation of more stable governance in Africa. It was decided that African 
democracies could only be improved in the twenty-first century by applying more liberally 
refined policy to governance on the continent. Liberal policy measures provide better guidelines 
for the management of diversity through acceptance and tolerance. This has possibly been one 
of the ideology’s greatest accomplishments to date. Under a liberally refined socio-political 
atmosphere in Africa, more inclusive democratic institutions, consociational constitutionalism, 
and multicultural policies may be achieved. These techniques, if applied to the many of the 
examples exhibited in this thesis, may be able to assist in creating more inclusive models of 
governance on the continent. 
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Colonial and Post-Colonial Sudan, Ethno-religious Conflict and The Secession of South 
Sudan 
In the final chapter the case study of the political history of the Sudan was brought under the 
analytical microscope. From this task it was established that Sudan, similar to other examples 
studied in this body of work, had also suffered the disjointed consequences of the effects of 
British indirect colonial rule. However, in the Sudan a particularly blatant religious ideology had 
determined its post-independence progression. After General Abboud, the respective 
authoritarian impositions of Nimeiry and Al Bashir, tried to apply Islamic fundamentalism as a 
conditional and compulsory format for the directive of state policy. A process of Arab absorption 
of animist and Christian groups in the south of the state became part and parcel of Sudanese 
governance. 
Southern Sudanese that refused this process of integration were either systematically 
discounted or drawn into conflict with the Khartoum government in the north. These factors 
largely promoted the politicisation of identity, which prompted Dr. John Garang to found the 
Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement. 
The advent of the discovery of oil in the south of Sudan in 1978 did little to quell the tensions 
between ethno-religious factionalism and the central government, as now the contestation for a 
vital resource increased the call for greater Southern autonomy and access to state resources. 
However, to suggest that oil was the primary cause for the conflict would be unfair and over-
cynical as ethno-religious conflict had been commonplace since independence roughly 20 years 
before. Hence, looking at the brutal effects of Arabisation in the Sudan, it would also be 
considered harsh and contemptuous to apply the theoretical triangle infallibly to the case study. 
In light of underdevelopment and subjugation suffered by Southerners at the hands of, but not 
exclusively the Al Bashir regime, one is inclined to conclude that the politicisation and rebellious 
mobilisation of identity was a legitimate endeavour. This became especially apparent when 
noting that the aftermath of the secession left South Sudan with infrastructural 
underdevelopment that will continue to hurt socio-economic progress within the state for 
decades to come. The remnants of secession could in no way disguise the lopsided development 
that had occurred since the British had left the Sudan under Northern administration in 1956. 
Continued conflict and protest against subjugation by the Khartoum central government would 
finally lead to a successful secession referendum for South Sudan in 2011. The period directly 
before secession was characterised by political manipulation including a clamp down on free 
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media, freedom of speech, and electoral corruption in the 2010 Sudanese election results. These 
criteria further proved that the perpetuation of totalitarian techniques in ethnic or ethno-
religious diverse states only succeeds to further imbue disunity and conflict. 
Additionally the study sought to provide some reasonable policy measures to potentially assist 
in the creation of more stable governance in Africa. It was found that African democracies could 
only be improved in the twenty-first century by applying more liberally refined policy to 
governance on the continent. Liberal policy measures tend to provide better guidelines for the 
management of diversity through acceptance and tolerance. This has possibly been one of the 
ideology’s greatest accomplishments to date. Under a liberally refined socio-political 
atmosphere in Africa, more inclusive democratic institutions, truly consociational 
constitutionalism, and multicultural policies may be achieved. These techniques stand as the 
modern benchmarks in other successful tolerant political societies. The study operates from the 
assumption then that by crafting a greater “we-feeling” amongst groups within African states, 
more sustainable democracies may be achieved. The fostering of tolerant inclusive policy, 
electoralism and representative methods can be considered the best solution for states that 
continue to struggle with subverting identity mobilisation against the state. Later in the chapter 
these same rules were applied to great analytical effect when discussing the nation-building 
opportunities for a newly independent South Sudan. 
Chapter five also looked at some of the persisting issues and potential policy remedies for the 
recently seceded state of South Sudan. It was proposed that Africa’s youngest state has a fair 
length to travel to be considered a consolidated success. Interstate conflict especially with its 
most volatile neighbour, Sudan, needs to be efficiently dealt with in the shortest possible 
timeframe. The implications of continued hostility between these two nations could have drastic 
socio-economic complications for each state if cooperative diplomacy is not obtained soon. 
At an intrastate level, South Sudan would do well to heed liberal policy-making to rescind some 
of the issues that have cropped up in the State’s governmental teething stage. To this accord, 
South Sudan needs strong fiscal direction and build regional and international partnerships as 
efficiently as possible. In terms of governance, South Sudan will need to use multicultural 
nation-building techniques, create fair institutions and an inclusively consulted constitution to 
ensure stable democracy is achieved. All indicators point to the ability of South Sudan to 
succeed as an autonomous state, as long as it does not fall into the restrictive authoritarian trap 
of the predeceasing unified Sudan, or use the exclusive dictatorial methods that have befallen 
many other African states since independence was achieved. At this time, it would be difficult to 
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state conclusively whether South Sudan will be one of Africa’s big success stories of the twenty-
first century. However, as a consequence of some of the persistent interstate issues with 
neighbours Sudan; and growing intrastate tensions between different ethnic groups in a now 
seceded South Sudan, one would be hard pressed to deem the secession a resounding success. 
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